The Works Of James Arminius Vol. 2.
The Private Disputations Of James
Arminius, D.D. On The Principal Articles Of
The Christian Religion. Commenced By
The Author Chiefly For The Purpose Of
Forming A System Of Divinity
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* On Theology
* How To Teach Theology
* On Blessedness, The End Of
Theology
* On Religion
* Rule Of Religion: The Word Of God
* Authority & Certainty Of The
Holy Scriptures
* The Perfection Of The Scriptures
* The Perspicuity Of The Scriptures
* The Interpretation Of The Holy
Scriptures
* The Efficacy Of The Scriptures
* On Religion In A Stricter Sense
* The Christian Religion, Its Name
And Relation
* The Christian Religion In General
* The Object Of Christianity: God
* The Nature Of God
* The Life Of God
* On The Understanding Of God
* The Will Of God
* Various Distinctions Of The Will
Of God
* God's Attributes: From The
Viewpoint Of His Will
* God's Attributes: Relating To
Moral Virtues
* On The Power Or Capability Of God
* The Perfection, Blessedness &
Glory Of God
* Creation
* Angels In General And In
Particular
* The Creation Of Man After The
Image Of God
* The Lordship Or Dominion Of God
* The
* The First Covenant Between God
& Man
* Manner Of Our 1st Parents In The
1st Covenant
* On The Effects Of The Sin Of Our
First Parents
* On The Necessity Of The Christian
Religion
* On The Restoration Of Man
* On The Person Of Our Lord Jesus
Christ
* On The Priestly Office Of
Christ
* On The Prophetical Office Of
Christ
* On The Regal Office Of
Christ
* Christ's Humiliation &
Exaltation
* God The Father & Christ's Will, &
Command
* The Predestination Of
Believers
* The Predestination Of The Means To
The End
* Relation Of Sinful Men To Christ,
& The Means Of Salvation
* True Repentance Towards God
* On Faith In God And Christ
* On The
* The Communion Of Believers With
Christ Regarding His Death
* The Communion Of Believers With
Christ Regarding His Life
* Justification
* The Sanctification Of Man
* The Church Of God And Of Christ
* The Church Of The Old
Testament
* The Church Of The New
Testament
* The Head And The Marks Of The
Church
* The Catholic Church, Her Parts And
Relations
* The Power Of The Church In
Delivering Doctrines
* The Power Of The Church In Enacting Laws
* The Power Of The Church In
Administering Justice
* On Councils
* The Ecclesiastical Ministrations
Of The New Testament
* On Sacraments In General
* The Sacraments Of The Old Testament
* The Sacraments Of The New
Testament In General
* On Baptism And Paedo-Baptism
* On The Lord's Supper
* On The Popish Mass
* On The Five False Sacraments
* On The Worship Of God In
General
* On The Precepts Of Divine Worship
In General
* On Obedience, Object Of All Divine
Precepts
* Obedience To God's Commands In
General
* The Material Object Of The
Precepts Of The Law
* Love, Fear, Trust, And Honor
Towards God
* On Particular Acts Of
Obedience
* On The First Command In The
Decalogue
* On The Second Command In The
Decalogue
* On The Third Precept Of The
Decalogue
* On The Fourth Command In The
Decalogue
* On The Fifth Command In The
Decalogue
* On The Sixth Precept
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DISPUTATION I ON THEOLOGY
As we are about again to commence our
course of theological disputations
under the auspices of our gracious
God, we will previously treat a little on
theology itself. II. By the word
"theology" we do not understand a
conception or a discourse of God
himself, of which meaning it would properly
admit; but we understand by it,
"a conception" or "a discourse about God and
things divine," according to its
common use. III. It may be defined, the
doctrine or science of the truth which
is according to godliness, and which
God has revealed to man that he may
know God and divine things, may believe
on him and may through faith perform
to him the acts of love, fear, honour,
worship and obedience, and obtain
blessedness from him through union with
him, to the divine glory. IV. The
proximate and immediate object of this
doctrine or science is, not God
himself, but the duty and act of man which
he is bound to perform to God. In
theology, therefore, God himself must be
considered as the object of this duty.
V. On this account, theology is not a
theoretical science or doctrine, but a
practical one, requiring the action
of the whole man, according to all and
each of its parts -- an action of the
most transcendent description,
answerable to the excellence of the object as
far as the human capacity will permit.
VI. From these premises, it follows
that this doctrine is not expressed
after the example of natural science, by
which God knows himself, but after the
example of that notion which God has
willingly conceived within himself
from all eternity, about the prescribing
of that duty and of all things
required for it.
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DISPUTATION II ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THEOLOGY MUST BE TAUGHT
It has long been a maxim with those
philosophers who are the masters of
method and order, that the theoretical
sciences ought to be delivered in a
synthetical order, but the practical
in an analytical order, on which
account, and because theology is a
practical science, it follows that it
must be treated according to the
analytical method. II. Our discussion of
this doctrine must therefore commence
with its end, about which we must
previously treat, with much brevity,
both on its nature or what it is, and
its qualities; we must then teach,
throughout the entire discourse, the
means for attaining the end, to which
the obtaining of the end must be
subjoined, and, at this, the whole
discussion must terminate. III. For,
according to this order, not only the
whole doctrine itself, but likewise
all its parts, will be treated from
its principal end, and each article will
obtain that place which belongs to it
according to the principal relation
which it has to its total and to the
end of the whole. IV. But though we are
easily satisfied with all treatises in
which the body of divinity is
explained, provided they agree
according to the truth, at least in the chief
and fundamental things, with the
Scripture itself; and though we willingly
give to all of them praise and
commendation; yet, if on account only of
inquiry into the order, and for the
sake of treating the subject with
greater accuracy, we may be allowed to
explain what are our views and
wishes. V. In the first place, the
order in which the theology ascribed to
God, and to the actions of God, is
treated, seems to be inconvenient.
Neither are we pleased with the
division of theology into the pathological,
and the therapeutic after a preface of
the doctrine about the principles,
the end and the efficient; nor with
that, how accommodating soever it may
be, in appearance, in which, after
premising as its principles the word of
God, and God himself, as the causes of
our salvation, and therefore the
works and effects of God, and man who is
its subject is placed as a part of
it. So neither do we receive
satisfaction from the partition of theological
science into the knowledge of God and
of man; nor from that by which
theology is said to exercise itself
about God and the church; nor that by
which it is previously determined that
we must treat about God, the motion
of a rational creature to him, and
about Christ; nor does that which
prescribes us to a discourse about
God, the creatures, and principally about
man and his fall, about his reparation
through Christ, and about the
sacraments and a future life.
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DISPUTATION III ON BLESSEDNESS, THE END OF THEOLOGY
The end of theology is the blessedness
of man; and that, not animal or
natural, but spiritual and
supernatural. II. It consists in fruition, the
object of which is a perfect, chief,
and sufficient good, which is God. III.
The foundation of this fruition is
life, endowed with understanding and with
intellectual feeling. IV. The
connective or coherent cause of fruition is
union with God, by which that life is
so greatly perfected, that they who
obtain this union are said to be
"partakers of the divine nature and of life
eternal." V. The medium of
fruition is understanding and emotion or feeling
-- understanding, not by species or
image, but by clear vision, which is
called that of face to face; and
feeling, corresponding with this vision.
