THE WORKS OF JAMES ARMINIUS VOL.
3
A Friendly Discussion Between James
Arminius & Francis Junius, Concerning
Predestination, Conducted By Means Of
Letters
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Discussion Between Arminius & Junius, Topic - Predestination
* Arminius And Junius’ First
Correspondence
* First Proposition Of Arminius
* Second Proposition Of Arminius
* Third Proposition Of Arminius
*
* Fifth Proposition Of Arminius
* Sixth Proposition Of Arminius
* Seventh Proposition Of Arminius
* Eighth Proposition Of Arminius
* Ninth Proposition Of Arminius
* Tenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Eleventh Proposition Of Arminius
* Twelth Proposition Of Arminius
* Thirteenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Fourteenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Fifteenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Sixteenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Seventeenth Proposition Of
Arminius
* Eighteenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Ninteenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Twentyth Proposition Of Arminius
* Twentyfirst Proposition Of
Arminius
* Twentysecond Proposition Of
Arminius
* Twentythird Proposition Of
Arminius
* Twentyfourth Proposition Of
Arminius
* Twentyfifth Proposition Of
Arminius
* Twentysixth Proposition Of
Arminius
* Twentyseventh Proposition Of
Arminius
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The origin of this discussion is thus
stated by the elder Brandt: "On the
subject of Predestination, he [Junius]
endeavoured to defend the opinion of
Calvin, by rendering it a little more
palatable. For he did not maintain
that the divine predestination had
respect to mankind either ANTECEDENT TO
THE DECREE OF THEIR CREATION, or
SUBSEQUENT TO THEIR CREATION, ON A
FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THEIR FALL, but that
it had respect only to MAN ALREADY
CREATED, so far as BEING ENDOWED BY
GOD WITH NATURAL GIFTS, HE WAS CALLED TO
A SUPERNATURAL GOOD. On that account
James Arminius, then one of the
ministers of the church at
with him, and tried to prove that the
opinion of Junius, as well as that of
Calvin, inferred the NECESSITY OF SIN,
and that he must therefore, have
recourse to a third opinion, which
supposed man, not only AS CREATED but AS
FALLEN, to have been the object of
predestination. Junius answered his first
letter with that good temper, which
was peculiar to him, but seemed to
fabricate out of the various opinions
concerning predestination one of his
own, which, Arminius thought
contradicted all those which it was his
endeavour to defend. Arminius was
induced to compose a rejoinder to the
answer of Junius, which he transmitted
to the Professor, who retained it
full six years, to the time of his
death, without attempting to reply."
The letter of Arminius was divided by
Junius into twenty-seven propositions
in answering it, and each of them is
here presented, with the answer of
Junius, and the reply of Arminius,
corresponding to it.
To The Most Distinguished Man, Francis
Junius, D.D., A Brother In Christ,
Worthy Of My Most Profound Regard,
James Arminius Wishes You Health.
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MOST DISTINGUISHED AND VENERATED SIR:
They who do not give their assent to
the sentiments of others, seem to
themselves, and wish to seem to
others, to be, in this, under the influence
of sound judgment; but sometimes,
ignorance of the sentiments of others is
the cause of this, which,
nevertheless, they by no means acknowledge. I have
not hitherto been able to agree, in
the full persuasion of my mind, with the
views of some learned men, both of our
own and of former ages, concerning
the decrees of predestination and of
reprobation.
Consciousness of my own lack of
talents does not permit me to ascribe the
cause of this disagreement to sound
judgment: that I should ascribe it to
ignorance is hardly allowed by my own
opinion, which seems to me to be based
on an adequate knowledge of their
sentiments. On this account I have been
till this time in doubt; fearing to
assent to an opinion of another, without
a full persuasion in my own mind; and
not daring to affirm that which I
consider more true, but not in
accordance with the sentiments of most
learned men. I have, therefore, thought
it necessary for the tranquillity of
my mind, to confer with learned men
concerning that decree, that I might try
whether their erudite labours might be
able to remove my doubt and
ignorance, and produce in my mind
knowledge and certainty. I have already
done this with some of my brethren;
and with others, whose opinions have
authority, but thus far, (to confess
the truth,) with a result useless, or
even injurious to me. I thought that I
must have recourse to you, who,
partly from your published works, and
partly from the statements of others,
I know to be a person such that I may,
without fear, be permitted to hope
from you some certain result.
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REPLY OF FRANCIS JUNIUS TO THE MOST
LEARNED MAN, AND MY VERY
DEAR BROTHER, JAMES ARMINIUS
GREETING:
TERTULLIAN, On whose works, as you
know, I have now been long engaged, has
been the cause of my long silence,
respected brother. In the mean time, I
placed your letter on a shelf plainly
in my view, that I might be reminded
of my obligation to you, and might
attend, at the earliest possible
opportunity, to your request. You
desire from me an explication of a
question of a truly grave character, in
which the truth is fully known to
God: that which is sufficient He had
expressed in His written word, which we
both consult with the divine help. You
may set forth openly what you think
and do not think. You desire that I
should present my views, that from this
mutual interchange and communication
of sentiments, we may illustrate the
truth of divine grace. I will do what
I can according to the measure, which
the Lord has admeasured to me; and
whatever I may perceive of this most
august mystery, I will indicate it,
whether I regard it as truth or as a
merely speculative opinion, that you
with me may hold that which belongs to
the Deity. Whatever pertains to my
opinion, if you have a more correct
sentiment, you may, in a kind and
brotherly manner, unfold it, and by a
salutary admonition recall me into the
way of truth. I will here say nothing
by way of introduction, because I
prefer to pass at once to the subject
itself, which may rather be "good
to the use of edifying," as the apostle
teaches. I judge that all desire the
truth in righteousness: but all do not
therefore see the truth in
righteousness. "We know in part, and we prophesy
in part," (1 Cor. xiii. 9,) and
"when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he
will guide you into all truth."
(John xvi. 13.) We perceive a part of the
truth: and present a part; the rest
will be given in his own time, by the
Spirit of truth to those who seek. May
he therefore grant to both of us that
we may receive and may present the
truth.
That we may both realize greater
advantage from this brotherly discussion,
and that nothing may carelessly fall
from me, I will follow the path marked
out in your letters, writing word for
word, and distinguishing the topics of
your discussion into propositions; and
will subjoin to them, in the same
order, my own opinion concerning each
point, that in reference to all things
you may be able to see clearly, and
according to the Divine will, determine
from the mode of my answer, what I
think and what I do not think. The
following is your first proposition,
in which you may recognize yourself as
speaking.
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FIRST PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I see, then, most renowned sir, that
there are three views in reference to
that subject, [predestination] which
have their defenders among the doctors
of our church. The first is that of
Calvin to Beza; the second that of
Thomas Aquinas and his followers; the
third that of Augustine and those who
agree with him. They all agree in
this, that they alike hold that God, by an
eternal and immutable decree,
determined to bestow upon certain men, the
rest being passed by, supernatural and
eternal life, and those means which
are the necessary and efficacious
preparation for the attainment of that
life.
THE REPLY OF FRANCIS JUNIUS TO THE
FIRST PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
If one should wish to accumulate a
variety of opinions, he would in
appearance have a large number of
them; but let these be the views of men to
whom will readily be assigned the
first place in relation to this doctrine.
But in reference to the points of
agreement among them all, of which you
speak, there are, unless I am
deceived, two things most worthy of
explanation and notice. First, that
what you say is indeed true, that "God,
by an eternal and immutable decree,
determined to give eternal, supernatural
life to certain men;" but that
eternal life is not here primarily, or per se
the work of that divine
predestination, but rather in a secondary manner,
and dependent, by consequence, on
adoption th~v uiJoqesiav The apostle
demonstrates this in Ephes. i.
5.
"Having predestinated us unto the
adoption of children by Jesus Christ to
himself, according to the good
pleasure of his will." And in verse 11,
"which He hath purposed in
Himself; that in the dispensation of the fullness
of time, He might gather together in
one all things in Christ," &c.
Also, Romans viii. 17, "if
children, then heirs; heirs of God, and
joint-heirs with Christ," &c.
We must not, however, forget that if an effect
is substituted for the distinguishing
part of the essence the definition of
the thing is defective.
Predestination, if we regard its peculiar and
distinguishing quality, is, according
to the testimony of the Scripture, to
filiation, (so to speak,) or the
adoption of children, the effect and
sequence of which is eternal life. It
is thus true that we are predestinated
to life, but, accurately speaking, we
are predestinated to adoption by the
special grace of our heavenly Father.
He who proposes one, supposes the
other; but it is necessary that the
former should be always set forth
distinctly in the general discussion. Hence it seems that the
arrangement of
this whole argument will be less
encumbered, if we consider that saving
decree of the divine predestination in
this order; that God has
predestinated us to the adoption of
children of God in Christ "to himself,"
and that he has pre-arranged by his
own eternal decree the way and the end
of that adoption; the way of that
grace, leading us in the discharge of
duty, by our vocation and
justification, but its end, that of life, which we
shall obtain when our glorification is
perfected, (Rom. 8,) which are the
effects of that grace, and the most
certain consequences of our adoption.
The statement that God has
predestinated certain persons to life, is a
general one; but it is not
sufficiently clear or convenient for the purpose
of instruction, unless gratuitous
adoption in Christ is supposed, prior to
justification and life and
glory.
There is still another statement, made
by you, which seems to me to need
consideration, that "God has
bestowed on certain men those means which are
the necessary and efficacious
preparation for the attainment of that life."
For though that assertion is true, yet
it must be received with cautious
discrimination and religious
scrupulousness. Our filiation is (so to speak)
the work of the divine predestination,
because God is our father, and by His
grace unites us to himself as sons.
But whatever God has ordained for the
consummation of this adoption in us,
it is, in respect to that adoption, not
a means but a necessary adjunct or
consectary. That eternal life, bestowed
on us, is a consectary of our adoption
"to himself." But in respect to the
adjuncts and consequence, they may be
called mutually, the means one of
another; as calling is said to be the
means of justification, and
justification of glorification, (Rom.
8.) Yet though they are means, most of
them are necessary and efficacious in
certain respects, not per se and
absolutely. For if they were, per se
and absolutely necessary and
efficacious, they would be equally
necessary and efficacious in all the
pious and elect. Yet most of them are
not of this character; since even
infants and they who come in their
last hours, being called by the Lord,
will obtain eternal life without those
means. These things have been said,
the opportunity being presented.
We agree generally in reference to the
other matters.
THE REPLY OF JAMES ARMINIUS TO THE
ANSWER OF FRANCIS JUNIUS
To that most distinguished person,
Doctor Francis Junius, and my brother in
Christ, to be regarded with due
veneration.
REVEREND SIR:
I have read and reviewed your reply,
and used all the diligence of which I
was capable, considering it according
to the measure of my strength, that I
might be able to judge with greater
certainty concerning the truth of the
matter which is under discussion
between us. But while I consider everything
in the light of my judgment, it seems
to me that most of my propositions and
arguments are not answered in your
reply. I venture, therefore, to take my
pen and to make some comments in order
to show wherein I perceive a
deficiency in your answer, and to
defend my own arguments. I am fully
persuaded that you will receive it
with as much kindness as you received the
liberty used in my former letter, and
if any thing shall seem to need
correction and to be worthy of
refutation, you will indicate it to me with
the same charity; that, by your
faithful assistance, may be able to
understand the truth which I seek with
simplicity of heart, and explain it
to others to the glory of God and
their salvation, as occasion shall demand.
May that Spirit of truth be present
with me, and so direct my mind and hand,
that it may in no respect err from the
truth. If however any thing should
fall from me not in harmony with its
meaning, I shall wish that it had been
unsaid, unwritten.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO
HIS FIRST PROPOSITION
In my former letter I laid down three
views held by our doctors in reference
to the decree of Predestination and
Reprobation, diverse, not contrary.
Others might perhaps have been
adduced, but not equally diverse among
themselves or from others. For each of
these are distinguished by marks
which are manifest and have reference
to the essence and nature of the
subject itself, which is under
discussion.
First, they give the object of the
decree (man) a different mode or form,
since the first presents him to the
Deity as an object to be created, the
second as created, the third as
fallen.
Secondly, they adapt to that decree
attributes of the Deity, either
different or considered in a different
relation. For the first presents
mercy and justice as preparing an
object for themselves; the third
introduces the same attributes as
finding their object prepared; the second
places grace, which holds the relation
of genus to mercy, over
predestination; and liberty of grace
over non-election or the preparation of
preterition, and justice over
punishment.
Thirdly, they differ in certain acts.
The first view attributes the act of
creation to that decree, and makes the
fall of man subordinate to the same
decree; the second and the third
premises creation; the third also supposes
the fall of man to be antecedent in
the order of nature to the decree,
regarding the decree of election which
flows from mercy and that of
reprobation which is administered by
justice, as having no possible place
except in reference to man considered
as a sinner, and on that account
meriting misery.
It is hence apparent that I have not
improperly separated those views which
are themselves separated and discriminated
by some marked distinction. But
you will perhaps persuade me that our
doctors differ only in their mode of
presenting the same truth, more easily
than you will persuade them or their
adherents. For Beza in many places
sharply contends that God, when
predestinating and reprobating man,
considers him, not as created, not as
fallen, but as to be created, and he
claims that this is indicated by the
term "lump," used in Rom.
ix. 21, and he charges great absurdities on those
who hold different views. For example,
he says that they "who present man as
created to God decreeing, consider the
Deity as imprudent, creating man
before he had his own mind arranged
any thing in reference to his final
condition. He accuses those who present
man as fallen, of denying, divine
providence, without the decree or
arrangement of which sin entered into the
world, according to their view. But I
can readily endure, indeed I can
praise any one who may desire to
harmonize the views of the doctors, rather
than to separate them more widely,
only let this be done by a suitable
explanation of views, apparently
diverse, not by change in statement, or by
any addition, differing from the views
themselves. He, who acts otherwise,
does not obtain the desired fruit of
reconciliation, and he gains the
emolument of an erroneously stated
sentiment, the displeasure of its
authors.
As to those two respects in which you
think that my explanation of the
agreement of those views needs
animadversion, in the former I agree, in the
latter I do not much disagree with
you. For Predestination is, immediately,
to adoption, and, through it, to life;
but when I propose the sentiments of
others, I do not think that they
should be corrected by me. Yet I cheerfully
receive the correction; though I
consider that it has little or nothing to
do with this controversy. Indeed I
think that it tends to confirm my view.
For adoption in Christ not only
requires the supposition of sin as a
condition requisite in the object, but
of a certain other thing also, of
which I did not in my former letter
think it best to treat. That thing is
faith in Jesus Christ, without which
adoption is in fact bestowed on no man,
and, apart from the consideration of
which, adoption is prepared for no one
by the divine predestination. (John i.
12.) For they who believe are
adopted, not they who are adopted
receive the gift of faith: adoption is
prepared for those who shall believe,
not faith is prepared for those who
are to be adopted, just as
justification is prepared for believers, not
faith is prepared for the justified.
The Scripture demonstrates that this is
the order in innumerable passages. But
I do not fully understand in what
sense you style vocation and
justification the way of adoption. That may be
called the way of adoption which will
lead to adoption, and that also by
which adoption tends to its own end.
You seem to me to understand the term
way in the latter sense, from the fact
that you make justification
subsequent to adoption, and you speak
of the way of grace leading us in the
discharge of duty, by our vocation and
justification. Here are two things
not unworthy of notice. The first is
that you connect vocation with adoption
as antecedent to it, which I think can
scarcely be said of vocation as a
whole. For the vocation of sinners and
unbelievers is to faith in Christ;
the vocation of believers is to
conformity to Christ and to communion with
him. The Scripture makes the former
antecedent to adoption. The latter is to
adoption itself, which is included in
conformity and communion with Christ.
The second is that you made adoption
prior to justification; both of which I
regard as bestowed on believers at the
same time, while in the order of
nature, justification is prior to
adoption. For the justified person is
adopted, not the adopted person is
justified. This is proved by the order
both of the attainment of those
blessings made by Christ, and that of the
imputation of the same blessings made
by God in Christ. For Christ obtained
the remission of sins, before he
obtained adoption, before in the order of
nature: and righteousness is imputed
before sonship. For "when we were
enemies, we were reconciled to God by
the death of his Son," (Rev. v. 10,)
but being reconciled, we are adopted
as sons.
Let us consider also what are opposed
to these, namely, imputation of sins
and non-adoption. From these it is clearly
seen that such is the order. Sin
is the cause of exclusion from
filiation by the mode of demerit. Imputation
of sin is the cause of the same
exclusion by the mode of justice, punishing
sin according to its demerit. In
reference to your remarks concerning means,
I observe that this term is applied by
the authors to whose sentiments I
refer, to those things which God makes
subordinate to the decree of
Predestination, but antecedent to the
execution of that decree, not those by
which or in respect to which
Predestination itself is made, whether to
adoption or to life. But I think it
may be most useful to consider whether
these, either as adjuncts, or
consectaries, or means, or by whatever other
name they may be called, are only
effective to consummate the adoption
already ordained for certain
individuals, or whether they were considered by
the Deity in the very act of
predestination to sonship, as necessary
adjuncts of those to be
predestinated.
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SECOND PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
They differ in this, that the first
presents men as not yet created, but to
be created, to God, electing and
predestinating, also passing by and
reprobating, (though, in the latter
case, it does not so clearly make the
distinction): the second presents them
created, but considered in a natural
state, to God electing and
predestinating, "to be raised from that natural
state above it; it presents them to
Him in the act of preterition, as
considered in the same natural state,
and to Him in that of reprobation, as
involved in sin by their own fault:
the third presents them to Him both
electing and predestinating, and
passing by and reprobating as fallen in
Adam, and as lying in the mass of
corruption and perdition.
THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SECOND
PROPOSITION
That, in this statement of views
(which are apparently, not really,
contradictory) you have, in some
manner, fallen into error, we shall, in its
own place, demonstrate. I could wish
that in this case an ambiguity, in the
verb reprobate, and the verbal
reprobation, had been avoided. This word is
used in three ways; one general, two
particular. The general use is when
non-election, or preterition and
damnation, is comprehended in the word, in
which way Calvin and Beza frequently
understood it, yet so as to make some
distinction. A particular mode or
signification is when it is opposed to
election, and designates non-election
or preterition (a Latin phrase derived
from forensic use) in which sense the
fathers used it according to the
common use of the Latins. There is
also a particular use of the word, when
reprobation is taken for damnation, as
I perceive that it is used by you in
this whole letter. The first mode is
synecdochical, the second common, the
third metonymical; I add that the
third might properly be called
catachrestic if we attend to the just
distinction of these members. I wholly
approve the second meaning and shall
adhere to it in this whole discussion.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO
THE SECOND PROPOSITION
I have made a difference, not a
contrariety between those views, and have
already explained that difference according
to my judgment. I do not,
however, wish to be tedious in the
proof of this point. For, in this matter,
it is my aim that of a number of
positions, any one being established,
others, perhaps before unsettled, may
be demonstrated.