VI. The cause of blessedness is God
himself, uniting himself with man; that
is, giving himself to be seen, loved,
possessed, and thus to be enjoyed by
man. VII. The antecedent or only
moving cause is the goodness and the
remunerative justice of God, which
have the wisdom of God as their
precursor. VIII. The executive cause
is the power of God, by which the soul
is enlarged after the capacity of God,
and the animal body is transformed
and transfigured into a spiritual
body. IX. The end, event, or consequence
is two-fold, (1.) a demonstration of
the glorious wisdom, goodness, justice,
power, and likewise the universal
perfection of God; and (2.) his
glorification by the beatified. X. Its
adjunct properties are, that it is
eternal, and is known to be so by him who
possesses it; and that it at once
both satisfies every desire, and is an
object of continued desire.
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DISPUTATION IV ON RELIGION
Omitting all dispute about the
question, "whether it be possible for God to
render man happy by a union with
himself without the intervening act of
man," we affirm that it has
pleased God not to bless man except by some duty
performed according to the will of
God, which God has determined to reward
with eternal blessedness. II. And this
most equitable will of God rests on
the foundation of the justice and
equity according to which it seems lawful
and proper, that the Creator should
require from his creature, endowed with
reason, an act tending to God, by
which, in return, a rational creature is
bound to tend towards God, its author
and beneficent lord and master. III.
This act must be one of the entire
man, according to each of his parts --
according to his soul, and that entirely,
and each of his faculties, and
according to his body, so far as it is
the mute instrument of the soul, yet
itself possessing a capacity for
happiness by means of the soul. This act
must likewise be the most excellent of
all those things which can proceed
from man, and like a continuous act;
so that whatever other acts those may
he which are performed by man through
some intervention of the will, they
ought to be performed according to
this act and its rule. IV. Though this
duty, according to its entire essence
and all its parts, can scarcely be
designated by one name, yet we do not
improperly denominate it when we give
it the name of Religion This word, in
its most enlarged acceptation,
embraces three things -- the act
itself, the obligation of the act, and the
obligation with regard to God, on
account of whom that act must be
performed. Thus, we are bound to
honour our parents on account of God. V.
Religion, then, is that act which our
theology places in order; and it is
for this reason justly called
"the object of theological doctrine." VI. Its
method is defined by the command of
God, and not by human choice; for the
word of God is its rule and measure.
And as in these days we have this word
in the Scriptures of the Old and New
Testament alone, we say that these
Scriptures are the canon according to
which religion is to be conformed. We
shall soon treat more fully about the
Scriptures how far it is required that
we should consider them as the canon
of religion. VII. The opposites to
religion are, impiety, that is, the
neglect and contempt of God, and
eqeloqrhskeia will-worship, or
superstition, that is, a mode of religion
invented by man. Hypocrisy is not
opposed to the whole of religion, but to
its integrity or purity; because that
in which the entire man ought to be
engaged, is performed only by his
body.
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DISPUTATION V ON THE RULE OF RELIGION, THE WORD OF GOD, AND THE SCRIPTURES
IN
PARTICULAR
As religion is the duty of man towards
God, it is necessary that it should
be so prescribed by God in his sure
word as to render it evident to man that
he is bound by this prescript as it
proceeds from God; or, at least, it may
and ought to be evident to man. II.
This word is either endiaqeton, [an
inward or mental reasoning,] or
wroforikon, [a spoken or delivered
discourse] the former of them being
engrafted in the mind of man by an
internal inscription, whether it be an
increation or a superinfusion; the
latter being openly pronounced. III.
By the engrafted word, God has
prescribed religion to man, first by
inwardly persuading him that God ought,
and that it was his will, to be
worshipped by man; then, by universally
disclosing to the mind of man the
worship that is pleasing to himself, and
that consists of the love of God and
of one's neighbour; and, lastly, by
writing or sealing a remuneration on
his heart. This inward manifestation is
the foundation of all external
revelation. IV. God has employed the outward
word, First, that he might repeat what
had been engrafted -- might recall it
to remembrance, and might urge its
exercise. Secondly, that he might
prescribe to him other things besides,
which seem to be placed in a
four-fold difference. (1.) For they
are either such things as are
homogeneous to the law of nature,
which might easily be raised up on the
things engrafted, or which man could
not with equal ease deduce from them.
(2.) Or they may appear to be such
things as these, yet such as it has
pleased God to circumscribe, lest,
from the things engrafted, conclusions
should be drawn that were universally,
or at least for that time, repugnant
to the will of God. (3.) Or they are
merely positive, having no communion
with these engrafted things, although
they rest on the general duty of
religion. (4.) Or, lastly, according,
to some state of man, they are
suitable to him, particularly for that
into which man was brought by the
fall from his primeval condition. V.
God communicates this external word to
man, either orally, or by writing.
For, neither with respect to the whole of
religion, nor with respect to its
parts, is God confined to either of these
modes of communication; but he
sometimes uses one and sometimes another, and
at other times both of them, according
to his own choice and pleasure. He
first employed oral enunciation in its
delivery, and afterwards, writing, as
a more certain means against
corruption and oblivion. He has also completed
it in writing; so that we now have the
infallible word of God in no other
place than in the Scriptures, which
are therefore appropriately denominated
"the instrument of
religion." VI. These Scriptures are contained in those
books of the Old and the New Testament
which are called "canonical:" They
consist of the five books of Moses;
the books of Joshua, Judges, and of
Ruth; the First and Second of Samuel;
the First and Second of Kings; the
First and Second of Chronicles; the
books of Ezra and of Nehemiah, and the
first ten chapters of that of Esther;
fifteen books of the prophets, that
is, the three Major and the twelve
Minor Prophets; the books of Job, the
Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, the
Canticles, Daniel, and of the
Lamentations of Jeremiah: All these
books are contained in the Old
Testament. Those of the New Testament
are the following: The four
Evangelists; one book of the Acts of
the Apostles; thirteen of
Epistles; the Epistle to the Hebrews;
that of St. James; the two of St.
Peter; the three of
John. Some of these are without
hesitation accounted authentic; but about
others of them doubts have been
occasionally entertained. Yet the number is
quite sufficient of those about which
no doubts were ever indulged. VII. The
primary cause of these books is God,
in his Son, through the Holy Spirit.
The instrumental causes are holy men
of God, who, not at their own will and
pleasure, but as they were actuated
and inspired by the Holy Spirit, wrote
these books, whether the words were
inspired into them, dictated to them, or
administered by them under the divine
direction. VIII. The matter or object
of the Scriptures is religion, as has
already been mentioned. The essential
and internal form is the true
intimation or signification of the will of God
respecting religion. The external is
the form or character of the word,
which is attempered to the dignity of
the speaker, and accommodated to the
nature of things and to the capacity
of men. IX. The end is the instruction
of man, to his own salvation and the
glory of God. The parts of the whole
instruction are doctrine, reproof,
institution or instruction, correction,
consolation, and threatening.
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DISPUTATION VI ON THE AUTHORITY AND CERTAINTY OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES
The authority of the word of God,
which is comprised in the Scriptures of
the Old and New Testament, lies both
in the veracity of the whole narration,
and of all the declarations, whether
they be those about things past, about
things present, or about those which
are to come, and in the power of the
commands and prohibitions, which are
contained in the divine word. II. Both
of these kinds of authority can depend
on no other than on God, who is the
principal author of this word, both
because he is truth without suspicion of
falsehood, and because he is of power
invincible. III. On this account, the
knowledge alone that this word is
divine, is obligatory on our belief and
obedience; and so strongly is it
binding, that this obligation can be
augmented by no external authority.
IV. In what manner or respect soever the
church may be contemplated, she can do
nothing to confirm this authority;
for she, also, is indebted to this
word for all her own authority; and she
is not a church unless she have
previously exercised faith in this word as
being divine, and have engaged to obey
it. Wherefore, in any way to suspend
the authority of the Scriptures on the
church, is to deny that God is of
sufficient veracity and supreme power,
and that the church herself is a
church. V. But it is proved by various
methods, that this word has a divine
origin, either by signs employed for
the enunciation or declaration of the
word, such as miracles, predictions
and divine appearances -- by arguments
engrafted on the word itself, such as
the matters which it contains, the
style and character of the discourse,
the agreements between all the parts
and each of them, and the efficacy of
the word itself; and by the inward
testification or witness of God
himself by his Holy Spirit. To all these, we
add a secondary proof -- the testimony
of those persons who have received
this word as divine. VI. The force and
efficacy of this last testimony is
entirely human, and is of importance
equal to the quantum of wisdom, probity
and constancy possessed by the
witnesses. And on this account the authority
of the church can make no other kind
of faith than that which is human, but
which may be preparatory to the
production of faith divine. The testimony of
the church, therefore, is not the only
thing by which the certainty of the
Scriptures is confirmed to us; indeed
it is not the principle thing; nay, it
is the weakest of all those which are
adduced in confirmation. VII. No
arguments can be invented for
establishing the divinity of any word, which
do not belong by most equitable reason
to this word; and, on the other hand,
it is impossible any arguments can be
devised which may conduce even by a
probable reason to destroy the
divinity of this word. VIII. Though it be not
absolutely necessary to salvation to
believe that this or that book is the
work of the author whose title it
bears; yet this fact may be established by
surer arguments than are those which
claim the authorship of any other work
for the writer. IX. The Scriptures are
canonical in the same way as they are
divine; because they contain the rule
of faith, charity, hope, and of all
our inward and outward actions. They
do not, therefore, require human
authority in order to their being
received into the canon, or considered as
canonical. Nay, the relation between
God and his creatures, requires that
his word should be the rule of life to
his creatures. X. We assert that, for
the establishment of the divinity of
the Scriptures of the Old and New
Testament, this disjunctive
proposition is of irrefutable validity: Either
the Scriptures are divine, or (far be
blasphemy from the expression!) they
are the most foolish of all writings,
whether they be said to have proceeded
from man, or from the evil spirit.
COROLLARIES I. To affirm "that the
authority of the Scriptures depends
upon the church, because the church is
more ancient than the
Scriptures," is a falsehood, a foolish speech, an
implication of manifold contradictions
and blasphemy. II. The authority of
the Roman pontiff to bear witness to
the divinity of the Scriptures, is less
than that of any bishop who is wiser
and better than he, and possessed of
greater constancy.
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DISPUTATION VII ON THE PERFECTION OF THE SCRIPTURES
We denominate that which comprehends
all things necessary for the church to
know, to believe, to do and to hope,
in order to salvation, "THE PERFECTION
OF THE SACRED SCRIPTURES." II. As
we are about to engage in the defense of
this perfection, against inspirations,
visions, dreams and other novel
enthusiastic things, we assert, that,
since the time when Christ and his
apostles sojourned on earth, no
inspiration of any thing necessary for the
salvation of any individual man, or of
the church, has been given to any
single person or to any congregation
of men whatsoever, which thing is not
in a full and most perfect manner
comprised in the sacred Scriptures. III.
We likewise affirm, that in the latter
ages no doctrine necessary to
salvation has been deduced from these
Scriptures which was not explicitly
known and believed from the very
commencement of the Christian church. For,
from the time of Christ's ascent into
heaven, the
adult state, being capable indeed of
increasing in the knowledge and belief
of things necessary to salvation, but
not capable of receiving accessions of
new articles; that is, she was capable
of increase in that faith by which
the articles of religion are believed,
but not in that faith which is the
subject of belief. IV. Whatever
additions have since been made, they obtain
only the rank of interpretations and
proofs, which ought themselves not to
be at variance with the Scriptures,
but to be deduced from them; otherwise,
no authority is due to them, but they
should rather be considered as allied
to error; for the perfection, not only
of the propositions, but likewise of
the explanations and proofs which are
comprised in the Scriptures, is very
great. V. But the most compendious way
of forming a judgment about any
enunciation or proposition, is, to
discern whether its subject and predicate
be either expressly or with equal
force contained in them, that proposition
may be rejected at least as not
necessary to salvation, without any
detriment to one's salvation. But the
predicate may be of such a kind, that,
when ascribed to this subject, it
cannot be received without detriment to
the salvation. For instance, "The
Roman pontiff is the head of the church."
"The virgin Mary is the mediatrix
of grace."
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DISPUTATION VIII ON THE PERSPICUITY OF THE SCRIPTURES I.
The perspicuity of the Scriptures is a
quality agreeing with them as with a
sign, according. to which quality they
are adapted clearly to reveal the
conceptions, whose signs are the words
comprised in the Scriptures, to those
persons to whom the Scriptures are
administered according to the benevolent
providence of God. II. That
perspicuity is a quality which agrees with the
Scriptures, is proved from its cause
and its end. (1.) In cause, we consider
the wisdom and goodness of the author,
who, according to his wisdom knew,
and according to his goodness willed,
clearly and well to enunciate or
declare the meanings of his own mind.
(2.) In the end is the duty of those
to whom the Scriptures are directed,
and who, through the decree of God,
cannot attain to salvation without
this knowledge. III. This perspicuity
comes distinctly to be considered both
with regard to its object and its
subject. For all things [in the
Scriptures] are not equally perspicuous, nor
is every thing alike perspicuous to
all persons; but in the epistle of St.
Paul, some things occur which
"are hard to be understood;" and "the gospel
is hid, or concealed, to them who are
lost, in whom the god of this world
hath blinded the minds of them who
believe not" IV. But those senses or
meanings, the knowledge and belief of
which are simply necessary to
salvation, are revealed in the
Scriptures with such plainness, that they can
be perceived even by the most simple
of mankind, provided they be able duly
to exercise their reason. V. But they
are perspicuous to those alone who,
being illuminated by the light of the
Holy Spirit, have eyes to see, and a
mind to understand and discern. For
any colour whatever, though sufficiently
illuminated by the light, is not seen
except by the eye which is endued with
the power of seeing, as with an inward
light. VI. But even in those things
which are necessary to be known and
believed in order to salvation, the law
must be distinguished from the gospel,
especially in that part which relates
to Jesus Christ crucified and raised
up again. For even the gentiles, who
are aliens from Christ, have "the
work of the law written in their hearts,"
though this is not saving, except by
the addition of the internal
illumination and inspiration of God;
but "the doctrine of the cross, which
is foolishness and a stumbling block
to the natural man," is not perceived
without the revelation of the Spirit.