The word reprobation may be sometimes
used ambiguously, but it was not so
used by me: and, if it had been, blame
for that thing ought not to be laid
on me, who have used that word in the
sense and according to the use of
those, whose views I presented, but
especially according to the sense in
which it has been used by yourself,
with whom I have begun this discussion.
For I had examined various passages in
your writings, and in them I found
that the word was used by you in the
last sense, which you here call
catachrestic. I will adduce some of
those passages, from which you will see
that I have used the word in
accordance with your perpetual usage. In your
Notes on Jude, (fol 27-6,) "The
proper cause of reprobation is man himself;
of his own sin, dying in sins."
So in your Sacred Axioms concerning Nature
and Grace, prefaced to the Refutation
of the Pamphlet of Puccius, Axioms
xliv, xlv, xlvi, xlvii, xlviii, and
especially xlix and l, the words of
which I here quote. Axiom xlix, "Nor
is preterition indeed the cause of
reprobation or damnation, but only its
antecedent. But the peculiar and
internal efficient cause of this is
the sin of the creature, while the
accidental and external cause is the
justice of God." Axiom i, "Therefore
Reprobation (that we may clearly
distinguish the matter) is understood
either in a wider sense, or in one
which is more narrow and peculiar to
itself. In a wider sense, if you
consider the whole subject of the divine
counsel from preterition, as the
antecedent and commencement, to damnation,
as the end and consequent, with the
intervention of the peculiar cause of
damnation, namely, sin; in a more
narrow and appropriate sense, if you
consider only the effects of
sin." We might add, also, what is said in the
51st axiom. Of the theses concerning
Predestination, discussed by Coddaeus
under you, the 14th has this
remark:
"Preterition is the opposite of
preparation of grace and reprobation or
preparation of punishment is the
opposite of preparation of glory. But
preparation of punishment is the act
in which God determines to punish his
creatures, &c." In theses 17
and 18, "reprobate on account of sins, from the
necessity of justice." Here you
seem to have wished to use those words
properly: which you also signify more
plainly in the Theses concerning
election discussed by the younger
Trelcatius under your direction. Thesis
xii, "But if reprobation is made
the opposite of election, (as it really
is,) it is a figurative expression,
that is either by synecdoche, or by
catachresis. By synecdoche, if it
refers to the whole series of acts opposed
to Predestination; by catachresis, if
it refers to non-election. For
non-election is the first limit of the
divine purpose, dependent on his will
alone. Reprobation is the ultimate
limit, next to the execution, dependent
on the supposition of antecedent
causes." Hence it is apparent that I have
used that word in the sense which you
have styled "appropriate." I will
state, in a few words, what I think in
reference to the same word, and its
use. I am wholly of the opinion that
the word reprobation, according to the
use of the Latin language, properly
signifies non-election, if election does
not consist without reprobation. But I
think that it is never used in the
Scripture for an act which is merely
negative, and never for an act which
has reference to those who are not
sinners. If at any time Augustine and
others of the fathers use it for
preterition, non-election, or any negative
act, they consider it as having
reference to a reelection in sin, and in the
mass of corruption, or for a purpose
to withhold mercy, the latter term
being used for a deliverance from sin
and actual misery. Calvin and Beza use
it in almost every case, for the mere
preparation of punishment, or for both
acts.
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THIRD PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The first theory is this, that God
determined from eternity to illustrate
his own glory by mercy and justice:
and as these could be exercised in fact
only in reference to sinners, that he
decreed to make man holy and innocent,
that is, after his own images yet,
good in such a sense as to be liable to a
change in this condition, and able to
fall and to commit sin: that he
ordained also that man should fall and
become depraved, that He might thus
prepare the way for the fulfillment of
his own eternal counsels, that he
might be able mercifully to save some and
justly to condemn others,
according to his own eternal purpose,
to the declaration of his mercy in the
former, and of his justice in the
latter.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE THIRD
PROPOSITION
This view seems to have been stated
not with sufficient fullness; for Calvin
in his Institutes, (lib. 3,)
eloquently refers to the words of Paul in
Ephes. i, "He predestinated us
unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ
to himself, &c.," and
explains them, preserving the order which we noticed
under Proposition I. God therefore
from eternity determined to illustrate
most wisely his own glory by the
adoption of these and the preterition or
non-adoption of those with the
introduction also of mercy and justice. This
being settled, that statement may be
very well conceded, that "God
determined to illustrate his own glory
by mercy and justice, if it is
rightly understood. But this will be
hereafter explained in a summary
manner. But it cannot be conceded, nor
can I think that Calvin or Beza would
have said simply that "mercy and
justice cannot in fact be exercised except
in reference to sinners. For in the
first place (that we may sooner or later
explain these things), sinners are such
in act, in habit, or in capability.
We are sinners in act when the
depravity of our nature has carried out its
own operations; we were sinners in
habit in the womb and from the womb,
before we wrought the works of the
flesh. Adam was such in capability in
some sense before the fall, when he
had the power to lay aside his holy
habits of life, and make himself the
bond-slave of sin. So also they are
miserable, in act, in habit, or in
capability, who now endure miseries or
have put on the habit of them, are
capable of falling into them. The latter,
however, are sinners and miserable,
not absolutely but relatively; not fully
but in a certain sense (kata ti) and
only in a comparative mode of speaking
as Job iv. 18, "Behold He put no
trust in his servants; and his angels he
charged with folly." Augustine
refers to this (Lib. contra. Priscill et
Origen, cap 10) concluding his remarks
with this most elegant sentence: "for
by participation in whom they are
righteous, by comparison with Him they are
unrighteous."
But in the second place it is not true
that "mercy cannot be exercised
except in reference to sinners,"
for all creatures, even the angels from
heaven, when compared, according to
their own nature, with the Deity, are
wretched, since in comparison with Him
they are not righteous, and because,
by their own nature, they can sink
into misery, (which is certainly the
capability of misery; as, on the
contrary, not to be capable of misery, is
the highest happiness), they are
miserable by capability. Therefore, He who
has freed them from possible misery by
His own election, has bestowed mercy
on them; in reference to which they
are called "elect angels" by Paul. (1
Tim. v. 21.) We may here merely refer
to the fact that the word mercy (the
Latin term misericordia being used in
a more contracted sense) does not
necessarily suppose misery, as will be
seen by a reference to the original
languages, the Hebrew and Greek, in
which the men of God wrote. The Hebrews
expressed that idea by two words dsj
and symjr neither of which had
reference properly and necessarily to
misery e]leov of the Greeks does not
necessarily suppose misery, if we
regard the common usage of the Scriptures;
for parents exercise it towards their
children, though happy and free from
misery. In the third place, it is by
no means more true that "he can
exercise justice only in reference to
sinners." For he who renders to each
his due, exercises justice: but God
would clearly not be just if he did not
render their due to the righteous as
well as to the unrighteous. For even
towards Adam, if he had remained
righteous, God would have exercised justice
both by the bestowment of his own
reward upon him, analogous to his
righteousness, and by that
supernatural gift, analogous to his own power and
grace, which He adumbrated to man by
the symbol of the tree of life. It was
possible that God should exercise
justice in reference even to those who
were not sinners. But concerning
judgment to death, the case is different.
From what has already been said, we
readily conclude in reference to the
rest. In reference to the word ordain,
we shall speak under the sixth
proposition.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO HIS
THIRD PROPOSITION
I might show that the sentiments of
Calvin and Beza were well and fully set
forth by me in those words, by many
passages selected from their writings.
For though sometimes, when they make
mention of adoption, and non-adoption,
which is its contrary by logical
division and opposition, yet they do not
set forth their views, as it was
explained by you in answer to my first
proposition, and as you have just
explained it in these words: "God,
therefore, from eternity, determined
to illustrate most wisely his own glory
by the adoption of these, and the
preterition or non-adoption of those, with
the introduction of mercy and
justice." For in two respects there is a
departure in those words from their
sentiment.
In the first place, because they do
not consider that the illustration of
the glory of God is effected
immediately by the adoption of these and the
non-adoption or preterition of those,
but by a declaration of mercy and
justice, which are unfolded in the
acts of adoption or election, and of
non-adoption or reprobation. It seems
proper, according to the rule of
demonstration, that this order should
be preserved; the glory of God
consists in the declaration of the attributes
of God; the attributes of God
are illustrated by acts suitable to
those attributes.
Secondly, mercy and justice are not
said by them to be introduced into the
decree of predestination and
reprobation. For those words signify that God,
according to other attributes of his nature, decreed the adoption of
these
and the non-adoption of those, to the
illustration of his own glory, in
which deed he used also mercy and
justice for the execution of that decree,
and indeed with the condition of a
change in the object. But this was not
their view, but it was as I have
already set it forth, namely, "God
determined from eternity to illustrate
his own glory by mercy and justice:
since the glory of God can be neither
acknowledged nor celebrated, unless it
be declared by his mercy and his
justice. But they consider mercy the
appropriate cause of adoption, but
justice the cause of non-adoption or
reprobation, and they regard his
purpose of illustrating both as the whole
cause of predestination, that is, of
election and reprobation; for they
divide predestination into these parts
or species. Therefore in my statement
less was ascribed to mercy and justice
in that decree than those authors
think ought to be ascribed to those
attributes, and than they do ascribe to
them in the explanation of their
entire view. Nor is it with justice denied
that it is a part of their sentiment
that mercy and justice can only be
exercised in fact in reference to
actual sinners. For they assert this most
clearly, not indeed restricting the
word justice to punitive justice, which,
indeed, is my view, as is evident from
my sixth proposition, and I think
that this can be understood from them.
I will adduce a few passages from
many.
Beza (adversus calumnias Nebulonis, ad
art. 2) "God, having in view the
creation of man, to declare the glory
both of his mercy and of his justice,
as the result showed, made Adam in his
own image, that is, holy and
innocent; since as he is good, nothing
depraved can be created by him. But
they must be depraved on whom he
determines to have mercy, and they also
whom he justly determines to
condemn." From this passage I quoted the words
in which I stated this view. The same
Beza again says (lib. 1, quest. et
reap. fol. 126, in 8,) "Since God
had decreed from eternity, as can be
learned from events, to manifest in
the highest degree his own glory in the
human race, which manifestation might
consist partly in the exercise of
mercy, partly in the demonstration of
hatred against sin, he made a man
inwardly and outwardly pure, and
endowed with right understanding and will,
but susceptible of change. He, as
supremely good, could not and would not
indeed create any evil thing, and yet
unless evil had entered into the
world, there would have been no place
for mercy or judgment." He expresses
himself, in the plainest manner
possible, in his conference with
Mombelgartes; "Let us," says
Beza "lay down these principles. God, an
infinitely wise architect, and whose
wisdom is unlimited, when He determined
to create the world, and especially
the human race had a certain proposed
end, &c. For the eternal and
immutable purpose of God was antecedent to all
causes, because He decreed in Himself from
eternity to create all men for
His own glory. But the glory of God is
neither acknowledged nor celebrated,
unless his mercy and justice is
declared. Therefore, He made an eternal and
immutable decree by which He destined
some particular individuals, of mere
grace, to eternal life, and some, by
an act of judgment, to eternal
damnation, that He might declare His
mercy in the former, but His justice in
the latter. Since God had proposed
this end to Himself in the creation of
men, it was necessary that He should
also devise the way and the means by
which He could attain that end, that
His mercy and His justice might be
equally manifested. For since mercy
presupposes misery, it can neither have
place nor be declared where misery
does not exist, it was then necessary
that man should be created, that in
him there might be a place for the mercy
of God. This could not be found
without preceding misery. So also, since
justice presupposes crime, without
which justice cannot be exercised, (for
where there is no crime, there justice
has no place,) it was necessary that
man should be so created that, without
the destruction of his nature, he
might be a fit subject, that in him
God might declare His own justice. For
He could not declare His own justice
in man unless He should have destined
him to eternal damnation. Therefore,
God proposed, &c." These things were
published by James Andreas, but
acknowledged by Beza, for in his answer to
that discussion he does not say that
views, not his own, are attributed to
him. You see, therefore, that I have
adapted the proper object to those
attributes according to their opinion,
which sentiment they without doubt
think that they have derived from the
Scripture; in which this is fixed that
God cannot justly punish one who is
not a sinner; in which also the same
author will deny that the word mercy
is so used that, when attributed to
God, it may signify salvation from possible
misery; since, in their view, it
every where designates salvation from
the misery which the sinner has
merited, and which either has been or
can be justly inflicted by the Deity.
But I shall not wish to contend
strenuously that it is not possible that
mercy should be exercised towards
those not actually miserable, and I can
easily assent to those things which
you have said concerning that subject,
if they may have the meaning which I
will give in my own words, namely, that
all creatures, even angels and men,
when compared with God, are miserable,
misery being here taken for non
felicity, not for that which is opposed to
felicity in a privative sense, but for
that which is opposed to it in a
contradictory sense; as nothing more
is proved by the reason from analogy.
In comparison with God they are not
just, therefore, in comparison with him
they are not happy. For there are
three antecedents, each of which has its
consequent; just, unjust, not just;
happy, unhappy or miserable, not happy.
From justice results happiness, from
injustice misery, from non-justice
non-felicity.
But creatures as such can be compared
with God, both in relation of the
limit whence they proceed, and in
relation to the limit to which they
advanced by the Deity. In relation to
the latter, angels and men exist, are
just, are happy; in relation to the
former, they do not exist, are not just,
are not happy, since they come from
nothing and can therefore be returned to
nothing. But in this relation they
cannot be called unjust or unhappy, since
the limit, from which they were
brought forward, is opposed, by
contradiction, not by privation, to
the limit to which they are borne by the
divine goodness, or more briefly, since
they are brought from possibility to
actuality, which possibility and
actuality are contradictory not privative,
one of the other. Now, since they
consist of possibility and actuality, it
is not possible that they, if deserted
by divine support, should return to
nothing, but it is necessary that
they, if thus deserted, should return to
nothing. It is moreover possible that,
continuing to exist by the divine
power, yet being left to themselves
and having power to decide their own
course, they should, in their second
action, not live according to the
dictates of justice, by which they
were governed in their first action, but
do something contrary to it, and by
this act become unrighteous and sinners,
and, having become such, should put on
the habit of unrighteousness, the
habit of righteousness having been
removed, either as an effect or on the
ground of demerit, so that they would
become miserable first by desert, next
by act, and finally by habit. But if
God should hinder them from deserving
that misery that is from sinning and
becoming actually miserable, I do not
see why that act may not be ascribed
to mercy since it originates in the
desire to prevent misery, which desire
pertains to mercy. I concede, indeed,
that this is so, and that it is not
therefore absolutely true that mercy can
only be exercised towards actual
sinners. But I wish that it should be
observed that mercy is not used, in
that sense, by Calvin and Beza, and
indeed if mercy, thus understood,
should be substituted for the same
affection, as it is used by Calvin and
Beza, the whole relation and
description of the decree would be
changed. I remark also that mercy,
understood as you present it, does not
come under consideration when the
subject treated of is the
predestination of men: for it is not exercised by
God towards man, as one who has not
been saved from possible misery by the
divine predestination. Finally, it
should also be considered that the
relation between mercy understood in
the latter, and mercy understood in the
former sense is such that both cannot
concur to the salvation of a man. For
if there be occasion for the mercy,
which saves from possible misery, there
can be no place for that which
delivers from actual misery, as the
opportunity for the exercise of its
peculiar functions is taken away, or,
rather, precluded by the former; if on
the contrary the mercy, which frees
from actual misery, is necessary, the
other does not act, and so the former
excludes the latter in the relation of
both cause and effect, and the latter
consequently excludes the former, not
succeeding after the fulfillment of
its office, but existing by the
necessity of its own action, as the man has
failed of the former.
We remark in reference to justice that
it is indeed very true that it can
have place, and can be exercised
towards those who are not sinners. For it
is the rewarder not only of sinful,
but of righteous conduct. But why may it
not be deduced from these things, so
considered by you, that the necessary
existence of sin cannot be inferred
even from the necessary declaration of
the mercy and justice of God, since
both, considered in a certain light, can
be exercised towards those who are not
sinners. In this way the order of
predestination established by Calvin
and Beza is wholly overthrown. But as
mercy, saving from possible misery,
and justice, rewarding virtue do not
need the pre-existence of actual
misery and sin, yet it is certain that
mercy, freeing from actual misery and
justice, punishing sin, can only be
exercised towards the actually
miserable and sinful. But Calvin and Beza
every where use the terms, mercy and
justice, in this sense, when they
discuss the decree of predestination
and probation. Since, also, mercy and
justice, understood in the former
sense, have no place in the predestination
and reprobation of men, but only as
they are received in the former
signification, mercy, saving from
possible misery and justice, rewarding
good deeds, might be properly omitted
in the discussion of the
predestination and reprobation of men,
though I do not deny that such a
consideration may have its appropriate
and by no means small advantages.
Since we have entered on the
consideration of mercy and justice, we may, if
you have leisure and are so disposed,
continue it for a short time,
comparing each with the other, for the
illustration of the subject which we
now discuss, in reference first to the
object of both, then to the order in
which each acts on its own
object.
Mercy and justice, the former saving
from possible misery, the latter
rewarding good conduct can be
exercised towards one and the same object, as
is manifest in the case of the elect
angels, who are saved from possible
misery, and have obtained from the
divine goodness the reward of right
conduct. But that same mercy cannot be
exercised in reference to the same
object with punitive justice. For
whatever is worthy of the act of punitive
justice is not saved from possible
misery. The mercy, also which saves from
actual misery is in this respect
similar to the other kind of mercy, that it
cannot concur in respect to the same
object with punitive justice; but it is
to be considered whether and how, like
the other mercy, it can be exercised
at the same time with the justice
which rewards goodness. We, indeed see,
that in the Scriptures the reward of a
good deed is promised to those who
have obtained mercy in Christ, and is
in fact bestowed upon them, but the
reward, though it may be of justice,
is yet not of justice, understood in
that sense in which justice is
regarded, when rewarding a good deed,
according to the promise of the law,
and of debt; for the former
remuneration is the grace of God in
Jesus Christ, who is made unto us of
God, righteousness, (justice) and
sanctification. Justice, in one case
bestowing a remuneration of debt, may
be called legal, but, in the other, of
grace, may not inappropriately be
called evangelical, the union of which
with the mercy saving from actual
misery has been effected in a wonderful
manner by God in Jesus Christ, our
High Priest, and expiatory sacrifice. The
object, then, of punitive justice is
essentially and materially different
from the object of mercy considered in
either light, and of justice
remunerating right conduct.