VII. In the Scriptures, some things
may be found so difficult to be
understood, that men of the quickest and
most perspicacious genius may, in
attaining to an understanding of those
things, have a subject on which to
bestow their labours during the whole
course of their lives. But God has so
finely attempered the Scripture, that
they can neither be read without
profit, nor, after having been perused and
reperused innumerable times, can they
be put aside through aversion or
disgust.
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DISPUTATION IX ON THE MEANINGS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES
The legitimate and genuine sense of
the holy Scriptures is, that which the
Holy Ghost, the author of them,
intended, and which is collected from the
words themselves, whether they be
received in their proper or in their
figurative signification; that is, it
is the grammatical sense, as it is
called. II. From this sense, alone,
efficacious arguments may be sought for
the proof of doctrines. III. But, on
account of the analogical similitude of
corporeal, carnal, natural, and
earthly things, and those belonging to the
present life, to things spiritual,
heavenly, future and eternal, it happens
that a double meaning, each of them
certain and intended by the author, lies
under the very same words in the
Scriptures, of which the one is called "the
typical," the other "the
meaning prefigured in the type" or "the
allegorical." To this allegorical
meaning, we also refer the analogical, as
opposed in a similar manner to that
which is typical. IV. From these
meanings, that which is called
"the ethiological" and "the tropological" do
not differ, since the former of them
renders the cause of the grammatical
sense, and the latter contains an
accommodation of it to the circumstances
of persons, place, time, &c. V.
The interpretation of Scripture has respect
both to its words and to its sense or
meaning. VI. The interpretation of its
words is either that of single words,
or of many words combined; and both of
these methods constitute either a
translation of the words into another
language, or an explanation [or
paraphrase] through other words of the same
language. VII. Let translation be so
restricted, that, if the original word
has any ambiguity, the word into which
it is translated may retain it: or,
if that cannot be done, let it have
something equivalent by being noted in
the margin. VIII. In the explanation
[or paraphrase] which shall be made by
other words, endeavours must be used
that explanatory words be sought from
the Scriptures themselves. For this
purpose, attention to the synonymy and
phraseology will be exceedingly
useful. IX. In the interpretation of the
meanings of the words, it must be
sedulously attempted both to make the
sense agree with the rule or
"form of sound words," and to accommodate it to
the scope or intention of the author
in that passage. To this end, in
addition to a clear conception of the
words, a comparison of other passages
of Scripture, whether they be similar,
is conducive, as is likewise a
diligent search or institution into
its context. In this labour, the
occasion [of the words] and their end,
the connection of those things which
precede and which follow, and the
circumstances, also, of persons, times and
places, will be principally observed.
X. As "the Scriptures are not of
private or peculiar explanation,"
an interpreter of them will strive to
"have his senses exercised"
in them; that the interpretation of the
Scriptures, which, in those sacred
writings, comes under the denomination of
"prophecy," may proceed from
the same Spirit as that which primarily
inspired the prophecy of the
Scriptures. XI. But the authority of no one is
so great, whether it be that of an
individual or of a church, as to be able
to obtrude his own interpretation on
the people as the authentic one. From
this affirmation however, by way of
eminence, we except the prophets and the
apostles. For such interpretation is
always subjected to the judgment of him
to whom it is proposed, to this extent
-- that he is bound to receive it,
only so far as it is confirmed by
strength of arguments. XII. For this
reason, neither the agreement of the
fathers, which can, with difficulty, be
demonstrated, nor the authority of the
Roman pontiff, ought to be received
as the rule of interpretation. XIII.
We do not wish to introduce unbounded
license, by which it may be allowable
to any person, whether a public
interpreter of Scripture or a private
individual, to reject, without cause,
any interpretations whatsoever,
whether made by one prophet, or by more; but
we desire the liberty of prophesying
[or public expounding] to be preserved
entire and unimpaired in the church.
This liberty, itself, however, we
subject to the judgment of God, as
possessing the power of life and death,
and to that of the church, or of her
prelates who are endowed with the power
of binding and loosing.
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DISPUTATION X ON THE EFFICACY OF THE SCRIPTURES
When we treat on the force and
efficacy of the word of God, whether spoken
or written, we always append to it the
principal and concurrent efficacy of
the Holy Spirit. II. The object of
this efficacy is man, but he must be
considered either as the subject in
whom the efficacy operates, or as the
object about whom this efficacy
exercises itself. III. The subject of this
efficacy in whom it operates, is man
according to his understanding and his
passions, and as being endowed with a
capacity, either active or passive.
(1.) According to his understanding, by which he is able to understand
the
meanings of the word, and to apprehend
them as true and good for himself:
(2.) According to his passions, by
which he is capable of being carried by
his appetites to something true and
good which is pointed out, to embrace
it, and to repose in it. IV. This
efficacy is not only preparatory, by which
the understanding and the passions are
prepared to apprehend something else
that is yet more true and good, and
that is not comprised in the external
word; but it is likewise perfective,
by which the human understanding and
affections are so perfected, that man
cannot attain to an ulterior
perfection in the present life.
Therefore, we reject [the doctrine of] those
who affirm that the Scriptures are a
dead letter, and serve only to prepare
a man, and to render him capable of
receiving another inward word. V. This
efficacy is beautifully circumscribed
in the Scriptures by three acts, each
of which is two-fold. (1.) That of
teaching what is true, and of confuting
what is false. (2.) That of exhorting
to what is good, dissuading from what
is evil, and of reproving if any thing
has been done beyond or contrary to
one's duty. (3.) That of administering
consolation to a contrite spirit, and
of denouncing threats against a lofty
spirit. VI. The object of this
efficacy, about which it exercises
itself, is the same man, placed before
the tribunal of divine justice, that,
according to this word, he [reporter]
may bear away from it a sentence
either of justification or of condemnation.
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DISPUTATION XI ON RELIGION IN A STRICTER SENSE
We have treated on religion generally,
and on its principles as they are
comprehended in the scriptures of the
Old and New Testament. We must now
treat upon it in a stricter
signification.
of man towards God, it must
necessarily be founded in the mutual relation
which subsists between God and man. If
it happen that this relation is
varied, the mode of religion must also
be varied, the acts pertaining to the
substance of every religion always
remaining, which are knowledge, faith,
love, fear, trust, dread and
obedience. II. The first relation between God
and man is that which flows from the
creation of man in the divine image,
according to which religion was
prescribed to him by the comprehensive law
that has been impressed on the minds
of men, and that was afterwards
repeated by Moses in the ten
commandments. For the sake of proving man's
obedience, God added to this a
symbolical law, about not eating the fruit of
the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil. III. Through the sin of man,
another relation was introduced
between him and God, according to which,
man, being liable to the condemnation
of God, needs the grace of
restoration. If God bestow this grace
on man, the religion which is to be
prescribed to man must now be also
founded on that act, in addition to
creation. Since this act [on the part
of God] requires from man an
acknowledgment of sin and thanksgiving
for deliverance, it is apparent that,
in this new relation, the mode of
religion ought likewise to be varied, as,
through the appointment of God, it has
in reality been varied. IV. It was
the pleasure of God so to administer
this variation, that it should not
immediately exhibit this grace in a
complete manner, but that it should
retain man for a season under the
sealed dominion of guilt, yet with the
addition of a promise of grace to be
exhibited in his own time. Hence,
arises the difference of the religion
which was prescribed by Moses to the
children of
-- of which the former is called
"the religion of the Old Testament and of
the promise," and the
latter," that of the New Testament and of the gospel;"
the former is also called the Jewish
religion; the latter, the Christian. V.
The use of the ceremonial law under
Moses, and its abrogation under Christ,
teach most clearly that this religion
or mode of religion differs in many
acts. But as the Christian religion
prevails at this time, and as [its
obligations are] to be performed by
us, we will treat further about it, yet
so as to intersperse, in their proper
places, some mention, both of the
primitive religion and of that of the
Jews, so Jar as they are capable, and
ought to serve to explain the
Christian religion. VI. But it is not our wish
for this difference to be extended so
far as to have the attainment of
salvation, without the intervention of
Christ, ascribed to those who served
God under the pedagogy of the Old
Testament and by faith in the promise; for
the subjoined affirmation has always
obtained from the time when the first
promise was promulgated: "There
is none other name under heaven, given among
men, than that of our Lord Jesus
Christ, by which men must be saved." VII.
It appears, from this, that the
following assertion, which was used by one
of the ancients, is false and
untheological: "Men were saved at first by the
law of nature, afterwards, by that of
Moses, and at length, by that of
grace." This, also, is further
apparent, that such a confusion of the Jewish
and Christian religions as was
introduced by it, is completely opposed to
the dispensation or economy of
God.
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DISPUTATION XII ON THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, ITS NAME AND RELATION
Beginning now to treat further on the
Christian religion, we will first
declare what is the meaning of this
term, and we will afterwards consider
the matter of this religion, each in
its order. II. The Christian religion,
which the Jews called "the heresy
of the Nazarenes," obtained its name from
Jesus of Nazareth, whom God hath
appointed as our only master, and hath made
him both Christ and Lord. III. But
this name agrees with him in two ways --
from the cause and from the object.
(1.) From the cause; because Jesus
Christ, as "the Teacher sent from
God," prescribed this religion, both by
his own voice, when he dwelt on earth,
and by his apostles, whom he sent
forth into all the world. (2.) From
the object; because the same Jesus
Christ, the object of this religion,
according to godliness, is now
exhibited, and fully or perfectly
manifested; whereas, he was formerly
promised and foretold by Moses and the
prophets, only as being about to
come. IV. He was, indeed, a teacher
far transcending all other teachers --
Moses, the prophets, and even the
angels themselves -- both in the mode of
his perception, and in the excellence
of his doctrine. In the mode of his
perception; because, existing in the
bosom of the Father, admitted
intimately to behold all the secrets
of the Father, and endued with the
plenitude of the Spirit, he saw and
heard those things which he speaks and
testifies. But other teachers, being
endued, according to a certain measure
with the Spirit, have perceived either
by a vision, by dreams, by conversing
"face to face," or by the
intervention of an angel, those things which it
was their duty to declare to others; and
this Spirit itself is called "the
Spirit of Christ." V. In the
excellence of his doctrine, also, Christ was
superior to all other teachers,
because he revealed to mankind, together and
at once, the fullness of the very
Godhead, and the complete and latest will
of his Father respecting the salvation
of men; so that, either as it regards
the matter or the dearness of the
exposition, no addition can be made to it,
nor is it necessary that it should.
VI. From their belief in this religion,
and their profession of it, the
professors were called Christians. (Acts xi.
26; 1 Pet. iv. 16.) That the
excellence of this name may really belong to a
person, it is not sufficient for him
to acknowledge Christ as a teacher and
prophet divinely called. But he must
likewise religiously own and worship
him as the object of this doctrine,
though the former knowledge and faith
precede this, and though from it,
alone, certain persons are sometimes said
to have believed in Christ.
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DISPUTATION XIII ON THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, WITH REGARD TO THE MATTER
GENERALLY
Since God is the object of all
religion, in its various modifications, he
must likewise be the object of this
religion. But Christ, in reference to
God, is also an object of it, as
having been appointed by God the Father,
King and Lord of the universe, and the
Head of his church. II. For this
reason, in a treatise on the Christian
religion, the following subjects
come, in due order, under our
consideration: (1.) The object itself, towards
which faith and religious worship
ought to tend. (2.) The cause, on account
of which, faith and worship may and
ought to be performed to the object.
(3.) The very act of faith and
worship, and the method of each, according to
the command of God and Christ. (4.)
Salvation itself, which, as being
promised and desired, has the power of
an impelling cause, which, when
obtained, is the reward of the observance
of religion, and from which arises
the everlasting glory of God in
Christ. III. But man, by whom [the duties
of] this religion must be executed, is
a sinner, yet one for whom remission
of sins and reconciliation have now
been obtained. By this mark, it is
intended to be distinguished from the
religion of the Jews, which God also
prescribed to sinners; but it was at a
time when remission of sins had not
been obtained, on which account, the
mode of religion was likewise
different, particularly with regard to
ceremonies. IV. This religion, with
regard to all those things which we
have mentioned as coming under
consideration in it, is, of all
religions, the most excellent; or, rather,
it is the most excellent mode of
religion. Because, in it, the object is
proposed in a manner the most
excellent; so that there is nothing about this
object which the human mind is capable
of perceiving, that is not exhibited
in the doctrine of the Christian
religion. For God has with it disclosed all
his own goodness, and has given it to
be viewed in Christ. V. The cause, on
account of which, religion may and
ought to be performed to this object, is,
in every way, the most efficacious; so
that nothing can be imagined, why
religion may and ought to be performed
to any other deity. that is not
comprehended in the efficacy of this
cause, in a pre-eminent manner. VI. The
very act of faith and worship is
required, and must be performed, in a
manner the most signal and particular;
and the salvation which arises from
this act, is the greatest and most
glorious, both because God will afford a
fuller and more perfect sight of
himself, than if salvation had been
obtained through another form of
religion, and because those who will become
partakers of this salvation, will have
Christ eternally as their head, who
is the brother of men, and they will
always behold him. On this account, in
the attainment and possession of
salvation, we shall hereafter become, in
some measure, superior to the angels
themselves.
_________________________________________________________________
DISPUTATION XIV ON THE OBJECT OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION: AND, FIRST, ABOUT
GOD,
ITS PRIMARY OBJECT, AND WHAT GOD IS I.