But the object of mercy, saving from
possible misery, is different in its
formal relation from the object of
mercy, saving from actual misery, for the
former is a creature, righteous and
considered in his state as it was by
creation, but the latter is a sinful
creature, and fallen from his original
state into misery by transgression. Of
those two classes both of mercy and
justice, the former in each case is to
be excluded from the decree of the
predestination and reprobation of men,
namely, mercy-saving from possible
misery and justice, rewarding goodness
from a legal promise, but the latter,
preside over that decree, namely,
mercy-saving from actual misery, over
predestination, and punitive justice
over reprobation. Now let us examine
the order, according to which each,
compared by themselves and among
themselves, tends to its own object.
Mercy preventing misery and justice
rewarding goodness according to law,
tending towards one subject, take this
order, that mercy should first perform
its office, and then justice
discharge its functions. For the
prevention of sin, and therefore of misery,
precedes any good deed, and therefore
precedes the reward of that good deed,
therefore, also, the misery which
saves from actual misery precedes the
justice which rewards a good deed, of
grace. For that mercy not only takes
away the guilt and dominion of sin,
but creates in the believer a habit of
righteousness, by which a good deed is
produced, to be compensated of grace
by the reward. But concerning
mercy-saving from actual misery, which is the
administration of predestination, and
punitive justice which is the cause of
reprobation, what judgment shall we
form? We will say that both tend, at the
same moment, to their own object, but
we will [make] consider the former as
an antecedent in the order of nature.
For though he, who elects, in the very
fact that he elects, reprobates also
the non-elect, yet the act of election
is antecedent in the order of nature,
just as an affirmative is in the order
of nature prior to negation. From
which we infer (of this we will speak
hereafter) that the decree to leave
man to the decision of his own destiny,
and to permit the fall, does not
belong to the decree of reprobation, since
it is prior to and more ancient than
the decree of predestination.
I wish that this order may be
considered with somewhat more diligence and at
greater length, for it will open
before us a way of knowing some other
things, different from and yet by no
means wholly foreign to the subject now
under discussion. If the mercy, which
bestows grace and life, holds the
prior relation to this decree, and the
justice, which denies grace and
inflicts death, the posterior relation
in the order of nature, though not of
time, then it is still more to be
considered, whether the object of this
decree is adequately and with
sufficient accuracy described by the term
sinner; or whether something else
ought not also to be added, which may so
limit the object, that it may be made
adequate to the decree which
originated in such mercy and justice,
and may be in harmony with it, namely
the nature of the object thus made
adequate, and, in its own capability,
tending to its own peculiar and
appropriate object. If any one thinks that
the functions of justice towards sin
and the sinner are prior to those of
mercy and that the rendering of it’s
due punishment to sin is prior by
nature to the remission of the same to
the sinner, I wish he would attend
diligently to two points.
First, that a two-fold action is attributed,
by those who discuss this
matter, to justice, so far as it
premises over the decree of reprobation, or
preterition and predamnation, and this
in harmony with the nature of the
subject; the former is negative, the
latter affirmative, and in this order
that the negative precedes the
affirmative. From this it follows that if
that negative act is posterior, in the
order of nature, to the affirmative
act of predestination, as is the case,
then the functions of mercy must be
prior; for from mercy originates the
affirmative act of predestination,
which is antecedent to the negative
act of reprobation. SECONDLY, that the
punishment, due to sin, is by this
decree destined for no one, unless so as
it is not removed by mercy; and in
this respect, though justice may in its
own right claim the punishment of the
sinner, yet it exacts that punishment,
according to the decree of
predomination which is made by justice, in view
not of the fact that it is due to the
sinner, but of the fact that it has
not been remitted to him of mercy;
else all men universally would be
predamned, since they all have
deserved punishment. Hence, this ought also
to be considered whether the justice,
which is the administratrix of the
decree of reprobation or predamnation
is revealed according to the Law or
the Gospel, of legal rigor or softened
by some mercy and forbearance. If
mercy, the administratrix of
predestination is revealed according to the
Gospel, as is true, it seems from what
has already been said, that justice
the opposite of mercy, which is prior
to it, in the order of nature, should
be also revealed according to the
Gospel. If any one thinks that these views
are vain and useless, let him consider
that what is said in the Scripture
concerning legal righteousness is not
useless—
"The man which doeth those things
shall live by them," (Rom. x. 5,) and
"cursed is every one that
continueth not in all things which are written in
the book of the law to do them."
(Gal. iii. 10.)
Let him also consider what is said
concerning Evangelical righteousness, "He
that believeth in the Son hath
everlasting life, (John iii. 36,) and "He
that believeth not is condemned. (John
iii. 18.) I wish that these things
may be considered thoroughly by the
thoughtful, and I ask a suspension of
their decision until they have
accurately weighed the matter.
_________________________________________________________________
FOURTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The second theory is this—God, from
eternity, considering men in their
original native condition determined
to raise some to supernatural felicity
and ordained for the same persons
supernatural means which are necessary,
sufficient and efficacious to secure
that felicity to them, to the praise of
his glorious grace; and to pass by
others, and to have them in their natural
state, and not to bestow on them those
supernatural and efficacious means,
to declare the liberty of his own
goodness; and that he reprobated the same
individuals, so passed by, whom he
foresaw as not continuing in their
original condition, but falling from
it of their own fault, that is, he
prepared punishment for them to the
declaration of his own justice.
THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FOURTH
PROPOSITION
This theory is stated, in these words,
not more nearly in accordance with
the sentiment of its authors than the
preceding. For in the first place, I
do not remember that I have read these
words in Thomas Aquinas, or others:
in the second place, if any have used
this phraseology, they have not used
it in that sense, as shall be proved
under the sixth proposition. But in the
phrase supernatural felicity, understand
th<n uiJoqesian, the adoption of
the sons of God with all its adjuncts
and consectaries. After the words
"declare the liberty of his own
goodness," add, if you please, "and the
perfection of his manifold
wisdom." The word reprobation is to be taken
catachrestically, as we have before
observed. I should prefer that words
should be variously distinguished in
referring to matters which are
distinct.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO
THE FOURTH PROPOSITION
If I have stated this second theory as
nearly in accordance with the
sentiments of its authors as in the
preceding case, it is well; but I fear
on this point since I do not, with
equal confidence claim a knowledge of the
second. Yet I think that I have
derived the explanation of this from the
Theses discussed under your direction
in which I recognize your style and
mode of discussion. Thus in Thesis 10
of those which were discussed,
Coddaeus being the respondent, is this
statement. "Human beings" (that is,
one part of the material of
predestination, as is stated in Thesis 7, of the
same disputation concerning
predestination) "are creatures in a condition of
nature (which can effect nothing
natural, nothing divine) to be exalted
above nature, and to be transmitted to
a participation of divine things by
the supernatural energy of the
Deity." The same assertion is found in the
Thesis 4 of your tenth theological
disputation, in which the subject of the
predestination of human beings alone
is discussed, as is the case with the
first Thesis, that no one may think
that things, said in common concerning
the predestination of angels and of
men, ought to be expressed in general
terms. which might afterwards be
attributed specially to each of these
classes, according to their different
condition to the elect angels, an
exaltation from that nature, in which
they were created by the Deity, but to
elect human beings on elevation from
their corrupt nature into which they
fell, of their own fault. If, however,
this matter is thus understood, there
is now no discrepancy between us in
this respect.
But I think that it is evident from
those words of your Theses that human
beings, considered in their original
condition are the material of
predestination, or its adequate
object. Human beings I say in their original
condition, both in the fact that
nothing supernatural or divine has been
bestowed upon them, and that they have
not yet fallen into sin.
Considered in their original
condition, I say again, in view of the fact
that even if they have either
supernatural and divine gifts or sin, they are
not considered with reference to these
by Him who determined to perform any
certain act concerning them, which is
equivalent to an assertion that
neither supernatural or divine gifts,
nor sin, held, in the mind of Him who
considered them the position of a
formal cause in the object, From these
words I deduce this conclusion: Human
beings, considered in their natural
state which can admit nothing
supernatural or divine, are the object or
material of predestination;-But human
beings, considered in their natural
condition, are here as beings
considered in that natural state, which can do
nothing supernatural or divine, or
rather they are the same in definition;-
Therefore, human beings in their
natural state are the object and material
of predestination, that is, according
to the views embraced in your Theses.
The Major Proposition is contained in
the Thesis. For if the will or decree
of God in reference to the exaltation
of men from such a state of nature to
a state above nature is
predestination, then men, considered in that natural
state, are the true material of
predestination; since the acts of God, both
the internal, which is the decree
concerning the exaltation of certain human
beings, and the external, which is the
exaltation itself, (as it ought to
be, if we wish to consider the mere
object) leave to us man in his mere
natural state which can do nothing supernatural or divine.
If it is said that, in these words,
the condition of sin is not excluded,
since even sinners may be raised from
their corrupt nature, I reply, in the
first place, that this cannot be the
meaning of those words, both because it
is not necessary that it should be
said of such a nature that can do nothing
supernatural or divine, for this is
understood from the qualifying term,
when it is spoken of as
"corrupt," and because, in the definition of
preterition, Thesis 15, that act, by
which the pure nature of some creatures
is not confirmed, is attributed to
preterition, which preterition is the
leaving of some created beings in
their natural condition. I reply, in the
second place, that there is here an
equivocation in the definition, and that
the decree is equivocal and only true
on the condition of its division, of
which I will say more hereafter. The
Minor is true, for this is evident from
the reciprocal and equivalent relation
of the antecedent and consequent to
each other. But what pertains to
predestination is enunciated in these
words, "to be exalted above
nature, and to be transferred to a participation
of divine things by the supernatural
energy of the Deity, which divine
things pertain to grace and
glory," as in your Thesis 9. It is not doubtful
that my words, in which I have
described the second theory, are in harmony
with these statements, but if any one
thinks that there is a discrepancy
because, in your Theses, grace and
glory are united, and that it can be
understood from my words that I
designed to indicate that glory first, and
grace afterwards, are prepared for men
in predestination, I would inform him
that I did not wish to indicate such
an idea, but that I wished to set
forth, in those words, what the
predestinate obtain from predestination.
I come now to the second part, which
refers to preterition, and in reference
to this, your Theses make this
statement "Preterition is the act of the
divine will, by which God, from
eternity, determined to leave some of his
creatures in their natural state, and
not to communicate to them that
supernatural grace by which their
nature might be preserved uncorrupt, or,
having become corrupt, might be
restored to the declaration of the freedom
of his own goodness." Also in
your theological axioms Concerning Nature and
Grace, axiom 44. "To this purpose
of election in Christ is opposed the
eternal purpose of non-election or
preterition, according to which some are
passed by as to be left in their own
natural state." These are my words:
"but he determined to pass by
some and to leave them in their natural state,
and not to impart to them those
supernatural and especially those
efficacious means, to declare the
freedom of his own goodness." He, who
compares our statements, will see that
one and the same sentiment is
expressed in different words. For
"supernatural grace" and "supernatural
means" signify the same thing,
"the grace by which nature, when uncorrupt,
might be strengthened, and when
corrupt, might be restored," is what I have
described in the phrase
"efficacious means." For "efficacious means" either
confirm nature when uncorrupt or
restore it when corrupt; as sufficient
means are those which have the power
to confirm or restore. Moreover the
end, which I have proposed, is
expressed in your second Thesis, "to the
praise of his glorious grace,"
and again, in the second Thesis of the tenth
disputation, "to the praise of
his most glorious grace," and in Thesis 15 of
the disputation concerning
predestination, in which Coddaeus is the
respondent, you have stated the end of
preterition to be "the declaration of
the freedom of the divine goodness,
with no additional remark; yet I do not
object to what you wish to add in this
place, "the perfection of his
manifold wisdom." However, the
freedom of goodness and the perfection of
wisdom cannot be at the same moment
engaged in the acts of predestination
and preterition. For the office of
wisdom takes precedence, in pointing out
all possible methods of illustrating
the glory of God, and that which may
especially conduce to the glory of
God. But the freedom of his goodness is
subsequent in its operation, in making
choice of the mode of illustration,
and in carrying it out into the
action, in the exercise (so to speak) of
power. In reference to the third part,
I make the same remark, namely,
concerning reprobation, or the
preparation of punishment, that I have also
explained it correctly according to
your view, for thus is reprobation or
the preparation for punishment defined
in Thesis seventeen. "It is the act
of the divine pleasure, by which God
from eternity determined for the
declaration of his own justice to
punish his creatures, who should not
continue in their original state, but
should depart from God, the author of
their origin, by their own deed and
depravity. But I have used the same
words with only this addition,
"the same individuals, so passed by," by
which addition I have only done that
which was made requisite by the
arrangement and distinction in
character which I have adopted; for those,
for whom punishment is prepared, are
not different from those who are passed
by, though punishment was prepared for
them, not because they are included
in the latter class, the passed by,
but because they were foreseen as those
who would be sinners.
I cannot, therefore, yet persuade
myself that this sentiment has been
incorrectly set forth by me. If I
shall see it hereafter, I will freely
acknowledge it, though this may not be
of so much importance.
This indeed I desire, that whether the
first view, or the second, or any
other view whatever be presented, it
may be clearly and strongly proved from
the Scriptures, and be defended, with
accuracy, from all objections. In
reference to the word
"reprobate," I have spoken before in reply to your
second answer, and I am prepared to use it
hereafter according to your later
explanation, as you have given it in
your last answer. I should perhaps have
so used it, in my former letter, if I
had found it so used by yourself in
your own writings, for I know that
equivocal meaning has always been the
mother of error, and that it ought to
be carefully avoided in all serious
discussions.
_________________________________________________________________
FIFTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The third theory is that God
determined of his grace to free some of the
human race, fallen, and lying in the
"lump" (Rom. ix. 21 ) of perdition and
corruption, to the declaration of his
Mercy; but to leave in the same
"lump," or at least to damn,
on account of final impenitence, others, to the
illustration both of the freedom of
his gratuitous grace towards the vessels
of glory and mercy, and of his justice
towards the vessels of dishonour and
wrath. I do not state these views,
that I may instruct you in reference to
them, but that you may see whether I
have correctly understood them, and may
direct and guide me, if I am, in any
respect, in error.
THE REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE FIFTH
PROPOSITION
This theory agrees with the first and
second in all respects, if you make
this one exception, that, in the
latter case, the election and reprobation
of men is said to have been made after
the condition of the fall and of our
sin, in the former case without
reference to the fall, and to our sin. But
neither of them seems properly and
absolutely to pertain altogether to the
relation of election and reprobation
since all admit that the cause of
election and reprobation is placed in
the consent only of the Being, who
alone predestinates. For, whether it
is affirmed that election and
reprobation are made from among human
beings in their original state, or
from those, who are fallen and sinful,
there was not any cause in them, who,
in either state, were equal in all respects,
according to nature, but only
in the will and liberty of God
electing, who separated these from those, and
adopted them unto himself "of his
own will" boulhqeiv as James says (ch. 1,
vers. 18,) or according to the counsel
of his will. But yet this
circumstance is worthy of notice, and
we will, hereafter in its own place,
give our opinion concerning it,
according to the Scriptures, as there will
be an appropriate place for speaking
of this subject.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO
THE FIFTH PROPOSITION
The circumstance of sin and of the
fall is of very great importance in this
whole subject, not indeed as a cause
but as a quality, requisite in the
object, without a consideration of
which I do not think that election or
reprobation was or could have been
made by the Deity, which matter we will
hereafter more fully discuss. There
are also many men learned, and not
unversed in the sacred Scriptures, who
say that God could not be defended
from the charge of sin, if he had not
in that decree, considered, man as a
sinful being. But I cannot, for a
two-fold reason, assent to your denial
that the formal cause of the object
properly pertains to the subject of that
decree, because all fully agree in
admitting that the cause of the decree is
placed in Him, who predestinates.
First, because the formal cause of the
object, and not the cause of the act
only, is necessarily required for the
definition of that act. Secondly,
because it is possible that the cause of
the act may be of such a nature, that,
in its own act, it cannot exert
influence on the object which is
presented to it, unless it be furnished
with that formal relation, which I
think is the fact in this case, and will
prove it. Nor is there any reason why
it should be said that the freedom of
God, in the act of predestination, is
limited though the circumstance of sin
may be stated to be of necessity
presupposed to that decree.
But since frequent mention has been
made, in this whole discussion of divine
freedom, it will not be out of place
to refer to it at somewhat greater
length, and to affix to it its limits
from the Scripture, according to the
declaration of God himself. The
subject of freedom is the will, its object
is an act. In respect to the former,
it is an affection of the will,
according to which it freely tends
towards its one object; in respect to the
latter, it is the power and authority
over its own act. This freedom is, in
the first place and chiefly, in God,
and it is in rational creatures by a
communication made by God. But freedom
is limited, or, which is the same
thing, it is effected that any act
should not be in the power of the agent
in three ways, by natural and internal
necessity, by external force and
coaction, and by the interposition of
law. God can be compelled by no one to
an act, he can be hindered by no one
in an act, hence, this freedom is not
limited by that kind of restriction.
Law also cannot be imposed on God, as
He is the highest, the Supreme
Lawgiver. But He can limit Himself, by His
own act. There are, then, but two
causes which effect that any act should
not be in the power of God; the former
is the nature of God, and whatever is
repugnant to it is absolutely
impossible; the latter is any previous act of
God, to which another act is opposed.
Examples of the former are such as
these; God cannot lie, because He is,
by nature, true. He cannot sin or
commit injustice, because he is
justice itself. Examples of the latter are
these; God cannot effect that what has
previously occurred may not have
occurred, for, by an antecedent act,
he has effected that it should be; if
now can effect that it may not have
been, He will destroy his own power and
will. God could not but grant to David
that his seed should sit on his
throne, for this was promised to
David, and confirmed by an oath. He cannot
forget the labour of love, performed
by the saints, so as not to bestow upon
it a reward, for He has promised that reward.
If, then, any one wishes to
inquire whether any act belongs to the
free will and the power of God, he
must see whether the nature of God may
restrict that act, and if it is not
so restricted, whether the freedom of
God is limited by any antecedent act,
if he shall find that the act is not
restricted in either mode, then he may
conclude that the act pertains to the
divine power; but it is not to be
immediately inferred that it has been
or will be performed by God, since any
act which depends on His free will,
can be suspended by Him, so as not to be
performed. It is also to be observed
here that many things are possible for
God, in respect to this absolute
power, which are not possible in respect to
justice. It is possible in respect to
His power that He should punish one
who has not sinned, for who could
resist Him, but it is not possible, in
respect to justice, for it would be at
variance with the Divine justice. God
can do whatever He wills with His own,
but He cannot will to do with His own
that which he cannot do of right. For
His will is restricted by the limits
of justice. Nor is the creature, in
such a sense, in the power of God, the
Creator, that he can do, of right, in
reference to it, whatever he might do
of His absolute power, for the power
of God over the creature depends, not
on the infinity of the Divine essence,
but on that communication by which he
has communicated to us our limited
essence. This permits that God should
deprive us of that being which he has
given us without merit on our part,
but does not permit that He should
inflict misery upon us without our
demerit. For to be miserable is worse
than not to be, as happiness is better
than mere existence. And, therefore,
there is not the same liberty to
inflict misery on the creature without
demerit, as to take away being
without previous sin. God takes away
that which He gave, and He can do as He
wills, with His own, but He cannot
inflict misery, because the creature does
not so far belong to God. The potter
cannot, from the unformed lump, make a
man to dishonour and condemnation,
unless the man has previously made
himself worthy of punishment and
dishonour by his own transgression.