The object of the Christian religion
is that towards which the faith and
worship of a religious man ought to
tend. This object is God and his Christ
-- God principally, Christ
subordinately under God -- God per se, Christ as
God has constituted him the object of
this religion. II. In God, who is the
primary object of the Christian
religion, three things come in order under
our consideration: (1.) The nature of
God, of which the excellence and
goodness is such that religion can
honourably and usefully be performed to
it. (2.) The acts of God, on account
of which religion ought to be performed
to him. (3.) The will of God, by which
he wills religion to be performed to
himself, and that he who performs it
be rewarded; and, on the contrary, that
the neglecter of it be punished. III. To every treatise on the nature
of
God, must be prefixed this primary and
chief axiom of all religion: "There
is a God." Without this, vain is
every inquiry into the nature of God; for,
if the divine nature had no existence,
religion would be a mere phantasm of
man's conception. IV. Though the
existence of God has been intimated to
every rational creature that perceives
his voice, and though this truth is
known to every one who reflects on
such an intimation; yet, "that there is a
God," may be demonstrated by
various arguments. First, by certain
theoretical axioms; and because when
the terms in which these are expressed
have been once understood, they are
known to be true, they deserve to
receive the name of "implanted
ideas." V. The first axiom is, "Nothing is or
can be from itself? For thus it would
at one and the same time, be and not
be, it would be both prior and
posterior to itself, and would be both the
cause and effect of itself. Therefore,
some one being must necessarily be
pre-existent, from whom, as from the
primary and supreme cause, all other
things derive their origin. But this
being is God. VI. The second axiom is,
"Every efficient primary cause is
better or more excellent than its effect."
From this, it follows that, as all
created minds are in the order of
effects, some one mind is supreme and
most wise, from which the rest have
their origin. But this mind is God.
VII. The third axiom is, "No finite
force can make something out of
nothing; and the first nature has been made
out of nothing." For, if it were
otherwise, it neither could nor ought to be
changed by an efficient or a former;
and thus, nothing could be made from
it. From this, it follows, either that
all things which exist have been from
eternity and are primary being, or
that there is one primary being. But this
being is God. VIII. The same truth is
proved by the practical axiom, or the
conscience, which has its seat in all
rational creatures. It excuses and
exhilarates a man in good actions;
and, in these which are evil, it accuses
and torments -- even in those things
[of both kinds] which have not come,
and which never will come, to the
knowledge of any creature. This stands as
a manifest indication that there is
some supreme judge, who will institute a
strict inquiry, and will pass
judgment. But this judge is God. IX. The
magnitude, the perfection, the
multitude, the variety, and the agreement, of
all things that exist, supply us with
the fifth argument, which loudly
proclaims that all these things
proceed from one and the same being and not
from many beings. But this being is
God. X. The sixth argument is from the
order perceptible in things, and from
the orderly disposition and direction
of all of them to an end, even of
those things which, devoid of reason,
themselves, cannot act on account of
an end, or at least, cannot intend an
end. But all order is from one being,
and direction to an end is from a wise
and good being. But this being is God.
XI. The preservation of political,
ecclesiastical and economical society
among mankind, furnishes our seventh
argument. Amidst such great perversity
and madness of Satan and of evil men,
human society could never attain to
any stability or firmness, except it
were preserved safe and unimpaired by
One who is supremely powerful. But
this is God. XII. We take our eighth
argument from the miracles which we
believe to have been done, and which
we perceive to be done, the magnitude
of which is so great as to cause them
far to exceed the entire force and
power of the created universe.
Therefore, a cause must exist which
transcends the universe and its power
or capability. But this cause is God.
XIII. The predictions of future and
contingent things, and their accurate
and strict completion, supply the
ninth argument as being things which could
proceed from no one except from God.
XIV. In the last place, is added, the
perpetual and universal agreement of
all nations, which general consent must
be accounted as equivalent to a law,
nay to a divine oracle. COROLLARY On
account of the dissensions of very
learned men, we allow this question to be
discussed, "from the motion which
is apparent in the world, and from the
fact, that whatever is moved is moved
by another, can it be concluded that
there is a God?
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DISPUTATION XV ON THE NATURE OF GOD
Concerning God, the primary object of
theology, two things must be known,
(1.) His nature, or what God is, or
rather what qualities does he possess?
(2.) Who God is, or to whom this
nature must be attributed. These must be
known, lest any thing foolish or
unbecoming be ascribed to God, or lest
another, or a strange one, be
considered as the true God. On the first of
these we will now treat in a few
disputations. II. As we are not able to
know the nature of God, in itself, we
can, in a measure, attain to some
knowledge from the analogy of the
nature which is in created things, and
principally that which is in
ourselves, who are created after the image of
God; while we always add a mode of
eminence to this analogy, according to
which mode God is understood to
exceed, infinitely, the perfections of
things created. III. As in the whole
nature of things, and in man, who is
the compendium or abridgment of it,
only two things can be considered as
essential, whether they be disparted
in their subjects, or, in a certain
order, connected with each other and
subordinate in the same subject, which
two things are Essence and Life; we
will also contemplate the nature of God
according to these two impulses of his
nature. For the four degrees, which
are proposed by several divines -- to
be, to live, to. feel, and to
understand -- are restricted to these
two causes of motion; because the word
"to live," embraces within
itself both feeling and understanding. IV. We say
the essence of God is the first
impulse of the divine nature, by which God
is purely and simply understood to be.
V. As the whole nature of things is
distributed according to their
essence, into body and spirit, we affirm that
the divine essence is spiritual, and
from this, that God is a Spirit,
because it could not possibly come to
pass that the first and chief being
should be corporeal. From this, one
cannot do otherwise than justly admire
the transcendent force and plenitude
of God, by which he is capable of
creating even things corporeal that
have nothing analogous to himself. VI.
To the essence of God no attribute can
be added, whether distinguished from
it in reality, by relation, or by a
mere conception of the mind; but only a
mode of pre-eminence can be attributed
to it, according to which it is
understood to comprise within itself
and to exceed all the perfections of
all things. This mode may be declared
in this one expression: "The divine
essence is uncaused and without
commencement." VII. Hence, it follows that
this essence is simple and infinite;
from this, that it is eternal and
immeasurable; and, lastly, that it is
unchangeable, impassable and
incorruptible, in the manner in which
it has been proved by us in our public
theses on this subject. VIII. And
since unity and goodness reciprocate with
being, and as the affections or
passions of every being are general, we also
affirm that the essence of God is one,
and that God is one according to it,
and is, therefore, good -- nay, the
chief good, from the participation of
which all things have both their
being, and their well being. IX. As this
essence is itself pure from all
composition, so it cannot enter into the
composition of any thing. We permit it
to become a subject of discussion,
whether this be designated in the
Scriptures by the name of "holiness,"
which denotes separation or a being
separated. X. These modes of
pre-eminence are not communicable to
any thing, from the very circumstance
of their being such. And when these
modes are contemplated in the life of
God, and in the faculties of his life,
they are of infinite usefulness in
theology, and are not among the
smallest foundations of true religion.
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DISPUTATION XVI ON THE LIFE OF GOD I.
Life is that which comes under our
consideration, in the second impulse of
the divine nature; and that it belongs
to God, is not only evident from its
own nature, but is likewise known, per
se, to all those who have any
conception of God. For it is much more
incredible that God is something
senseless and dead, than that there is
no God. And the life of God is easily
proved. For, as whatever is beside God
is from him, we must also attribute
life to him, because among his
creatures are many things which have life;
and we affirm that God is a living
substance, and that life belongs to him,
not only eminently but also formally,
since life is simply perfection. II.