_________________________________________________________________
SIXTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I am not pleased with the first theory
because God could not, in his purpose
of illustrating his glory by mercy and
punitive justice, have reference to
man as not yet made, nor indeed to man
as made, and considered in his
natural condition. In which sentiment
I think that I have yourself as my
precedent, for, in discussing
predestination, you no where make mention of
mercy, but every where of grace, which
transcends mercy, as exercised
towards creatures, continuing in their
original, natural state, while it
coincides with mercy in being occupied
with the sinner, but when you treat
of the passed by and the reprobate,
you mention justice, and only in the
case of such. Besides, according to
that opinion, God is, by necessary
consequence, made the author of the
fall of Adam and of sin, from which
imputation he is not freed by the
distinctions of the act and the evil in
the act, of necessity and coaction, of
the decree and its execution, of
efficacious and permissive decree, as
the latter is explained by the authors
of this view, in harmony with it, nor
a different relation of the divine
decree and of human nature, nor by the
addition of the proposed end, namely
that the whole might redound to the
divine glory, &c.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SIXTH
PROPOSITION
There are three things to be laid down
in order, before I come to the
argumentation itself. First, in
reference to the meaning of the first view;
secondly, in reference to its
agreement with the second and third; thirdly,
in reference to a few fundamental
principles necessary to the clearness of
this question. In the first place,
then, if that view be fully examined, we
shall perceive with certainty that its
authors did not regard man absolutely
and only before his creation, &c.,
but in a general view and with a
universal reference to that and to all
times. For though they make the act
of election and predestination, (as
one which exists in the Deity,) as from
eternity, in reference to the creation
of man, yet they teach that its
object, namely mankind, was
predestinated without discrimination, and in
common, and that God, in the act of
predestination, considered the whole
human race as various parts inwrought
by the eternal decree into its
execution. Thus Beza, very clearly on
Ephes. i. 4, says, "Christ is
presented to us as mediator.
Therefore, the fall must, in the order of
causes, necessarily precede in the
purpose of God, but previous to the fall
there must be a creation in
righteousness and holiness." So afterwards, on
ch. iv, 24, "As God has made for
Himself a way both for saving, by his
mercy, those whom He had elected in
Christ, and for justly punishing those
who, having been conceived in sin,
should remain in their depravity," &c.
This view he also learnedly presents
in a note on verses 4 and 5. Thus those
authors embrace the first, and, at the
same time, the second and third
theories.
But this first theory has an agreement
with the second and also with the
third, indeed it is altogether the
stone, though in appearance it seems
otherwise, if you attend to the
various objects of these theories. For while
the authors of the first regard man
universally, in the argument of
predestination, election and
reprobation, the authors of the second have
made a restriction to the case of man
before transgression only, and this
with the design to show that, in
predestination, the cause of election and
of reprobation was only in the being
predestinating, which is very true.
When they assert, therefore, that the
election of man was made before his
fall, they do not exclude the idea of
the eternity of that decree, but
consider this to be sufficient if they
may establish the fact that eternal
predestination, that is, election and
reprobation, was made by God, without
reference to sin, which the apostle
has demonstrated in the example, by no
means obscure, of Jacob and Esau.
(Rom. 9) The first, therefore, differs
from the second less in substance than
in the manner of speaking. But those,
who adhere to the third theory, have
looked, properly speaking, not so much
to the cause of election and
reprobation, as to the order of causes, of
which damnation is the consequence;
which damnation, many in former times,
confounding with reprobation, that is,
non-election or predestination,
exclaimed that the doctrine of
predestination was impious, and accused the
servants of God, as is most clearly
evident from the writings of Augustine
and Fulgentius. The little book of
Augustine, which he wrote in answer to
the twelve articles falsely charged
against him, most opportunely explains
the matter. Neither those who favour
the second theory, therefore, nor those
who favour the third, have attacked
the first, but have rather presented in
a different mode, parts of the same
argument, distinct in certain respects.
It seems then that, as to the sum of
the whole matter, they do not differ so
much as some suppose, but have
attributed to parts of its execution, (to all
of which the decree has reference,)
certain circumstances, not indeed
ineptly in respect to the
decree.
Let us now come to certain fundamental
principles necessary to this
doctrine, by the application of which
its truth may be confirmed, and those
things which seem to operate against
it, may be removed. These seem to me
capable of being included under four
heads, the essence of God, His
knowledge, His actions, and their
causes, to each of which we will here
briefly refer. We quote first from
Mal. iii. 6, "I am the Lord, I change
not;" also from James i. 17,
"with whom is no variableness, neither shadow
of turning," and many similar
passages. The truth of this fundamental
principle is very certain; from it is
deduced the inevitable necessity of
this conclusion, that in the Deity
nothing is added, nothing is taken away,
nothing is changed in fact or
relation; for such have philosophers
themselves decided to be the nature of
eternity; but God is eternal. Also
that God is destitute of all movement
in His essence, because He is
immortal; in His power because He is pure and
simple action; and in
intellect, because "all things
are naked and opened unto His eyes," and He
sees all and each of them eternally,
by a single glance; in His will and
purpose, for He "is not a man that
he should lie, neither the son of a man
that He should repent," (Num.
xxiii. 19,) but He is always the same; and
lastly in operation, for the things
which vary are created, while the Lord
remains without Variation, and has in
Himself the form of immutable
conception of all those things which
exist and are done mutably in time. The
second fundamental principle is that
the knowledge of the eternal, immutable
and infinite mind is eternal,
immutable and infinite and knows things to be
known as such, and those to be done as
such, (gwstw~v) eternally, immutably
and infinitely. God has a knowledge
practically (praktikw~v) of all evil as
a matter of mere knowledge and finally
of all things of all classes, (which
consist of things the highest, the
intermediate, and the lowest of things
good and evil,) energetically
(ejnerghtikw~v) according to his own divine
mode. There is a three-fold relation
in all science, if comparison is made
with the thing known according to the
measure of the being who knows or
takes cognizance of it; inferior,
equal, and superior, or supereminent,
which may be made clear by an
illustration from sight. I see the sun, but
the light of my vision is inferior to
its light; I take cognizance of
natural objects, but as owls do of the light
of the sun, as Aristotle says.
Here is the inferior mode of
knowledge, which never exists in God. In him
alone exists equal knowledge, and that
knowledge which is supereminent after
the divine mode, for He has equal
knowledge of Himself; He is that which He
knows Himself to be, and he knows
adequately what He is. All other things He
knows in the supereminent mode, and
has them present to himself from
eternity; if not, there would be two
very grievous absurdities, not to
mention others; one, that something
might be added to the Deity, but that
nothing can be added to eternity; the
other, that knowledge could not belong
to God univocally as the source of all
knowledge. But nature herself teaches
that in every class of objects there
is some one thing which they call
univocal, from which are other things
in an equivocal sense; as, for
example, things which are hot, are
made so by fire. Here the fire is hot
univocally, other things equivocally.
God has knowledge univocally, other
beings equivocally; unless perhaps
some may be so foolish as to place a
possessor of knowledge above the
Deity, which would be blasphemy. The third
point is that the actions of God in
Himself are eternal, whether they
pertain to His knowledge or His
essence, to His intellect, will or power,
and whatever else there may be of this
nature; but from Himself they flow,
as it were, out of himself according
to His own mode, or according to that
of the creature according to his eternal decree, yet in an order which
is
his own, but adapted to time.
According to the mode of the Deity, action is
three-fold; that of creation, that of
providence, so far as it is immediate,
and that of saving grace.
For many things proceed from the Deity
without the work of the creature, but
they are things which He condescends
to accomplish mediately in nature and
in grace. He does, as a universal
principle according to the mode of the
creature, and, as Augustine says,
(lib. 7, de. civit. Dei. cap. 30) "He so
administers all things which He has
created, as to permit them also to
exercise and to perform their own
motions." But "their own motions" pertain,
some of them to nature and to natural
instinct and are directed invariably
to one certain and destined end, and
others to the will in the rational
nature, which are directed to various
objects either good or evil, to those
which are good, by the influence of
the Deity, to those which are evil by
His influence only so far as they are
natural, and by his permission so far
as they are voluntary. From which it
can be established in the best and most
sacred manner that all effects and
defects in nature and in the will of all
kinds, depend on the providence of God; yet in
such a manner that, as Plato
says, the creature is in fault as the
proximate cause, and "God is wholly
without blame."
The fourth point is that the first and
supreme cause is so far universal,
that nothing else can be supposed or
devised to be its cause, since if it
should depend on any other cause, it
could be neither the first nor the
supreme cause, but there must be
another, either prior or superior, or equal
to it, so that neither would be
absolutely first or supreme. In the next
place, all causes exist, either as
principles or derived from a principle;
"as principles" nature and
the will exist; "from a principle" are mediate
causes, from nature, natural causes,
and from the will voluntary causes. The
mode of the latter has been made
two-fold by the Deity, necessary and
contingent. The necessary mode is that
which cannot be otherwise, and this
is always good, in that it is
necessary; but the contingent is that which is
as it happens to be, whether good or
bad. But here a three-fold caution is
to be carefully observed; first, that
we hold these modes of the causes to
be from the things themselves and in
themselves, according to the relation
of the principles from which they
proceed, for we speak now not of the
immediate actions of God, which are
above these principles, as we have
before noticed, the natural causes,
naturally, and the voluntary causes,
voluntarily; secondly, that we make
both these modes to be from God, but not
in God; for mode in God is only
divine, that is, it surpasses the necessary
and contingent in all their modes;
since there can occur to the Deity
neither necessity from any source, nor
any contingency, but all things in
the Deity are essential, and in a
divine mode; thirdly, that we should
consider those modes as flowing from
God to created things, in such a manner
that none of them should be
reciprocated, and, as it were, flow back to God.
For God is the universal principle;
and if any of these should flow back to
Him, He would from that fact cease to
be the principle. The reason, indeed,
of this is manifest from a comparison
of natural examples, since this whole
thing proceeds not from natural power simply,
in so far as it is natural,
but from the rational power of God.
For it is a condition of natural power,
that it always produces one and the
same thing in its own kind, and that if
it should produce any thing, out of
itself, it must produce something like
itself from the necessity of nature,
or something unlike from contingency. A
pear tree produces a pear tree, a bull
begets one of its own species, and a
human being begets a human being; that
is, in accordance with the distinct
form which exists in the nature of
each thing.
But the operation of rational power,
which is capable of all forms, is of
all kinds; to which three things must
concur in the agent, knowledge, power,
and will. But the mode of those
things, which rational power effects, is not
constituted according to the mode of
knowledge or power, but to the mode of
the will which actually forms the
works, which virtually are formed in the
knowledge and power, as in a root; and
this from the freedom of the will and
not from the necessity of nature. If
we would illustrate this by an example
in divine things, let it be this: the
person of the Father begat the person
of the Son by nature, not by the will;
God begat his creatures by the will,
not by nature. Therefore, the Son is
one with the Father, but created things
are diverse from the Deity, and are of
all classes, degrees, and conditions,
made by His rational power voluntarily
to demonstrate His manifold wisdom.
It is indeed nothing new that those
things which are of nature should be
reciprocated and refluent, since many
of them are adequate, while many
indeed are essential. But it is a new
idea that those things which are of
the will should be either reciprocated
or made adequate. But if this is true
in nature, as it surely is, how much
more must it be believed in reference
to God, if He be compared with created
things. It was necessary that these
should be laid down by me, my brother,
rather copiously, that the sequence
might be more easily determined by
certain limits.
You say that the first opinion does
not please you, because you think that
God cannot, in his purpose to
illustrate his glory by mercy and punitive
justice, have had reference to the
human race, considered as not yet made.
You add, in amplifying the idea, that
God did not have reference even to the
human race, considered as created, and
in his natural condition. That we may
each understand the other, I remark
that I understand by your phrase, "have
reference to the human race," to
have man as the object or instead of the
object of action. But let us consider,
if you please, or rather, because it
does please you and you request it,
how far your view is correct. Indeed,
from the first fundamental principle,
which I have before laid down, (from
which I trust that you do not
dissent,) I consider man as not yet created,
as created, as fallen, and, in fine,
man in general, in whatever light he
may be viewed, to be the object of the
power, knowledge, will, mercy and
justice of God; for if this is
granted, it will then be a complete sequence
that there is something, aside from
common providence and the special
predestination of the sons of God, not
an object of the action of the Deity.
Then there can be some addition to
God, if something can be added to His
power, knowledge, will, &c., since
the power, knowledge, will, &c., of God,
is either God, or a divine, that is,
an infinite act. Whatever eternity
looks upon, if it does not look upon
it eternally, it ceases to be eternity;
it loses the nature of eternity. If
infinity does not look on infinite
things, in an infinite manner, if it
is limited by parts, it ceases to be
infinity. To God and His eternity, it
is not is, was or shall be, but
permanent and enduring being, all at
once, and without bounds. The creature
exists indeed in time, but is present
to God, in a peculiar, that is, a
divine mode, which is above all
consideration of time, and from eternity to
eternity; and this is true not only of
the creature itself, but of all its
feelings, whatever may be their
origin. You will perhaps say that this
principle is acknowledged in the
abstract, but that here, as it is
considered in the concrete, it has a
different relation, in that it has
reference to mercy and punishment,
which can really be supposed only in view
of antecedent misery and sin. But
these also, my brother, are present with
God as really as those; I do not say
in the mode of nature, which is
fleeting, but in that of the Deity,
which is eternal, and in all respects
surpasses nature. They, who think
differently, are in danger of denying the
most absolute and eternal essence of
the Deity itself. We said also, under
proposition three, that in created
things misery and sin may be considered
in relation to the act, the habit, or
the capability also in an absolute and
in a relative sense. But in God, (whom
also Aristotle acknowledges to be
"energy in its most simple
form," mercy and judgment exist by an eternal
act, and not by a temporal one; and
contemplates the misery and sin of man
in all their modes, previous to all
time, and does not merely take
cognizance of them as they occur in time.
Lastly, that we may disclose the
fountain of the matter, this whole idea
originates in the fact that the third
fundamental principle which, we before
laid down, has not been sufficiently
regarded by those who so think. For
since all action is either internal or
external, or both united together.
The internal is in God, as the maker:
the external is in the creature in its
own time and place, and in the thing
made just as the house is formed in the
mind of the builder, before it is built
materially (as it is said). But when
both acts are united and from them is
produced a work, numerically a unit,
which they style a result, then the
internal act is the formal cause; the
external act is the material cause.
Nothing in God is temporary; action in
God is alone eternal, for it is
internal, it is therefore not temporary; so,
on the contrary, all things out of God
are temporary, therefore the external
act is temporary, for it is out of
God. "What, then, do you prove?" you will
ask. "That God in his mercy and
punitive justice acts with reference to man
as not yet created, or indeed as
created, but considered in his natural
condition?" I indeed admit that
whatever it may be, which can be predicated
of man, it can sacredly and in truth
be predicated of him. Yet I see that
two statements may be made of a milder
character, and in harmony with the
words of Christ and the apostles,
which are clearly intimated, if not fully
expressed by them; the former, that,
in this question, we must consider, not
only the mode and the consequent event
(which some call, catechrestically,
the end), namely, mercy and punitive
justice, also life and eternal death,
but the fountain and the genus from
which these result, and to which they
hold the relation of species, namely,
grace and non-grace, adoption or
filiation, and non-adoption, which is
reprobation, as we have said above
(Prop. 2), the latter, that, in the
argument of election, we must propose
not any particular relation of the
human race, but the common or universal
relation so that we may consider him
as not yet created, as created, as
fallen &c., yet present in all
respects in the conception of God, so that in
this election, grace towards mankind
in the abstract, and mercy towards man
as fallen and sinful, which is of
grace, concur, but in reprobation, the
absence of the grace of adoption and
the absence of mercy concur. If these
statements are correct, I do not see
in what respect a pious mind can be
offended. For Christ says that they
are blessed of God, the Father who
"inherit the kingdom prepared for
them from the foundation of the world."
(Matt. xxv. 34.)
And Paul says that God "hath
blessed us with all spiritual blessings in
heavenly places in Christ, according
as he hath chosen us in him, before the
foundation of the world, that we
should be holy and without blame before him
in love, having predestinated us unto
the adoption of children by Jesus
Christ to himself, according to the
good pleasure, to the praise, &c."
(Ephes. i. 3-6.) "What then? is
there no special reference?" I answer that
properly in the argument of election
and reprobation (for the matter of
damnation is a different one) there is
no particular reference to men as a
cause, but our separation from the
reprobate is wholly of the mere will of
God: in that God has separated and
made a distinction among men, whether not
yet created, created or fallen, and
indeed among all things, present alike
to Him, yet equal in all respects by
nature and condition, by electing and
predestinating some to the adoption of
the sons of God, and by leaving
others to themselves and to their own
nature, not calling them to the
adoption of the sons of God, which is
gratuitous and can be ascribed only to
grace. This grace, also, unique in
itself only, may be two-fold in the
elect, for either it is grace simply,
if you look even from eternity on man
without reference to the fall, which
grace is communicated to the elect,
both angels and men, or it is grace
joined to mercy, or gracious mercy, when
you come down to the special matter of
the fall and of sin. God dealt with
the angels according to His grace,
with us according to His grace and mercy,
if you do not also have reference to
possible misery (of which we spoke,
Prop. 3, and misery.) For in this
sense mercy is, and can, with propriety,
be called a divine work of grace. But
what is there here which can be
reprehended in God? What is there,
which can be denied by us? God has
bestowed human nature on all; it is a
good gift; on certain individuals he
has bestowed mercy and the grace of
adoption; this is a better gift. He was
not under obligation to bestow either;
He bestowed both, the former on all,
the latter on some men. But it may
perhaps be said that reprobation is one
thing, and punitive justice and
damnation, which is under discussion, is
another. Let that be conceded; then
there is agreement between us in
reference to reprobation, let us then
consider punitive justice and
damnation. It is certain that, as the
vessels of mercy which God has
prepared for His glory that He might
demonstrate the riches of His glory,
are from eternity fully present to Him
in a divine and incomprehensible
manner, without any motion or change
in Himself, so also "the vessels of
wrath fitted to destruction" that
he might "show His wrath and make His
power known," (Rom. ix. 22,) are
eternally presented to his eyes, according
to the mode of Deity. As vessels,
therefore, they are of God, for He is the
maker of all things: as vessels of
wrath, they are of themselves and of
their own sin, into which they rush of
their own will, for we all are by
this nature the children of wrath,
(Ephes. ii. 3,) but not in our original
constitution. Moses affirms in Gen. i.
31, that "God saw every thing that He
had made, and, behold, it was very
good."
God, who is good, does not hate that
which is good. All things, at their
creation, were good, therefore at
their creation, God did not hate any one
of all created things: He hates that
which is alien from Himself, but not
that which is His own: He is angry
with our fall and sin, not with His own
creation. By creation they are
vessels; by the fall, they are vessels of
wrath, and fitted to destruction, as
the most just consequence of the fall
and of depravity: for "neither
shall evil dwell with God." (Psalm v. 4.) As
in the knowledge of God is the good of
the elect, with whom he deals in
mercy, so in the knowledge of God, as
Isaiah says, chapter xlviii, 4 and 8,
is the evil of others: the latter He
hated and damned from the period of His
knowledge of it. But He knew and
foreknew from eternity; therefore, He hates
and damns, and even pre-damns from
eternity.
As this is the relation of the former
proposition, the relation of the other
also, added by way of amplification,
"nor indeed to man as made and
considered in his original
condition," is also the same. For the consequence
is plainly deduced in the same mode,
in reference to the latter as in
reference to the former; and you are
not ignorant that universal
affirmations follow by fair deduction
from that which is general to that
which is particular. God has reference
from eternity in election and
reprobation to mankind in general;
therefore He had reference to man as not
created, created and fallen, and if
there is any other term, by which we can
express our ideas. In the case of
election, and of reprobation, I say, He
regarded man abstractly, with whatever
relation you may invest him. In the
case of damnation, He regarded the
sinner, whom He had not given to Christ
in the election of grace, and whom He
from eternity saw as a sinner. Those
holy men, therefore rightly stated
that the election and reprobation of man
was made from eternity: some
considered them as having reference to man, not
yet created, others to man as not yet
fallen, and yet others to man as
fallen: since in whatever condition
you regard him, a man is elected or
reprobated without consideration of
his good or evil deeds. Nor indeed can
it be proved that they are at variance
in this matter, unless a denial of
other conditions is shown in plain
terms. For such is the common statement
by universal consent. In which, if any
one affirms that the supposition of
one involves the disavowal of the
other he opposes the truth of natural
logic and common usage. But if such is
the relation of election and
reprobation in a general sense, it is
a complete sequence that they who say
that men, as not created, were
elected, speak very truly, since God elected
them by the internal act, before He
did by the external act; and that they
who affirm that the election was of
man, as created, have reference to the
principle of the external act; and so
with the rest. But all these things
are not in reference to His act per
se, but in reference to the condition of
the act, which does not affect its
substance. You say that in this opinion
you have me as a precedent since, in
the discussion of predestination, I "no
where make mention of mercy, but every
where of grace, which transcends
mercy." Indeed, my brother, I
have never thought that I should seem to
exclude the other parts when I might
use the term grace, nor do I see how
that inference can be made from the
phrase itself. Grace is the genus; it
does not exclude mercy, the species.
Grace includes, so to speak, the path
for all times; therefore it includes
that of mercy. Nor do they, who mention
mercy, in presenting the species,
exclude the genus, nor, in presenting a
part, do they exclude all which
remains. And we, in presenting the genus, do
not deny the species, nor in
presenting the whole, do we disavow a part.
Both are found in the Scriptures,
which speak of grace in respect to the
whole and its single parts, and in a
certain respect, of mercy: but they
take away neither by the affirmation
of the other. I would demonstrate this
by quotations, did I not think that
you with me, according to your skill and
intelligence would acknowledge this.
Predestination is of grace: the same
grace, which has effected the predestination
of the saints, also includes
mercy: this I sufficiently declared a
little while since. I mentioned grace
simply, in the case of simple
predestination, that is, predestination
expressed in simple and universal
terms. I speak of mercy, also, in relation
to a man who is miserable, spoken of
absolutely, or relatively. You add that
when I treat of the passed by and the
reprobate, I mention justice, and only
in the case of such. Let us, if you
please, remove the homonymy; then we
shall expedite the matter in a few
words. We exposed the homonymy in the
second proposition; we speak of the
reprobate either generally or
particularly. If you understand it
generally, the mention of justice is
correctly made, as we shall soon show.
If particularly, either reprobates
and those passed by refer to the same,
which is the appropriate
signification, or the term reprobate
is applied to the damned, which is
catachrestic. I do not think that you
understand it in the former sense, if
you understand it in the latter (as
you do), what you say is certainly very
true, that I spoke of justice only
when treating of the damned. However, I
do not approve that you write
copulatively of the passed by and the
reprobate, that is, the damned. For
although they are the same in subject,
and all the passed by are damned, and
all the damned are passed by, yet
their relation as passed by or
reprobate is one thing, and their relation as
damned is another.
Preterition or reprobation is not
without justice, but it is not of justice,
as its cause: damnation is with
justice and of justice. Election and
reprobation or preterition are the
work of free will according to the wisdom
of God; but damnation is the work of
necessary will according to the justice
of God; for God "cannot deny
Himself" (2 Tim. ii. 13.) As a just judge, it
is necessary that He should punish
unrighteousness, and execute judgment.
This, I say, is the work of the
manifold wisdom of God, which in those
creatures, in whom he has implanted
the principle of their own ways, namely,
a free will, He might exhibit its
two-fold use, good and bad, and the
consequent result of its use in both
directions. Hence he has, in His own
wisdom, ordained, both in angels and
in men, the way of both modes of its
use, without any fault or sin on His
own part. But it is a work of justice
to damn the unrighteous. Therefore
also it is said truly that the passed by
are damned by the Deity, but because they
were to be damned, not because
they were passed by or
reprobated.
Now I come to your argumentation, in
which you affirm that, "according to
that theory, God is, by necessary
consequence, made the author of the fall
of Adam, and of sin &c." I do
not, indeed, perceive the argument from which
this conclusion is necessarily
deduced, if you correctly understand that
theory. Though I do not doubt that you
had reference to your own words, used
in stating the first theory,
"that he ordained also that man should fall and
become depraved, that he might thus
prepare the way for the fulfillment of
his own eternal counsels, that he
might be able mercifully to save some,
&c." This, then, if I am not
mistaken, is your reasoning. He, who has
ordained that man should fall and
become depraved, is the author of the fall
and of sin; God ordained that man
should fall and become depraved;
therefore, God is the author of sin.
But the Major of this syllogism is
denied, because it is ambiguous; for
the word ordain is commonly, though in
a catachrestical sense, used to mean
simply and absolutely to decree, the
will determining and approving an act;
which catachresis is very frequent in
forensic use. But to us, who are bound
to observe religiously, in this
argument, the propriety of terms, to
ordain is nothing else than to arrange
the order in acts, and in each thing
according to its mode. It is one thing
to decree acts absolutely, and another
to decree the order of acts, in each
thing, according to its mode. The
former is immediate, the latter, from the
beginning to the end, regards the
means, which in all things, pertain to the
order of events. In the former
signification, the Minor is denied; for it is
entirely at variance with the truth,
since God is never the author of evil
(that is, of evil involving guilt). In
the latter signification the Major is
denied, for it is not according to the
truth, nor is it necessary in any
respect that the same person who
disposes the order of actions and, in each
thing, according to its mode: should
be the author of those actions. The
actor is one thing, the action is
another,-and the arranger of the action is
yet another. He who performs an evil
deed is the author of evil. He, who
disposes the order in the doer and in
the evil deed, is not the author of
evil, but the disposer of an evil act
to a good end. But that this may be
understood, let us use the fourth
fundamental principle, which we have
previously stated, according to this,
we shall circumscribe this whole case
within this limit; every fault must
always be ascribed to the proximate, not
to the remote or to the highest cause.
In a chain, the link, which breaks,
is in fault; in a machine, the wheel,
which deviates from its proper course,
is in fault, not any superior or
inferior one. But as all causes are either
principles, or from principles, (in
this case, however, principles are like
wheels, by which the causes,
originating from the principles, are moved),
God is the universal principle of all
good, nature is the principle of
natural things, and the rational will,
turning freely to good or evil, is
the principle of moral actions. These
three principles, in their own
appropriate movement, perform their
own actions, and produce mediate causes,
act in their own relations, and
dispose them; God in a divine mode, nature
in a natural mode, and the will in an
elective mode. God, in a divine mode,
originates nature; nature, in its own
mode, produces man; the will, in its
own appropriate mode, produces its own
moral and voluntary actions. If, now,
the will produces a moral action,
whether good or evil, it produces it, of
its own energy, and this cannot be
attributed to nature itself as a cause,
though nature may implant the will in
man, since the will, (though from
nature) is the peculiar and special
principle of moral actions, instituted
by the Deity in nature. But if the
blame of this cannot be attributed to
nature as a cause, by what right, I
pray, can it be attributed to God, who,
by the mode and medium of nature, has
placed the will in man? I answer then,
with Augustine, in his book against
articles falsely imputed to him, artic.
10.
"The predestination of God
neither excited, nor persuaded, nor impelled, the
fall of those who fell, or the
iniquity of the wicked, or the evil passions
of sinners, but it clearly
predestinated His own judgment, by which He
should recompense each one according
to his deeds, whether good or bad,
which judgment would not be inflicted,
if men should sin by the will of
God." He proceeds to the same
purpose in art. 11, remarking, "If it should
be charged against the devil, that he
was the author of certain sins, and
the inciter to them, I think he would
be able to exonerate himself from that
odium in some way, and that he would
convict the perpetrators of such sins
from their own will, since, although
he might have been delighted in the
madness of those sinners, yet he could
prove that he did not force them to
crime. With what folly, what madness,
then, is that referred to the counsel
of God, which cannot at all be
ascribed to the devil, since he, in the sins
of wicked men, aids by enticements,
but is not to be considered the director
of their wills. Therefore God
predestinated none of these things that they
should take place, nor did He prepare
that soul, which was about to live
basely and in sin, that it should live
in such a manner; but He was not
ignorant that such would be its
character, and He foreknew that He should
judge justly concerning a soul of such
character."
But if this could be imputed neither
to nature, nor to the devil, how much
less to God, the most holy and wise
Creator? God, (as St. Augustine says
again, book 6) "does not
predestinate all which he foreknows. For He only
foreknows evil. He does not
predestinate it, but He both foreknows and
predestinates good." But it is a
good, derived from God, that, in His own
ordination, He disposes the order in
things good and evil; if not, the
providence of God would be, for the
most part, indifferent (may that be far
from our thoughts). God does not will
evil, but He wills, and preserves a
certain order even in evil. Evil comes
from the will of man; from God is the
general and special arrangement of His
own providence, disposing and most
wisely keeping in order even those
things which are, in the highest degree,
evil.
Here a two-fold question will perhaps
be urged upon me:
first, how can these be said, in
reference to the will, to be its own
motions, when we acknowledge that the
will itself, that is, the fountain of
voluntary motions, is from nature, and
nature is from God? Secondly, why did
God place in human beings this will,
constituted in the image of liberty? I
will reply to both in a few words. To
the first; the will is certainly from
nature, and nature is from God, but
the will is not, on that account, the
less to be called the principle of
those motions, than nature is called the
principle of natural motions. Each is
the principle of its own action,
though both are from the supreme
principle, God. It is one thing to describe
the essence of a thing, another to refer to its source. What is
essential to
nature and the will? That the former
should be the principle of natural
motions, the latter, of spontaneous
motions. What is their source? God is
the only and universal source of all
things. Nor is it absurd that a
principle should be derived from
another principle: for although a
principle, which originates in
another, should not be called a principle in
the relation of origin or source, yet,
in the relation of the act it does
not on that account, cease to be an
essential principle. God is, per se, a
principle. Nature and our wills are
principles derived from a principle. Yet
each of them has its own appropriate
motions. Nor is there any reason,
indeed, why any should think that
these are philosophical niceties: they are
natural distinctions, and that, which
is of nature, is from God. But if we
are unwilling to hear nature, let us
listen to the truth of God, to Christ
speaking of the devil (John viii. 44),
"when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh
of his own: for he is a liar and the
father of it." Here he is called "the
father of a lie," and is said
"to speak of his own."
According to Christ’s words, then, we
have the origin and the act of sin in
the devil. For the act has a
resemblance to himself, for he speaks of his
own. What, I pray, can be more
conclusive than these words? Hence Augustine,
in the answer already quoted, very
properly deduces this conclusion. "As God
did not, in the angels who fell,
induce that will, which they did not
continue in the truth; so he did not
produce in men that inclination by
which they imitate the devil. For he
speaketh a lie of his own; and he will
not be free from that charge, unless
the truth shall free him." He indeed
gave free will, namely, that essential
power to Adam: but its motion is, in
reference to Adam, his own, and, in
reference to all of us, our own. In what
sense is it our own, when it is given
to us by God? Whatever is bestowed on
us by God, is either by the law of
common right, or of personal and private
property. He gave the will to angels
and men by the law of personal
possession. It is therefore, one’s own
and its motion belong to the
individual. "This," says
Augustine, (lib. de Genes. ad litt. in perf. cap.
5,) "He both makes and disposes
species and natures themselves, but the
privations of species and the defects
of natures he does not make, He only
ordains." Therefore God is always
righteous, but we are unrighteous.
To the second question, namely, why
did God create in us this will, and with
such a character? I reply; -- it was
the work of the highest goodness and
wisdom in the universe. Why should we,
with our ungrateful minds, who have
already made an ill use of those
minds, obstruct the fountain of goodness
and wisdom? It was the work of
goodness to impress his own image on both
natures, in the superior, on that of
angels, and in the inferior, on that of
men: since, while other things in
nature are moved by instinct, or feeling,
as with a dim trace of the Deity,
these alone, in the freedom of their own
will, have the principle of their own
ways in their own power by the mere
goodness of God. It was the work of
wisdom to make these very species,
endued with His own image, together
with so many other objects, and above
the others, as the most perfect mirror
of His own glory, so far as is
possible in created things. But why
did he make them of such a character,
with mutable freedom? He made His own
image, not himself.
The only essential image of God, the
Father, is the Lord Jesus Christ, one
God, eternal and immutable, with the
Father and the Holy Spirit. Whoever
thou mayest be, who makest objections
to this, thou hearest the serpent
whispering to thee, as he whispered
once to Eve, to the ruin of our race.
Let it suffice thee that thou wast
made in the image of God, not possessing
the divine perfection. Immutability is
peculiar to the divine perfection.
This pertains by nature to God. The
creature had in himself His image,
communicated by God, and placed in his
will: but he, whether angel or man,
who fell, rejected it of his own will.
Not to say more, this whole question
was presented by Marcion, and
Tertullian, with the utmost fluency and
vigour, discussed it in its whole
extent, in a considerable part of his
second book against Marcion, the
perusal of which will, I trust, be
satisfactory to you.
You remark, finally, that they are not
freed from the necessity of that
conclusion "by the distinctions
of the act, and the evil in the act, of
necessity and creation, of the decree
and its execution, &c." Indeed, my
brother, I think that, from those
things, which have just been said, you
will sufficiently perceive in what
respects your reasoning is fallacious.
For God does not make, but ordains the
sinner, as I say, with Augustine,
that is, He ordains the iniquity of
the sinner not by commanding or
decreeing particularly and absolutely
that he should commit sin, but by most
wisely vindicating His own order, and
the right of His infinite providence,
even in evil which is peculiar to the
creature.
For it was necessary that the wisdom
of God should triumph in this manner,
when He exhibited His own order in the
peculiar and voluntary disorder of
His own creature. This disorder and
alienation from good the creature
prepared for himself by the
appropriate motion of free-will, not by the
impulse of the Deity. But that freedom
of the will, says Tertullian against
Marcion (lib. 2, cap. 9) "does
not fix the blame on Him by whom it was
bestowed, but on him by whom it was
not directed, as it ought to have been."
Since this is so, it is not at all
necessary that I should speak of those
particular distinctions, which, in
their proper place, may perhaps be valid;
they do not seem to me to pertain
properly to this argument, unless other
arguments are introduced, which I cannot
find in your writings. Besides all
those distinctions pertain generally
to the subject of providence, not
particularly to this topic. I am not
pleased that the discussion should
extend beyond its appropriate range.
But here some may perhaps say;
"Therefore, the judgments of God
depend on contingencies, and are based on
contingencies, if they have respect to
man as a sinner, and to his sin."
That consequence is denied: for, on
the contrary, those very things which
are contingencies to us, depend on the
ordination of God, according to their
origin and action. To their origin,
for God has established the contingency
equally with the necessity: To their
action, for He acts in the case of that
which is good, fails to act in that which
is evil, in that it is evil, not
in that it is ordained by His special
providence. They are not, therefore,
contingencies to the Deity, whatever
they may be to us; just as those
things, which are contingent to an
inferior cause, can by no means be justly
ascribed to a superior cause. But I
have already stated this matter with
sufficient clearness, in the
discussion of the fourth fundamental principle.
Let us, therefore, pass to other
matters.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO
THE SIXTH PROPOSITION
The meaning of the first theory is
that which I have set forth in the third
proposition. But it is of little
importance to me, whether the object,
generally and without distinction, or
with a certain distinction, and
invested with certain circumstances,
is presented to God, when
predestinating and reprobating, for
that is not, now, the point before me.
If, however, it may be proper to
discuss this also in a few words, I should
say that it cannot seem to one who weighs
this matter with accuracy, that
the object is considered in general
and without any distinction by God, in
the act of decreeing, according to the
sentiment of the authors of the first
theory. For the object was considered
by God, in the act of decreeing, in
the relation which it had at the time.
when it had, as yet, been affected by
no external act of God, executing that
decree; for this, in a pure and
abstract sense, is an object, free
from every other consideration, which can
pertain to an object, through the
action of a cause operating in reference
to it. But since, according to the
authors of the first theory, the act of
creation pertains to the execution of
the decree, of which we now treat, it
is, therefore, most certainly evident,
that man, in that he was to be made,
was the object of predestination and
reprobation. If any one considers the
various and manifold sets of that
decree, it is not doubtful that some of
these must be accommodated and applied
to this and others to that condition
of man, and in this sense, I would
admit the common and general
consideration of the object. But all
those acts, according to the authors of
that first theory, depend on one
primary act, namely, that in which God
determined to declare, in one part of
that unformed "lump," from which the
human race was to be made, the glory
of his mercy, and, in another part, the
glory of his justice, and it is this
very thing which I stated to be
displeasing to me in that first
theory; nor can I yet persuade myself that
there exists, in the whole Scripture,
any decree, by which God has
determined to illustrate his own
glory, in the salvation of these and in the
condemnation of those, apart from
foresight of the fall.