But, as life is taken, either in the
second act, and is called "operation,"
or in the first, principal and radical
act, and thus is the very nature and
form of a living thing, we attribute
this, of itself, primarily and
adequately to God; so that he Is the
life of himself, not having it from His
union with another thing; (for that is
the part of imperfection,) but
existing the same as it does -- he
being life itself, and living by the
first act, but bestowing life by the
second act. III. The life of God,
therefore, is most simple, so that it
is not, in reality, distinguished from
his essence; and according to the
confined capacity of our conception, by
which it is distinguished from his
essence, it may, in some degree, be
described as being "an act that
flows from the essence of God," by which is
intimated that it is active in itself;
first, by a reflex act on God
himself, and then on other objects, on
account of the most abundant
copiousness, and the most perfect
activity of life in God. IV. The life of
God is the foundation and the
proximate and adequate principle not only of
ad intra et ad extra, an inward and an
outward act, but likewise of all
fruition by which God is said to be
blessed in himself. This seems to be the
cause why God wished himself,
principally in reference to life, to be
distinguished from false gods and dead
idols, and why he wished men to swear
by his name, in a form composed thus:
"The Lord liveth." V. As the essence
of God is infinite and most simple,
eternal, impassable, unchangeable and
incorruptible, we ought likewise to
consider His life with these modes of
being and life; on which account we
attribute to him per se immortality, and
a most prompt, powerful, indefatigable
and insatiable desire, strength and
delight to act and to enjoy, and in
action and enjoyment, if it be lawful,
thus to express ourselves. VI. By two
faculties, the understanding and the
will, this life is active towards God
himself; but towards other things it
is active by three faculties, power,
or capability, being added to the two
preceding. But the faculties of the
understanding and the will are
accommodated to fruition, and this chiefly
as they tend towards God himself;
secondarily, and because it thus
pleases him of his abundant goodness, as
they tend towards the creatures.
_________________________________________________________________
DISPUTATION XVII ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF GOD I.
The understanding of God is that
faculty of his life which is first in
nature and order, and by which the
living God distinctly understands all
things and every one, which, in what
manner soever, either have, will have,
have had, can have, or might
hypothetically have, a being of any kind, by
which he also distinctly understands
the order, connection, and relation of
all and each of them between each
other, and the entities of reason, those
beings which exist, or which can
exist, in the mind, imagination, and
enunciation. II. God knows all things,
neither by intelligible
representations, nor by similitude,
but by his own and sole essence; with
the exception of evil things, which he
knows indirectly by the good things
opposed to them, as privation is known
by means of our having been
accustomed to any thing. III. The mode
by which God understands, is, not by
composition and division, not by
gradual argumentation, but by simple and
infinite intuition, according to the
succession of order and not of time.
IV. The succession of order, in the
objects of the divine knowledge, is in
this manner: First. God knows himself
entirely and adequately, and this
understanding is his own essence or
being. Secondly. He knows all possible
things, in the perfection of his own
essence, and, therefore, all things
impossible. In the understanding of
possible things, this is the order: (1.)
He knows what things can exist by his
own primary and sole act. (2.) He
knows what things, from the creatures,
whether they will come into existence
or will not, can exist by his
conservation, motion, assistance, concurrence,
and permission. (3.) He knows what
things he can do about the acts of the
creatures consistently with himself or
with these acts. Thirdly. He knows
all entities, even according to the
same order as that which we have just
shown in his knowledge of things
possible. V. The understanding of God is
certain and infallible; so that he sees
certainly and infallibly, even,
things future and contingent, whether
he sees them in their causes, or in
themselves. But this infallibility
depends on the infinity of the essence of
God, and not on his unchangeable will.
VI. The act of understanding of God
is occasioned by no external cause,
not even by its object; though if there
be not afterwards an object, neither
will there be any act of God's
understanding about it. VII. How
certain soever the acts of God's
understanding may themselves be, this
does not impose any necessity on
things, but rather establishes
contingency in them. For, as he knows the
thing itself and its mode, if the mode
of the thing be contingent, he must
know it as such, and, therefore, it
remains contingent with respect to the
divine knowledge. VIII. The knowledge
of God may be distinguished according
to its objects. And, First, into the
theoretical, by which he understands
things under the relation of entity
and truth; and into the practical, by
which he considers things under the
relation of good, and as objects of his
will and power. IX. Secondly. One
[quality of the] knowledge of God is that
of simple intelligence, by which he
understands, himself, all possible
things, and the nature and essence of
all entities; another is that of
vision, by which he beholds his own
existence and that of all other entities
or beings. X. The knowledge by which
God knows his own essence and
existence, all things possible, and
the nature and essence of all entities,
is simply necessary, as pertaining to
the perfection of his own knowledge.
But that by which he knows the
existence of other entities, is
hypothetically necessary, that is, if
they now have, have already had, or
shall afterwards have, any existence.
For when any object, whatsoever, is
laid down, it must, of necessity, fall
within the knowledge of God. The
former of these precedes every free
act of the divine will; the latter
follows every free act. The schoolmen;
therefore, denominate the first
"natural," and the second
"free knowledge." XI. The knowledge by which God
knows any thing if it be or exist, is
intermediate between the two [kinds]
described in theses 9 & 10; In
fact it precedes the free act of the will
with regard to intelligence. But it
knows something future according to
vision, only through its hypothesis.
XII. Free knowledge, or that of vision,
which is also called
"prescience," is not the cause of things; but the
knowledge which is practical and of
simple intelligence, and which is
denominated "natural," or
"necessary," is the cause of all things by the
mode of prescribing and directing to
which is added the action of the will
and of the capability. The middle or
intermediate [kind of] knowledge ought
to intervene in things which depend on
the liberty of created choice or
pleasure. XIII. From the variety and
multitude of objects, and from the
means and mode of intelligence and
vision, it is apparent that infinite
knowledge and omniscience are justly
attributed to God; and that they are so
proper or peculiar to God according to
their objects, means and mode, as not
to be capable of appertaining to any
created thing.
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DISPUTATION XVIII ON THE WILL OF GOD
The will of God is spoken of in three
ways: First, the faculty itself of
willing. Secondly, the act of willing.
Thirdly, the object willed. The first
signification is the principal and
proper one, the two others are secondary
and figurative. II. It may be thus
described: It is the second faculty of
the life of God, flowing through the
understanding from the life that has an
ulterior tendency; by which faculty
God is borne towards a known good --
towards a good, because this is an
adequate object of every will -- towards
a known good, not only with regard to
it as a being, but likewise as a good,
whether in reality or only in the act
of the divine understanding. Both,
however, are shown by the
understanding. But the evil which is called that
of culpability, God does not simply
and absolutely will. III. The good is
two-fold. The chief good, and that
which is from the chief. The first of
these is the primary, immediate,
principal, direct, peculiar and adequate
object of the divine will; the latter
is secondary and indirect, towards
which the divine will does not tend,
except by means of the chief good. IV.
The will of God is borne towards its objects
in the following order: (1.) He
wills himself. (2.) He wills all those
things which, out of infinite things
possible to himself he has, by the
last judgment of his wisdom, determined
to be made. And first, he wills to
make them to be; then he is affected
towards them by his will, according as
they possess some likeness with his
nature, or some vestige of it. (3.)