The passage which you quote from Beza,
on Ephes. i. 4, plainly proves that I
have done no injustice to those
authors in explaining their doctrine. He
says, in that passage, that God, by
the creation and corruption of man,
opened a way for himself to the
execution of that which he had before
decreed."
In reference to the harmony of those
theories, I grant that all agree in
this, that this decree of God was made
from eternity, before any actual
existence of the object, whatever might
be its character, and however it
might be considered. For "known
unto God are all his works from the
beginning of the world." (Acts
xv. 18.)
It is necessary also that all the
internal acts of God should universally be
eternal, unless we wish to make God
mutable; yet in such a sense that some
are antecedent to others in order and
nature. I admit also that they agree
in this, that there exists, in the
predestinate or the reprobate, no cause
why the former should be
predestinated, the latter reprobated; and that the
cause exists only in the mere will of
God. But I affirm that some ascend to
a greater height than others, and
extend the act of decree farther. For the
advocates of the third theory deny
that God, in any act of predestination
and reprobation, has reference to man,
considered as not yet fallen, and
those of the second theory say that
God, in the act of that decree, did not
have reference to man as not yet
created. The advocates of the
first, however, openly assert and
contend that God, in the first act of the
decree, had reference to man, not as
created, but as to be created. I,
therefore, distinguished those
theories according to their objects, as each
one presented man to God, at the first
moment of the act of predestination
and reprobation, as free from any
divine act predestinating and reprobating,
either internal, by which he might
decree something concerning man, or
external, by which He might effect
something in man; this may be called pure
object, having as yet received no
relation from the act of God, decreeing
from eternity, and no form from the
external act. But when it has received
any relation or form from any act of
God, it is no longer pure object, but
an object having some action of God
concerning it, or in it, by which it is
prepared for receiving some further
action, as was also a short time since
affirmed. We will hereafter examine
your idea that they substantiate their
theory by the example of Jacob and
Esau in Romans 9.
I may be permitted to make some
observations or inquiries concerning what
you lay down as fundamental principles
of this doctrine, and of your reply
to my arguments. In reference to the
first, concerning the essence of the
Deity,
God is in such a sense immutable in
essence, power, intellect, will, counsel
and work, that, nevertheless, if the
creature is changed, he becomes to that
creature in will, the application of
power, and in work, another than that
which he was to the same creature
continuing in his primitive state;
bestowing upon a cause that which is
due to it, but without any change in
Himself. Again if God is immutable, He
has, for that very reason, not
circumscribed or determined to one
direction, by any decree, the motion of
free-will, the enjoyment and use of
which He has once freely bestowed on
man, so that it should incline, of
necessity, to one direction, and should
not be able, in fact, to incline to
another direction, while that decree
remains. Thirdly, God has the form and
an eternal and immutable conception
of all those things which are done
mutably by men, but following, in the
order of nature, many other
conceptions, which God has concerning those
things which He wills both to do
Himself, and to permit to men.
In reference to the second, concerning
the knowledge of God;
I am most fully persuaded that the
knowledge of God is eternal, immutable
and infinite, and that it extends to
all things, both necessary and
contingent, to all things which He
does of Himself, either mediately or
immediately, and which He permits to
be done by others. But I do not
understand the mode in which He knows
future contingencies, and especially
those which belong to the free-will of
creature, and which He has decreed to
permit, but not to do of Himself, not,
indeed, in that measure, in which I
think that it is understood by others
more learned than myself. I know that
there are those who say that all
things are, from eternity, presented to
God, and that the mode, in which God
certainly and infallibly knows future
contingencies, is this, that those
contingent events coexist with God in the
Now of eternity, and therefore they
are in Him indivisibly, and in the
infinite Now of eternity, which
embraces all time. If this is so, it is not
difficult to understand how God may
certainly and infallibly know future
contingent events. For contingencies
are not opposed to certainty of
knowledge, except as they are future,
but not as they are present. That
reasoning, however, does not exhaust
all the difficulties which may arise in
the consideration of these matters.
For God knows, also, those things which
may happen, but never do happen, and consequently
do not co-exist with God
in the Now of eternity, which would be
events unless they should be
hindered, as is evident from 1 Samuel
xxiii. 12, in reference to the
citizens of Keilah, who would have
delivered David into the hands of Saul,
which event, nevertheless, did not
happen. The knowledge, also, of future
events, which depend on contingent
causes, seems to be certain, if those
causes may be complete and not
hindered in their operation. But how shall
the causes of those events, which
depend on the freedom of the will, be
complete, among which, even at that
very moment in which it chose one, it
was free not to choose it, or to
choose another in preference to it? If
indeed at any time your leisure may
permit, I could wish that you would
accurately discuss, in your own
manner, these things and whatever else may
pertain to that question. I know that
this would be agreeable and acceptable
to many, and that the labour would not
be useless.
The knowledge of God is called
eternal, but not equally so in reference to
all objects of knowledge. For that
knowledge of God is absolutely eternal,
by which God knows Himself, and in
Himself all possible things. That, by
which He knows beings which will
exist, is eternal indeed as to duration,
but, in nature, subsequent to some act
of the divine will concerning them,
and, in some cases, even subsequent to
some foreseen act of the human will.
In general, the following seems to me
to be the order of the divine
knowledge, in reference to its various
objects. God knows
1. Himself what He, of Himself is able
to do.
2. All things possible what can be
done by those beings which He can make.
3. All things which shall exist by the
act of creation.
4. All things which shall exist by the act of creatures and especially
of
rational creatures. Whether moved by
those actions of His creatures and
5. What He Himself especially of His
rational shall do. creatures; Or at
least receiving occasion from
them.
From this, it is apparent that the
eternity of the knowledge of God is not
denied by those, who propose, as a
foundation for that knowledge, something
dependent on the human will, as
foreseen.
But I do not understand in what way it
can be true that, in every genus,
there must be one thing univocal, and
from this, other things in an
equivocal sense. I have hitherto
supposed that those things which are under
the same genus are univocal or at
least analogous; but, that things
equivocal are not comprehended with
those which are univocal, under the same
genus, either in logic, or
metaphysics, and still less in physics. Then I
have not thought that the univocal
could be the cause of the equivocal. For
there is no similarity between them.
But if there exists a similarity as
between cause and effect, they are no
longer equivocal. Thus those things,
which are heated by the fire as I
should say, are heated neither univocally,
nor equivocally, but analogically. God
exists univocally, we, analogically.
This they admit, who state that
certain attributes of the divine nature are
communicable to us according to
analogy, among which they also mention
knowledge.
In reference to the third, concerning
the actions of the Deity; the actions
of God are, in Himself, indeed
eternal, but they preserve a certain order;
some are prior to others by nature,
and indeed necessarily precede them,
whether in the same order, in which
they proceed from Him, I could not
easily say; but I know that there are
those who have thus stated, among whom
some mention George Sohnius. Some also
of the internal actions in God, are
subsequent in nature to the foresight
of some act dependent on the will of
the creature. Thus the decree
concerning the mission of His Son for the
redemption of the human race is
subsequent to the foresight of the fall of
man. For although God might have
arranged to prevent the fall, if he had not
known that He could use an easy remedy
to effect a restoration, (as some
think,) yet the sure decree for the
introduction of a remedy for the fall by
the mission of His Son, was not
effected by God except on the foresight of
the disease, namely, the fall.
The mode in which God, as the
universal principle, is said to flow into His
creatures, and especially his rational
creatures, and concurs with their
nature and will, in reference to an
action, has my approbation, whatever it
may be, if it does not bring in a
determination of the will of the creature
to one or two things which are
contrary, or contradictory. If any mode
introduces such a determination, I do
not see how it can be consistent with
the declaration of Augustine, quoted
by yourself, that God so governs all
things which He has created as also
"to permit them to exercise and put
forth their own motions," or with
the saying of Plato, in which God is
declared to be free from all
blame.
I could wish that it might be plainly
and decisively explained how all
effects and defects in nature, and the
will, of all kinds universally, are
of the providence of God, and yet God
is free from fault, the whole fault,
(if any exists,) residing in the
proximate cause. If any one thinks that God
is exempted from fault because He is
the remote cause, but that the
creature, as the proximate cause, is
culpable, (if there is any sin,) he
does not seem to me to present a
correct reason why any cause may be in
fault, or free from fault, but,
concerning this also, I will hereafter speak
at greater length. In reference to the
fourth, concerning the causes of the
actions of God; the universal cause
has no cause above itself, and the first
and supreme cause does not depend on
any other cause, for the very terms
include that idea; but it is possible
that there may be afforded to the
universal, first and supreme cause, by
another cause, an occasion for the
production of some certain effect,
which, without that occasion, the first
cause would neither propose to be
produced in itself, nor in fact produce
out of itself, and indeed could
neither produce nor propose or decree to be
produced. Such is the decree to damn
certain persons, and their damnation
according to that decree.
I readily assent to what you have said
in reference to the modes of
necessary and contingent causes, as
also those things which you have
remarked in reference to the
distinction between natural and rational power.
I am, however, certain that nothing can
be deduced from them against my
opinion, or against those things,
which have been presented by me for the
refutation of the first theory.
Having made these remarks, I come to
the consideration of your answer to my
arguments. In my former argument, I
denied that man, considered as not yet
created, is the object of mercy
rescuing from sin and misery, and of
punitive justice, and I persist in
that sentiment; for I do not see that any
thing has been presented, which
overthrows it, or drives me from that
position. For man is not, by that
consideration, removed from under the
common providence or the special
predestination of God, but providence must,
in this case, be considered as
according to mercy and justice thus
administered, and predestination, as
decreed according to them. But the
reasoning from the relative to the
absolute is not valid; and the removal,
in this case, is from under the
providence of God, considered relatively,
not absolutely; so also with predestination.
You foresaw that I would make
this reply, and consequently you have
presented a three-fold answer; but, in
no respect, injurious to my reasoning.
For as to the first, I admit that sin
and misery were, in the most complete
sense, present with God from eternity,
and, as they were present, so also
there was, in reference to them, a place
for mercy and justice. But the theory,
which I oppose, does not make them,
(as foreseen,) present to mercy and
justice, but, according to the decree
for illustrating mercy and justice, it
presents a necessity for the
existence of sin and misery, as, in
their actual existence, there could be
in fact, a place, for the decree, made
according to mercy and justice. As to
the second, I grant also that there
could be, in one who was in fact neither
a sinner, nor miserable, a place for
mercy saving from sin and possible
misery, but we are not here treating
of mercy so considered: and it is
certain that mercy and judgment exist
in the Deity, by an eternal act, but
it is in the first action of those
attributes. In a second act, God cannot
exercise those attributes, understood
according to the mind of the authors
of that theory, except in reference to
a sinful and actually miserable
being. Lastly, what you say concerning
the internal, and external action of
the Deity, and these conjoined, does
not disturb, in any greater degree, my
argument. For neither the internal
action, which is the decree of God in
reference to the illustration of his
glory, by mercy and punitive justice,
nor the external action, which is the
actual declaration of that same glory
through mercy and justice, nor both
conjoined can have any place in
reference to a man who is neither
sinful, nor miserable. I know, indeed,
that, to those who advocate this
theory, there is so much difference between
internal and external action, that is,
as they say, between the decree and
its execution, that God may decree
salvation according to mercy and death
according to justice to a person who
is not a sinner, but may not really
save, according to mercy, any one,
unless, He is a sinner, or damn,
according to justice, any except
sinners. But I deny that distinction;
indeed I say that God, can neither
will nor decree, by internal act, that
which He cannot do, by external act,
and thus the object of internal and
external action is the same, and
invested with the same circumstances:
whether it be present to God, in
respect to his eternal intelligence and be
the object of His decree, or be, in
fact, in its actual existence, present
to Him and the object of the execution
of the decree. Hence, I cannot yet
decide otherwise concerning that
theory, than that it cannot be approved by
those, who think and desire to speak according
to the Scriptures.
The "two statements" which
you think "may be made, of a milder character,
and in harmony with the words of
Christ and the apostles," do not serve to
explain that first theory, but are
additions, by which it is very much
changed, and which its advocates would
by no means acknowledge, as, in my
opinion, was made sufficiently
manifest in my statement of the same theory
in reply to your third answer, and may
be, at this time, again demonstrated
in a single word. For those very
things, which you make the mode and the
consequent event of predestination and
reprobation, are styled, by the
authors of that first theory, the
cause, and the principle of that same
decree, and also the end, though not
the final one, which, they affirm, is
his glory, to be declared by mercy and
justice. Again they acknowledge no
grace in predestination which is not
mercy, and correctly so, for the grace,
which is towards man considered
absolutely, is not of election: also they do
not acknowledge any non-grace, or
non-mercy, which is not comprehended in
punitive justice. Here I do not argue
against that theory thus explained,
not because I approve it in all
respects, but because I have, this time,
undertaken to examine what I affirm to
be the view of Calvin and Beza; other
matters will be hereafter considered.
I will notice separately what things
are here brought forward, agreeing
with that view, thus explained. The
passages of Scripture quoted from
Matthew 25, and Ephesians 1, in which it
is taught that "God, from all
eternity, of the good pleasure of his will,
elected some to adoption,
sanctification, and a participation of his
kingdom," so far fail to prove
the common view that on the contrary there
may be inferred from them a reference
to sin, as a condition requisite in
the object of benediction and
election. In the former passage, the blessed
are called to a participation of the
kingdom, which God has prepared for
them from eternity; but in whom and by
whom? Is it not in Christ and by
Christ? Certainly; then it was
prepared for sinners, not for men considered
in general, and apart from any respect
to sin. For "thou shall call his name
Jesus; for he shall save his people from their
sins." (Matt. i. 2.)
The passage from Ephesians 1, much
more plainly affirms the same thing, as
will be hereafter proved in a more
extended manner, when I shall use that
passage, avowedly to sustain the
theory which makes sin a condition
requisite in the object. I did not
present a particular reference to men, as
a cause, which I wished to have kept
in mind, but according to a condition,
requisite in the object, namely,
misery and sin. This I still require. The
distinction, which you make between
grace and mercy, is according to fact
and the signification of terms, but in
this place is unnecessary. For no
grace, bestowed upon man, originates
in predestination, as there is no
grace, previous to predestination, not
joined with mercy. God deals with
angels according to grace, not
according to mercy saving from sin and
misery. He deals with us according to
mercy, not according to grace in
contradistinction to mercy. I speak here
of predestination. According to
that mercy, also, is our adoption; it
is not, then, of men, considered in
their original state, but of sinners.
This is also apparent from the
phraseology of the apostle, who calls
the elect and the reprobate "vessels,"
not of grace and non-grace but of
"mercy" and "wrath." The relation of
"vessels" they have equally
and in common from their divine creation,
sustainment, and government. That they
are vessels worthy of wrath,
deserving it, and the "children
of wrath," (Ephes. ii. 3), in this also
there is no distinction among them.
But that some are "vessels of wrath,"
that is, destined to wrath, of their
own merit, indeed, but also of the
righteous judgment of God, which
determines to bring wrath upon them; while
others are "vessels" not
"of wrath" but "of mercy" according to the grace of
God, which determines to pardon their
sin, and to spare them, though worthy
of wrath, this is of the will of God,
making a distinction between the two
classes; which discrimination has its
beginning after the act of sin,
whether we consider the internal or
the external act of God. From this it is
apparent that they are not on this
account vessels of wrath because they
have become depraved, the just
consequence of which is wrath, if the will of
God did not intervene, which
determines that this, which would be a just
consequence in respect to all the
depraved, should be a necessary
consequence in respect to those, whom
alone He refuses to pardon, as He can
justly punish all and had decreed to
pardon some. That which is "added by
way of amplification" is
confirmed by the same arguments. For there is no
place for punitive justice except in
reference to the sinner; there can be
no act of that mercy, of which we treat,
except towards the miserable. But
man, considered in his natural
condition is neither sinful nor miserable,
therefore that justice and mercy have
no place in reference to him. Hence,
you, my brother, will see that the
object of predestination, made according
to those attributes and so understood,
cannot be man, considered in general,
since it requires, in its object, the
circumstance of sin and misery, by
which circumstance man is restricted
to a determinate condition, and is
separated from a general
consideration. I know, indeed, that, if the general
consideration is admitted, no one of
those particular considerations is
excluded, but you also know that if
any particular relation is precisely
laid down, that universal relation is
excluded. I do not think that it is to
be altogether conceded that, in the
case of election and reprobation, there
is no consideration of well-doing or
of sin. There is no consideration of
well-doing, it is true, for there is
none to be considered; there is no
consideration of sin as a cause why
one, and not another, should be
reprobated, but there is a
consideration of sin as a meritorious cause of
the possibility of the reprobation of
any individual, and as a condition
requisite in the object, as I have
often remarked, and shall, hereafter,
often remark, as occasion may require.
In what respects, those theories
differ was briefly noticed in reply to
your first answer. When God is said
to have elected persons, as not
created, as created but not fallen, or as
fallen, all know that it is
understood, not that they are in fact such, but
that they are considered as such, for
all admit that God elected human
beings from eternity, before they were
created, that is, by the internal
act; but no one says, that man was
elected by the external act before he was
created; therefore a reconciliation of
those theories was unnecessary, since
the object of both acts is one and the
same, and considered in the same
manner. Besides the questions, when
the election was made, and in what sense
it was considered, are different. I
wished to confirm my words by the
authority of your consent; whether
ignorantly, will be proved from these
statements. You make man, considered
as a sinner, the subject of the
preparation of punishment according to
justice, which I, agreeably to your
Theses, have called reprobation, and
you, according to your opinion,
presuppose sin in him; but, in the
first theory, they make sin subordinate
to that same decree. The preterition,
which the same theory attributes to
punitive justice, you attribute to the
freedom of the divine goodness, and
you exclude punitive justice from it,
when you make man, not yet a sinner,
the subject of preterition.