The third object of the will of God is
those things which he judges fit and
equitable to be done by creatures who
are endowed with understanding and
with free will, in which is included a
prohibition of that which he wills not
to be done. (4.) The fourth object of
the divine will is his permission,
that chiefly by which he permits a
rational creature to do what he has
prohibited, and to omit what he has
commanded. (5.) He wills those things
which, according to his own wisdom, he
judges to be done concerning the acts
of his rational creatures. V. There is
out of God no inwardly moving cause of
his will; nor out of him is there any
end. But the creature, and its action
or passion, may be the outwardly
moving cause, without which God would
supersede or omit that volition or act
of willing. VI. But the cause of all
other things is God, by His
understanding and will, by means of
His power or capability; yet so, that
when he acts either through his
creatures, with them or in them, he does not
take away the peculiar mode of acting,
or of suffering, which he has
divinely placed within them; and that
he suffers them, according to their
peculiar mode, to produce their own
effects, and to receive in themselves
the acts of God, either necessarily,
contingently, or freely. As this
contingency and liberty do not make
the prescience of God to be uncertain,
so they are destroyed by the volition
of God, and by the certain futurition
of events with regard to the
understanding of God.
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DISPUTATION XIX ON THE VARIOUS DISTINCTIONS OF THE WILL OF GOD
Though the will of God be one and
simple, yet it may be variously
distinguished, from its objects, in
reference to the mode and order
according to which it is borne towards
its objects. Of these distinctions
the use is important in the whole of
the Scriptures, and in explaining many
passages in them. II. The will of God
is borne towards its object either
according to the mode of nature, or
that of liberty. In reference to the
former, God tends towards his own
primary, proper and adequate object, that
is, towards himself. But, according to
the mode of liberty, he tends towards
other things -- and towards all other
things by the liberty of exercise, and
towards many by the liberty of
specification; because he cannot hate things,
so far as they have some likeness of
God, that is, so far as they are good;
though he is not necessarily bound to
love them, since he might reduce them
to nothing whenever it seemed good to
himself. III. The will of God is
distinguished into that by which he
absolutely wills to do any thing or to
prevent it; and into that by which he
wills something to be done or omitted
by his rational creatures. The former
of these is called "the will of his
good pleasure," or rather
"of his pleasure;" and the latter, "that of his
open intimation." The latter is
revealed, for this is required by the use to
which it is applied. The former is
partly revealed, partly secret, or
hidden. The former employs a power
that is either irresistible, or that is
so accommodated to the object and
subject as to obtain or insure its
success, though it was possible for it
to happen otherwise. To these two
kinds of the divine will, is opposed
the remission of the will, that is, a
two-fold permission, the one opposed
to the will of open intimation, the
other to that of good pleasure. The
former is that by which God permits
something to the power of a rational
creature by not circumscribing some act
by a law; the latter is that by which
God permits something to the will and
capability of the creature, by not
placing an impediment in its way, by
which the act may in reality be
hindered. IV. Whatever things God wills to
do, he wills them (1.) either from
himself, not on account of any other
cause placed beyond him, (whether that
be without the consideration of any
act perpetrated by the creature, or
solely from the occasion of the act of
the creature,) (2.) or on account of a
preceding cause afforded by the
creature. In reference to this
distinction, some work is said to be "proper
to God," some other
"extraneous, strange and foreign." But there is a
two-fold difference in those things
which he wills to be done; for they are
pleasing and acceptable to God, either
in themselves, as in the case of
moral works; or they please
accidentally and on account of some other thing,
as in the case of things ceremonial.
V. The will of God is either
peremptory, or with a condition. (1.)
His peremptory will is that which
strictly and rigidly obtains, such as
the words of the gospel which contain
the last revelation of God: "The
wrath of God abides on him who does not
believe;" "He that believes
shall be saved;" also the words of Samuel to
Saul: "The Lord hath rejected
thee from being king over Israel." (2.) His
will, with a condition, is that which
has a condition annexed, whether it be
a tacit one, such as, "Yet forty
days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown."
"Cursed is every one that
continueth not in all things which are written in
the book of the law to do them,"
that is, unless he be delivered from this
curse as it is expressed in Gal. iii.
13. See also Jer. xviii. 7-10. VI. One
will of God is absolute, another
respective. His absolute will is that by
which he wills any thing simply,
without regard to the volition or act of
the creature, such as is that about
the salvation of believers. His
respective will is that by which he
wills something with respect to the
volition or the act of the creature. It is
also either antecedent or
consequent. (1.) The antecedent is
that by which he wills something with
respect to the subsequent will or act
of the creature, as, "God wills all
men to be saved if they believe."
(2.) The consequent is that by which he
wills something with respect to the
antecedent volition or act of the
creature, as, "Woe to that man by
whom the Son of man is betrayed! Better
would it have been for that man if he
had never been born! Both depend on
the absolute will, and according to it
each of them is regulated. VII. God
wills some things, so far as they are
good, when absolutely considered
according to their nature. Thus he
wills alms-giving, and to do good to man
so far as he is his creature. He also
wills some other things, so far as,
all circumstances considered, they are
understood to be good. According to
this will, he says to the wicked man,
"What hast thou to do, that thou
shouldst take my covenant in thy mouth?"
And he speaks thus to Eli: "Be it
far from me that thy house, and the
house of thy father, should walk before
me for ever; for them that honour me I
will honour, and they that despise me
shall be lightly esteemed." This
distinction does not differ greatly from
the antecedent will of God, which has
been already mentioned. VIII. God
wills some things per se or per
accidens. Of themselves, he wills those
things which are simply relatively
good. Thus He wills salvation to that man
who is obedient. Accidentally, those
things which, in some respect are evil,
but have a good joined with them,
which God wills more than the respective
good things that are opposed to those
evil. Thus he wills the evils of
punishment, because he chooses that
the order of justice be preserved in
punishment, rather than that a sinning
creature should escape punishment,
though this impunity might be for the
good of the creature. IX. God wills
some things in their antecedent
causes, that is, he wills their causes
relatively, and places them in such
order that effects may follow from them;
and if they do follow, he wills that
they, of themselves, be pleasing to
him. God wills other things in
themselves. This distinction does not
substantially differ from that by
which the divine will is distinguished
into absolute and selective.
COROLLARIES I. Is it possible for two
affirmatively contrary volitions of
God to tend towards one object which is
the same and uniform? We answer in the
negative. II. Can one volition of
God, that is, one formally, tend
towards contrary objects? We reply, It can
tend towards objects physically
contrary, but not towards objects morally
contrary. III. Does God will, as an
end, something which is beyond himself,
and which does not proceed from his
free will? We reply in the negative.
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DISPUTATION XX ON THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD WHICH COME TO BE CONSIDERED UNDER
HIS
WILL AND, FIRST, ON THOSE WHICH HAVE AN ANALOGY TO THE AFFECTIONS OR
PASSIONS
IN RATIONAL CREATURES
Those attributes of God ought to be
considered, which are either properly or
figuratively attributed to him in the
Scriptures, according to a certain
analogy of the affections and virtues
in rational creatures. II. Those
divine attributes which have the
analogy of affections, may be referred to
two principal kinds, so that the first
class may contain those affections
which are simply conversant about good
or evil, and which may be denominated