Predestination, which the first theory ascribes
to mercy, in contra-distinction to
grace, your Theses, already cited
(answers 2 and 4) assign to grace,
spoken of absolutely, since they consider
man in the state of nature in which he was
created; but you make man, as a
sinner, the subject of grace, as
conjoined with mercy, and you presuppose
sin. That first theory, on the other
hand, makes sin subordinate to that
predestination, both of which cannot,
at the same time, be true, therefore,
in this you seem to agree with me, as
you ascribe election to mercy, only so
far as man is considered miserable,
and preparation of punishment to
justice, only so far as man is
considered sinful. You reply, that, when
grace is presented, as the genus,
mercy, as the species, is not excluded,
and mercy being presented, as the
species, grace, as the genus, is not
excluded. I grant it, but affirm,
first, that grace cannot be supposed here
as the genus, for grace, spoken of
generally, cannot be supposed to be the
cause of any act, that is, any special
act, such as predestination. Again,
the relation of grace and mercy in
this case, is different from that of
genus and species: for they are spoken
of, in an opposite manner, as two
different species of grace, the term
grace, having the same appellation with
that of the genus, referring to that
grace which regards man as created, the
term mercy, receiving its appellation
from its object, referring to that
grace which regards man as sinful and
miserable. If man is said to be
predestinated according to the former,
the latter can have no place; if
according to the latter, then it is
certain that the former can have no
place, otherwise the latter would be
unnecessary. Predestination cannot be
said to have been made conjointly
according to both. My conclusion was,
therefore, correct, when I excluded
one species by the supposition of the
other. If man is to be exalted to
supernatural glory from a natural state,
this work belongs to grace, simply
considered, and in contra-distinction to
mercy; if from a corrupt state, it
belongs to grace conjoined with mercy,
that is, it is the appropriate work of
mercy. Grace, simply considered and
opposed to mercy, cannot effect the
latter, mercy is not necessary for the
former. But predestination is of such
grace as is both able and necessary to
effect that which is proposed in
predestination.
What I wrote copulatively, in
reference to the passed by and the reprobate,
was written thus, because they are one
subject. But that they are not the
same in relation, is admitted: and I
expressed this when I remarked that you
referred to justice only in the case of
the latter, namely, the reprobate,
that is, the damned. In my second
proposition, however, I signified that,
according to the view of those to whom
I ascribed the second theory, the
relation of preterition was different
from that of predamnation, which I
there called reprobation. The homonymy
of the term reprobation is explained
in my second answer, and all fault is
removed from me, who have used that
word every where according to your own
idea. But it is very apparent, from
what follows, that you dissent from
the authors of the first theory. For you
assert that "predestination is of
justice," but that preterition or
reprobation is according to justice,
but not "of justice;" while the authors
of the first theory ascribe to justice
the cause of reprobation, however
understood, whether synecdochically,
or properly, or catachrestically, that
is, they affirm that both preterition
and predamnation are of justice.
But how are election and preterition
"the work of flee-will according to the
wisdom of God and damnation, the work
of necessary will according to the
justice of God? I have hitherto
thought, with our theologians, that this
whole decree was instituted by God, in
the exercise of most complete freedom
of will, and I yet think that the same
idea is true, according to the
declaration, "I will have mercy
on whom I will have mercy," and "He hath
mercy on whom He will have mercy, and
whom He will He hardeneth." (Rom. ix.
15, 18.)
In each of these acts God exercises
equal freedom. For, if God necessarily
wills in any case to punish sin, how
is it that He does not punish it in all
sinners? If he punishes it in some,
but not in others, how is that the act
of necessary will? Who, indeed, does not
ascribe the distinction which is
made among persons, equally meriting
the punishment, to the freewill of God?
Justice may demand punishment on
account of sin, but it demands it equally
in reference to all sinners without
distinction; and, if there is any
discrimination, it is of free-will,
demanding punishment as to these, but
remitting sin to those. But it was
necessary that punishment should be at
least inflicted on some. If I should
deny that this was so after the
satisfaction made by Christ, how will
it be proved? I know that Aquinas, and
other of the School-men, affirm that
the relation of the divine goodness and
providence demands that some should be
elected to life, and that others
should be permitted to fall into sin and
then to suffer the punishment of
eternal death, and that God was free
to decree to whom life, and to whom
death should appertain, according to
his will, but their arguments seem to
me susceptible of refutation from
their own statements, elsewhere made
concerning the price of our redemption
paid by Christ. For they say the
price was sufficient for the sins of
all, but if the necessity of divine
justice demands that some sinners
should be damned, then the price was not
sufficient for all. For if justice, in
him who receives that price,
necessarily demands that some should
be destitute of redemption, then it
must have been offered by the redeemer
with the condition that there must
always remain to the necessity of
justice, some satisfaction, to be sought
elsewhere and to be rendered by
others. Let no one think that the last
affirmation of the school-men (that
concerning the sufficiency of the
price), which, however, they borrowed
from the fathers, is to be rejected,
for it could be proved, if necessary,
by plain and express testimonies from
the Scripture.
Let us now come to my second argument,
which was this. A theory, by which
God is necessarily made the author of
sin, is to be repudiated by all
Christians, and indeed by all men; for
no man thinks that the being, whom he
considers divine, is evil; -- But
according to the theory of Calvin and Beza
God is necessarily made the author of
sin; -- Therefore it is to be
repudiated. The proof of the Minor, is
evident from these words, in which
they say that "God ordained that
man should fall and become corrupt, that in
this way he might open a way for His
eternal counsels." For he, who ordains
that man should fall and sin, is the
author of sin This, my argument, is
firm, nor is it weakened by your
answer. The word ordain is indeed
ambiguous, for it properly signifies
to arrange the order of events or
deeds, and in each thing according to
its own mode, in which sense it is
almost always used by the school-men.
But it is also applied to a simple and
absolute decree of the will
determining an action. What then? Does it
follow, because I have used a word,
which is ambiguous and susceptible of
various meanings that I am chargeable
with ambiguity? I think not; unless it
is proved that, in my argument, I have
used that word in different senses.
Otherwise sound reasoning would be
exceedingly rare, since, on account of
the multitude of things and the
paucity of words, we are very frequently
compelled to use words, which have a
variety of meanings. Ambiguity may be
charged when a word is used in
different senses in the same argument. But I
used that word, in the same sense in
the Major and in the Minor, and so my
argument is free from ambiguity. I
affirm that this is evident from the
argument itself. For the added phrase
"that man should fall" signifies that
the word ordain, in both propositions,
is to be applied to the simple decree
in reference to an action, or rather
to a simple decree that something
should be done. It cannot, on account
of that phrase, be referred to a
decree disposing the order of
actions.
Let us now state the syllogism in a
few words, that we may be able to
compare your answer with the
argument.
He who ordained that man should fall
and become depraved, is the author of
the fall and of sin; God ordained that
man should fall and become depraved;
Therefore, God is the author of
sin.
You deny the Major, if the word ordain
is understood to mean the disposal of
the order of actions. You deny the
Minor if the same word is used to mean a
simple decree as to actions, or things
to be done. This is true, and, in it,
I agree with you. But what if the same
word in the Minor signifies a simple
decree, &c.? Then, indeed, even by
your own admission, the Major will be
true. Else your distinction in the
word is uselessly made, if the Major is
false, however the word may be
understood. But that the word is used in the
Major in this sense, is proved by the
phraseology, "He who ordained that man
should fall." Then you say that
the Minor is false if the word is used in
the same sense in which we have shown
that it is used in the Major, and so
the conclusion does not follow. I
reply, that the question between us is not
whether that Minor is true or false,
the word ordain being used for the
decreeing of things to be done, but
whether they affirm it, to whom the
first theory is attributed. If, then,
they affirm this, and the Major is
true, then it follows (and in this you
agree with me,) that God is the
author of sin. For you admit that he
is the author of sin, who, by the
simple decree and determination of the
will, ordains that sin shall be
committed. Calvin and Beza assert this
in plain and most manifest
declarations, needing no explanation,
and by no means admitting that
explanation of the word ordain, which,
as you say and I acknowledge, is
proper. I wish also that it might be
shown in what way the necessity of the
commission of sin, can depend on the
ordination and decree of God otherwise
than by the mode of cause, either
efficient or deficient, which deficiency
is reduced to efficiency, when the
efficiency of that which is deficient is
necessary to the avoidance of sin.
Beza himself concedes that it is
incomprehensible how God can be free
from and man be obnoxious to guilt, if
man fell by the ordination of God, and
of necessity.
This, then, was to be done: their
theory was to be freed from the
consequence of that absurdity, which,
in my argument, I ascribe to it. It
was not, however, necessary to show
how God ordained sin, and that He is not
indeed the author of sin. I agree with
you, both in the explanation of that
ordination, and in the assertion that
God is not the author of sin. Calvin
himself, and Beza also, openly deny
that God is the author of sin, although
they define ordination as we have
seen, but they do not show how these two
things can be reconciled. I wish,
then, that it might be shown plainly, and
with perspicuity, that God is not made
the author of sin by that decree, or
that the theory might be changed,
since it is a stumbling block to many,
indeed to some a cause of separating
from us, and to very many a cause of
not uniting with us. But I am
altogether persuaded that you also perceive
that consequence, but prefer to free
the theory of those men from an absurd
and blasphemous consequence, by a fit
explanation, than to charge that
consequence to it. This is certainly
the part of candour and good will, but
used to no good purpose, since the
gloss, as they say, is contrary to the
text, which is manifest to any one who
examines and compares the text with
the gloss. Those two questions, which
you present to yourself, do not affect
my argument, when the matter is thus
explained.
Yet I am delighted with your beautiful
and elegant discussion of those
questions. But I would ask, in
opposition to the theory of Calvin and Beza,
"How can these movements of the
will be called its own and free, when the
act of the will is determined to one
direction by the decree of God?" Then,
"Why did God place the will in
man, if He was unwilling that he should enjoy
the liberty of its use?" For
these questions are necessarily to be answered
by those authors, if they do not wish
to leave their theory without defense.
It is therefore, apparent from these
things that my argument does not fail,
but remains firm and unmoved, since
all things which you have adduced, are
aside from that argument, which did
not seek to conclude, as my own views,
that God is the author of sin (far
from me be even the thought of that
abominable blasphemy), but to prove
that this is a necessary consequence of
the theory of Calvin and Beza: which
(I confidently say) has not been
confuted by you: nor can it be at all
confuted, since you use the word
ordain in a sense different from that
in which they use it, and from that
sense, according to which if God
should be said to have ordained sin,
nothing less could be inferred than
that He is the author of sin.
I said, moreover, that the theory of
Calvin and Beza, in which they state
that God ordained that man should fall
and become depraved, could not be
explained so that God should not be
made by it the author of sin, by the
distinctions of the act, and the evil
in the act, of necessity and coaction,
of the decree and its execution, of
efficacious and permissive decree, as
the latter is explained by the authors
of that theory agreeably to it, nor
by the different relation of the
divine decree and of human nature or of
man, nor by the addition of the end,
namely, that the whole ordination was
designed for the illustration of the
glory of God. You seem to me, reverend
sir, not to have perceived for what
purpose I presented these things, for I
did not wish to present any new course
of reasoning against that first
theory, but to confirm my previous
objection by a refutation of those
answers, which are usually presented
by the defenders of that theory, to the
objection which I made, that, by it,
God is made the author of sin. For
they, in order to repel the charge
from their theory, never make the reply
which has been presented by you, for,
should they do this, they would
necessarily depart from their own
theory, which is wholly changed, if the
word ordain, which they use, signifies
not to decree that sin should be
committed, but to arrange the order of
its commission, as you explain that
word. But to show that it does not
follow from their theory, that God is the
author of sin, they adduce the
distinctions to which I have referred, and
have diligently gathered from their
various writings; which ought to be done
before that accusation should be made
against their theory. For, if I could
find any explanation of that theory,
any distinction, by which it could be
relieved of that charge, it would have
pertained to my conscience, not to
place upon it the load of such a
consequence. Your distinction in the word
ordain indeed removes the difficulty,
but, in such a way, that, by one and
the same effort, it removes the theory
from which I proved that the
difficulty followed. Prove that the
authors of that theory assert that God
ordained sin in no other sense than
that, in which you have shown that the
word is properly used, and I shall
obtain that which I wish, and I will
concede that those distinctions were
unnecessary for the defense of that
theory. For the word ordain used in
your sense, presupposes the perpetration
of sin; in their sense, it precedes
and proposes its perpetration, for "God
ordained that man should fall and
become depraved," not that from a being,
fallen and depraved, He should make
whatever the order of the divine wisdom,
goodness, and justice might
demand.
There is here, then, no wandering
beyond the appropriate range of the
discussion. You say that all those
distinctions pertain in common to the
question of providence, and therefore
the ordination of sin pertains in
common to the question of providence.
If, however, the authors of the first
theory have ascribed the ordination of
sin to the divine predestination, why
should it cause surprise, that those
distinctions should also be referred to
the same predestination? There is, in
this case, then, no blame to be
attached to me, that I have mentioned
these distinctions. On the contrary, I
should have been in fault, if,
omitting reference to those distinctions, I
should have made an accusation against
their theory, which they are
accustomed to defend against this
accusation by means of those distinctions.
But since you do not, by your
explanation, relieve their theory from that
objection, and I have said that those
distinctions do not avail for its
relief and defense, it will not be
useless that I should prove my assertion,
not for your sake, but for the sake of
those, who hold that opinion, since
they think that it can be suitably
defended by these distinctions.
They use the first distinction thus:
"In sin there are two things, the act
and its sinfulness." God, by his
own ordination, is the author of the act,
not of the sinfulness in the act. I
will first consider the distinction,
then the answer which they deduce from
it. This distinction is very commonly
made, and seems to have some truth,
but to one examining, with diligence,
its falsity, in most respects, will be
apparent. For it is not, in general
or universally, applicable to all sin.
All sins, especially, which are
committed against prohibitory laws,
styled sins of commission, reject this
distinction. For the acts themselves are
forbidden by the law, and
therefore, if perpetrated, they are
sins. This is the formal relation of
sin, that it is something done
contrary to law. It is true that the act in
that it is such, would not be sin, if
the law had not been enacted, but then
it is not an act, having evil or
sinfulness. Let the law be absent, the act
is naturally good: introduce the law,
and the act itself is evil, as
forbidden, not that there is any thing
in the act which can be called
unlawfulness or sin. I will make the
matter clear by an example. The eating
of the forbidden fruit, if it had been
permitted to the human will as right,
would, in no way, be sin, nor any part
of sin, it would not contain any
element of sin; but the same act,
forbidden by law, could not be otherwise
than sinful, if perpetrated; I refer
to the act itself, and not to any thing
in the act to which the term evil can
be applied. For that act was simply
made illicit by the enactment of the
law. I shall have attained my object
here in a single word, by simply
asking that the sinfulness in that act may
be shown separately from the act
itself. That distinction, however, had a
place in acts which are performed
according to a perceptive law, but not
according to a due mode, order, or
motive. Thus he, who gives alms, that he
may be praised does a good act badly,
and there is, in that deed both the
act and the evil of the act according
to which it is called sin. But the sin
which man perpetrated at the beginning,
of the ordination of God, was a sin
of commission; it therefore affords no
place for that distinction. This
fundamental principle having been
established, the answer, deduced from that
distinction, is at once refuted. Yet
let us look at it. "God," they say,
"is, by ordination, the author of
the act, not of the evil in the act." I
affirm, on the contrary, that God
ordained that act, not as an act, but as
it is an evil act. He ordained that
the glory of His mercy and justice
should be illustrated, of his
pardoning mercy, and His punitive justice; but
that glory is illustrated not by the
act as such, but as it is sinful, and
as an evil act. For the act needs
remission, not as such, but as evil; it
deserves punishment, not as such, but
as evil. The declaration, then, of His
glory by mercy and justice, is by the
act as it is evil, not as it is an
act; therefore that ordination which
had its end, the illustration of that
glory, was not of the act as such, but
as evil, and of sin, as sin and
transgression. That distinction,
therefore, is useless in repelling the
objection, which I have urged against
that theory. I add, for the
elucidation of the subject, that if
God efficaciously determines the will to
the material of sin, or to depraved
objects, though it may be affirmed that
He does not determine the will to an
evil decision, in respect to the evil,
He is still made the author of sin,
since man himself does not will the evil
in respect to the evil and the devil
does not solicit to evil in respect to
the evil, but in respect to that which
is delectable, and yet he is said to
induce persons to sin.
The second distinction is that of
necessity and coaction. They use it in
this way. If the decree of God, in
which he ordained that man should fall,
compelled him to sin, then would God,
by that decree, become the author of
sin, and man would be free from guilt:
but that decree did not compel man.
It only imposed a necessity upon him
so that he could not but sin; which
necessity does not take away his
liberty. Therefore, man, since he sins
freely, the decree being in force, is
the cause of his own fall, and God is
free from the responsibility. Let us
now consider this distinction, and the
use made of it.
Necessity and coaction differ as genus
and species. For necessity
comprehends coaction in itself.
Necessity also is twofold, one from an
internal, the other from an external
cause; the one, natural, the other,
violent. Necessity, from an external
cause and violent, is also called
coaction, whether it be used contrary
to nature, or against the will, as
when a stone is projected upwards, and
a strong man makes use of the hand of
a weaker person to strike a third
person. The former has the name of the
genus, necessity, but is referred to a
specific idea, by a contraction of
the mental conception. There is, then,
between these two species, some
agreement, as they belong to the same
genus, and some discrepancy, since
each has its own form. But it is now
to be considered whether they so differ
that coaction alone, and not that
other species of necessity, is contrary to
freedom; and whether he who compels to
sin is the cause of sin, and not he
who necessitates without compulsion.
They indeed affirm this, who use this
distinction. First, in reference to
freedom; it is opposed directly to
necessity, considered in general,
whether natural or compulsive, for each of
these species causes the inevitability
of the act. For a cause acts freely
when it has the power to suspend its
action. Some say that freedom is fully
consistent with natural necessity, and
refer to the example of the Deity,
who is, by nature and freely, good.
But is God freely good? Such an
affirmation is not very far from
blasphemy. His own goodness exists in God,
naturally and most intimately; it does
not then exist in Him freely. I know
that a kind of freedom of complacency
is spoken of by the School-men, but
contrary to the very nature and definition of freedom. We say, in
reference
to sin, that he is the cause of sin,
who necessitates to the commission of
sin, by any act whatever of
necessitation, whether internal or external,
whether by internal suasion, motion,
or leading, which the will necessarily
obeys, or by an application of
external violence, which the will is not
able, though it may desire, to resist;
though, in that case, the act would
not be voluntary. He, indeed sins more
grievously, who uses the former act,
than he, who uses the latter. For the
former has this effect, that the will
may consent to the sin, but the latter
has no such effect, though that
consent is not according to the mode
of free-will, but according to that of
nature, in which mode only, God can so
move the will, that it may be moved
necessarily, that is, that it cannot
but be moved. And in this relation, the
will, as it consents by nature to sin,
is free from guilt; for sin, as such,
is of free-will, and tend towards its
object, according to the mode of its
own freedom. The law is enacted not
for nature but for the will, for the
will as it acts not according to the
mode of nature, but according to the
mode of freedom. That distinction is,
therefore, vain, and does not relieve
the first theory from the objection
made against it. If any one wishes, with
greater pertinacity, still to defend
the idea, that one and the same act can
be performed freely and necessarily,
in different respects, necessarily in
respect to the first cause, which
ordains it, but freely and contingently in
respect to the second cause, let him
consider that contingency and necessity
differ not in certain respects, but in
their entire essence, and that they
divide the whole extent of being, and
cannot, therefore, be coincident. That
is necessary which cannot fail to be
done; that is contingent which can fail
to be done. These are contradictions
which can in no way be attributed to
the same act. The will tends freely to
its own object, when it is not
determined, to a single direction, by
a superior power; but, when that
determination is made by any decree of
God, it can no longer be said to tend
freely to its own object; for it is no
longer a principle, having dominion
and power over its own acts. Did it
not pertain to the nature of the bones
of Christ, (which they present as an
example,) to be broken? Yet they could
not be broken on account of the decree
of God. I reply, that the divine
determination being removed, they
could be broken; but, that determination,
being presented by the decree of God,
they could not at all be broken, that
is, it was necessary, not contingent,
that they should remain unbroken. Did
God, therefore, change the nature of
the bones? That was not necessary. He
only prevented the act of breaking the
bones, which were liable by their
nature to be broken, which act could
have been performed, and would have
been, if God had not anticipated it by
His decree, and by an act according
to that decree. For our Lord gave up
the ghost when the soldiers were
approaching the cross to break his
bones, and were about to use the breaking
of his legs to accelerate his death.
That I may not be tedious, I will not
refute all the objections; but I am
persuaded, from what has been presented,
that they are all susceptible of
refutation. The third distinction is that
of the decree and its execution. They
use it thus; though God may have
decreed from eternity to devote
certain persons to death, and, that this may
be possible, may have ordained that
they should fall into sin, yet he does
not execute that decree, by their
actual condemnation, until after the
persons themselves have become sinful
by their own act, and, therefore, He
is free from responsibility. I answer
that the fact that the execution of
the decree is subsequent to the act of
sin, does not free from
responsibility him, who, by his own
decree, has ordained that sin should
occur, that he might afterwards punish
it; indeed he, who has ordained and
decreed that sin should be committed,
cannot justly punish sin after its
commission; he cannot justly punish a
deed, the doing of which he has
ordained; he cannot be the ordainer of
the punishment, who was the ordainer
of the crime. Augustine rightly says,
"God can ordain the punishment of
crimes, not the crimes
themselves," that is, He can ordain that they should
take place. I have already demonstrated
that man does not become depraved of
his own fault, if God has ordained
that he should fall and become depraved.
The fourth distinction is that of
efficacious and permissive decree: which
distinction, rightly explained,
removes the whole difficulty, but it removes
also the theory, by which God is
affirmed to have ordained that sin should
take place. The authors, however, of
the first theory endeavour to sustain
that theory by reference to permissive
decree. They affirm that God does not
effect, but decrees and ordains sin,
and that this is done not by an
efficacious, but by a permissive
decree; and they so explain a permissive
decree, that it coincides with one,
which is efficacious. For they explain
permission to be an act of the divine
will, by which God does not bestow, on
a rational creature, that grace, which
is necessary for the avoidance of
sin. This action, joined with the
enactment of a law, embraces in itself the
whole cause of sin. For he, who
imposes a law which cannot be observed
without grace, and denies grace to
him, on whom the law is imposed, is the
cause of sin by the removal of the
necessary hindrance. But more on this
point hereafter.
On the contrary, if permissive decree
be rightly explained, it is certain
that he, who has decreed to permit
sin, is by no means the cause of sin; for
the action of his will has reference
to its own permission, not to sin. Nor
are these two things, God, in the
exercise of His will, permits sin, and,
God wills sin, equivalent. For, the
object of the will is, in the former
case, permission, in the latter, sin.
On the contrary rather, the
conclusion, God permits, therefore, He
does not will, a sinful act, is
valid, for he who wills any thing does
not permit the same thing. Permission
is a sign of want of action in the
will. That distinction, then, does not
relieve the first theory. The fifth
distinction is that of the divine decree
and human nature, which they use thus:
-- sin, if you consider the divine
decree, is necessary; but if you have
reference to human nature, which is
equally free and flexible in every
direction, it is freely and contingently
committed; and, therefore, the whole
responsibility is to be placed on human
nature, as the proximate cause. We
have discussed this, previously, in
reference to the second distinction,
and have sufficiently refuted it. They
make another use of the same
distinction, by a diverse respect of the ends,
which God has proposed to Himself in
His decree, and which are proposed to
man in the commission of sin.
"For," they say, "God intends, in His decree,
to illustrate His own glory, but man
intends to gratify his own desire; and
though man does the very thing, which
is divinely decreed, he does not do it
because it is decreed, but because his
will so inclines him. I reply, first;
a good end does not approve, or make
good, an action which is unlawful in
itself; for "we are not to do
evil that good may come;" but it is evil to
ordain that sin shall be committed.
Secondly, that man, to satisfy his own
desire, should do that which God has
forbidden, also results from the decree
of God, and, therefore, man is
relieved from responsibility. Thirdly, though
the fulfillment of the divine decree
is not the end which moves man to the
commission of sin, yet that same thing
is the cause which, by a gentle,
silent, and imperceptible, yet
efficacious, movement effects that man should
sin, or, rather, commit that act which
God had decreed should be committed,
which, then, in respect to man, cannot
be called sin. Finally, the last
defense consists in a reference to the
end, of which they make this use: "We
are accustomed to state the decree of
God, not in these terms, that ‘God has
determined to adjudge some men to
eternal death and condemnation,’ but we
add, ‘ that His justice may be
illustrated to the glory of his name.’"
I answer, that the addition does not
deny the previous statement, (for this
is confirmed by the rendering of the
cause,) and the addition, even of the
best end, does not justify an action
which is not in itself formally good,
as has before been stated. From these
things, then, it is apparent, that
these grounds of defense are
insufficient, and avail nothing for the defense
of that theory which states that God
ordained that men should fall and
become depraved, in order to open to
Himself, in that manner, a way for the
execution of the decree which He had,
from eternity, determined and proposed
to Himself, for the illustration of
His own glory by mercy and justice. If
any one may think that any other
distinction or explanation can be
presented, by which that theory may be
defended and vindicated, I shall be,
in the highest degree, pleased, if
this is done. But let him be cautious not
to change the theory or add to it any
thing inconsistent with it. You
mention, at the end of your sixth
answer, an objection to your view; --
"Then the judgments of God depend
on contingency, and are based on things
contingent, if they have reference to
man as a sinner, and to his sin." I
must examine this with diligence,
since it also lies against my view, in
that I think that sin must be presupposed
in the object of the divine
decree. It is most manifest, from the
Scriptures, that many of the judgments
of God are based on sin, which, yet,
cannot be said, to depend on sin. It is
one thing to make sin the object and
occasion of the divine judgments, and
another to make it the cause of the
same. The judgment, which God pronounces
in reference to sin, He pronounces
freely, nor does this depend on sin, for
He can suspend it, or substitute
another in its place; yet it is based on
sin, because, apart from sin, He could
not thus judge. But sin is
contingent, or contingently
committed.
Therefore, the judgments of God are
based on things contingent. I deny the
consequence. The judgments of God are
based on sin, not as it is committed
contingently, but as it is certainly
and infallibly foreseen by God.
Therefore, the sight of God intervenes
between sin and judgment, and thus,
judgment is based on the certain and
infallible vision of God. Then that
which exists, so far as it exists, is
necessary. But the judgments of God
are based on sin, already committed
and in existence. In your answer,
however, I could wish that it might be
explained to me how those things,
which are contingent, depend on the
ordination of God, whether according to
the source or the act, the word
ordination having reference to a decree that
certain things shall be done, not to
the disposal of the order in which they
shall be done, for so the word is to
be understood in this place. For,
though God has appointed the mode of
contingency in nature, yet it does not
follow from this that contingencies
have their source in the ordination of
God. For a cause, which is free and
governs its own action, can suspend or
carry forward a contingent act,
according to its own will; so also in
reference to the act. I do not,
therefore, understand in what way
contingencies, which are such in
themselves, are not contingencies to God,
from the fact that He has established
the mode of contingency in nature. Sin
is not, in any mode and in respect to
anything, necessary. Therefore, sin is
also contingent to God, that is, it is
considered by God as done
contingently, though in His certain
and infallible sight, on account of the
infinity of the divine knowledge. Nor
is it the same idea, that a thing
should be really contingent to the
supreme cause, and that a thing, truly
contingent in itself, should be
considered as contingent by that supreme
cause. For it is understood that
nothing can be accidental or contingent to
God, for He is immutable, He is
entirely uncompounded, and, as Being and
Essence, belongs to Himself alone. But
the knowledge of God considers things
as they are, though with vision far
exceeding the nature of all things.
_________________________________________________________________
SEVENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I will not now adduce other reasons
why that theory is not satisfactory to
me, since I perceive that you treat it
in a mode and respect different from
mine. I come then to the theory of
Thomas Aquinas, to which, I think, you
also gave your assent, and presented
proofs from the Scriptures, and I will
openly state that, of which I
complain. I would pray you not to be
displeased with the liberty, which I
take, if your good will towards me was
not most manifest.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SEVENTH
PROPOSITION
I should prefer that those "other
reasons," whatever they might be, had been
presented, that I might dispose of the
whole matter, (if possible,) at the
same time, for I desire that my
opinion should be known to you without any
dissimulation, and that your
expectation should be satisfied. Nevertheless,
I hope, that, in your wisdom, you will
perceive, from what I have already
said, and shall yet say, either what
my opinion is concerning those reasons,
or what there may be, according to my
view, in which your mind may rest,
(which may the Lord grant). The theory
of Thomas Aquinas I unite with the
other, I do not follow it. But I will,
briefly and in a few words, explain
what I shall state in this argument,
and in what mode, from the word of God,
and what does not please me in that
theory, noticing the words of your
writing in the same order.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE
SEVENTH PROPOSITION
If I thought, indeed, that you
considered that first theory, as it is
explained by its authors, to be in
accordance with the Scriptures, I would,
in every way, attempt to divest you of
that idea, but I see that you so
explain it, as greatly to change it;
on which account I am persuaded that
you judge that, unless it be explained
according to your interpretation, it
is, by no means, in accordance with
the Scriptures. You will also allow me,
my brother, to repeat, that, in your
entire answer, you have not relieved
that theory from any objection. For it
remains valid, that "God is made the
author of sin, if He is said to have
ordained that man should fall and
become depraved that He might open to
Himself a way for the declaration of
His own glory, in the way in which He
had already determined by eternal
decree." Yet, that no one may
think that my promise was vain, I will attempt
by other arguments also the refutation
of that theory, which presents, as an
object to God, in the act of
predestination, man not yet created or to be
created. I used two arguments, one a
priore, the other, a posteriore or by
absurdity of consequence. The argument
a priore was as follows; --
Predestination is the will of God in
reference to the illustration of His
glory by mercy and justice; but that
will has no opportunity for exercise in
a being not yet created. The argument
a posteriore was as follows; If God
ordained that man should fall and
become depraved, that He might open to
Himself a way for the execution of
that purpose of His will
(predestination,) then it follows that
He is the author of sin by that
ordination. These arguments have been
already dwelt upon at sufficient
length.
I adduce my third argument.
Predestination is a part of providence,
administering and governing the human
race; therefore, it was subsequent to
the act of creation or to the purpose
of creating man. If it is subsequent
to the act of creation, or to the
purpose of creating man, then man,
considered as not yet created, is not
the object of predestination. I will
add a fourth. Predestination is a
preparation of supernatural benefits, it
is, therefore, preceded by the
communication of natural gifts, and,
therefore, by creation, in nature, or
act, or in the decree of God. Also a
fifth. The illustration of the wisdom
of God in creation, is prior to that
illustration of the wisdom of God,
which is the business of predestination.
(1 Cor. i. 21.) Therefore, creation is
prior to predestination, in the
purpose of God. If creation is prior,
man is considered by God, in the act
of predestination, as existing, not as
to be created.
So also in reference to goodness and
mercy, the former of which, in the act
of creation, was illustrated in
reference to Nothing, the latter, in the act
of predestination, concerning that
which was subsequent to Nothing. To the
same purpose can all the arguments be
used, by which it was proved that "sin
is a condition requisite in the object
of predestination."
_________________________________________________________________
EIGHTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I shall, therefore, consider three
things in that theory.
1. Did God elect from eternity, of
human beings, considered in their natural
condition, some to supernatural
felicity and glory, and non elect or pass by
others?
2. Did God prepare for those whom He
elected, that is, for human beings to
be raised from a natural to a
supernatural state, and to be translated to a
participation of divine things,
according to the purpose of election, those
means which are necessary, sufficient,
and efficacious to the attainment of
that supernatural felicity, but passed
by others, that is, determine not to
communicate those means to them, but
to leave them in their natural state?
3. Did God, foreseeing that those
persons, thus passed by, would fall into
sin, reprobate them, that is, decree
to subject them to eternal punishment?
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE EIGHTH
PROPOSITION
Let this be the rule which shall guide
us in our future discussion. If any
use the term, "in their natural
condition," they do not exclude supernatural
endowments, which God communicated to
Adam, but use it in opposition to sin,
(which afterwards supervened,) and to
native depravity. They, who use these
words otherwise, seem to me to be
deceived by a diversity of relation. The
word reprobation is here used, (as we
have before observed,) in its third
signification, which we have called
catachrestic; but sufficient on that
point. We will come to those three
points in their order.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO
THE EIGHTH PROPOSITION
Natural condition I have opposed both
to supernatural endowments, and to sin
and native depravity, for I have
supposed the former term to be used, to the
exclusion of the latter; -- not
incorrectly, whether we consider the force
of the terms themselves, or their use
by the school-men. Natural condition
has a relation to supernatural
endowments, which they exclude as
transcending it, and to sin and
depravity which they, in like manner,
exclude, as corrupting it. Though I
have used the term reprobation in the
sense in which it is used in your
Theses and other writings, yet I shall
desist from it hereafter, (if I can
keep this in my mind,) and use, in its
place, the words preterition and
non-election, except when I wish to include
both acts, by Synecdoche, in one word.
For the term reprobation, as it is
used by me, I will substitute
preparation of punishment or predamnation.
_________________________________________________________________
NINTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
In the first question, I do not
present as a matter of doubt, the fact that
God has elected some to salvation, and
not elected or passed by others for I
think that this is certain from the
plain words of Scripture; but I place
the emphasis on the subject of
election and non election; -- Did God, in
electing and not electing, have
reference to men, considered in their
natural condition. I have not been
able hitherto to receive this as truth.
THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE NINTH
PROPOSITION
We remarked, in the sixth proposition,
that, though the mode of regarding
man can and ought to be distinguished
by certain respects or relations, yet
the authors of the first theory have
stated that mankind was considered in
common by the Deity in the case of
election and reprobation; but the authors
of the second have not excluded that
common relation of the human race,
which they have referred to a special
relation; but they have only desired
that the contemplation of supervenient
sin should not affect the case of
election and reprobation, according to
the declaration of the apostle,
"neither having done any good or
evil," (Rom. ix. 11,) and according to
those words "natural
condition," mean only the exclusion of any reference to
supervenient sin from the case of
election. If this observation is correct,
the latter state of the question,
properly considered, will not be at
variance with the former. For he, who
states that man, as not yet created,
as not yet fallen, and as fallen, was
considered by the Deity in the case of
election and reprobation, he certainly
affirms the latter, and both the
former. The question, therefore, is,
properly, not whether God, in electing
and in passing by or reprobating, had
reference to men in their natural
condition, that is, apart from the
contemplation of sin, as sin, but the
question should be, whether God had
reference, in this case, to man, apart
from any contemplation of sin as a
cause. We deny this, on time authority of
the word of God. Nor did Augustine, to
whom the third theory is ascribed,
mean any thing else, as he has most
abundantly set forth (lib. 1, quaes. ad
Simplicianum), for what he asserts
concerning Jacob and Esau is either to be
understood, in the same manner, in the
ease of Adam and Eve, or the rule of
election and reprobation will be
different in different cases, which is
certainly absurd. Before, then, Adam
and Eve were made, or had any thing
good or evil, the Divine election, as
we have plainly stated in the same
argument, was already made according
to the purpose of grace, which election
preceded both persons, and all causes
originating from, or situated in,
persons. The truth of this is proved
from authority, reason, and example.
From authority, in Romans 9, Ephesians
1, and elsewhere. From reason; for,
in the first place, election is made
in Christ, not in the creatures, or in
any condition in them; secondly, it is
admitted by all, (which you
afterwards acknowledge in part, though
in a different sense,) that
predestination and reprobation suppose
nothing in the predestinate or the
reprobate, but only in Him who
predestinates, as the apostle affirms "not of
works, but of Him that calleth."
(Rom. ix. 11.) Augustine presents a most
luminous exposition of that passage,
showing, from the reasoning of the
apostle, that neither works, nor
faith, nor will, was foreseen in the case.
The procreation of the child depends,
in nature, on the parent only; much
more does the adoption of His children
originate in God alone (to whom it
peculiarly pertains to be the cause
and principle of all good), not in any
consideration of them. Finally the
example of angels demonstrates the same
thing, of whom some are called elect,
others are non-elect. Of the angels,
the elect were such apart from any
consideration of their works, and those,
who are non-elect, passed-by; or
reprobate, are non-elect, apart from the
consideration of their works. For, as
Augustine conclusively argues in
reference to men, "if, because
God foresaw that the works of Esau would be
evil, He, therefore, predestinated him
to serve the younger, and, because
God foresaw that the works of Jacob
would be good, He, therefore,
predestinated him to have rule over
the elder, that which is affirmed by the
apostle, would be false, ‘not of
works,’" &c. The state of the case is the
same in reference to angels. For God
provided against the possible misery of
these, by the blessing of election; He
did not provide against the possible
misery of those, in the work of
reprobation and preterition. But how? by
predestinating the elect angels, to
the adoption of sons, who are so styled
in Job 1, 2 & 38, and not
predestinating the others. God begat them as sons,
not by nature, but by will, which will
is eternal, and preceded from
eternity their existence, which
belongs to time. What does the child
contribute towards his procreation? He
does not indeed exist. What does an
angel contribute towards his sonship?
If nothing, what does man contribute?
In reply to both these, Augustine, in
the place already cited, surely with
equal justice, thunders forth that
inquiry of St. Paul, "who maketh thee to
differ from another? and what hast
thou that thou didst not receive?" &c. (1
Cor. iv. 7.)
God, therefore, regards man in
general; He does not find any cause in man;
for the cause of that adoption or
filiation is from His sole will and grace.
But if any one should say that sin is
the cause of reprobation or
preterition, He will not establish
that point. For, in the first place, the
reasoning of Augustine, which we have
just adduced, remains unshaken, based
on a comparison of works foreknown; in
the second place, since we are, by
nature, equally sinners before God,
one of these three things must be true;
-- either all are rejected on account
of sin, as a common reason, or it is
remitted to all, or a cause must be
found elsewhere than in sin, as we have
found it. Lastly, "who makes us
to differ," if it be not God, according to
the purpose of His own election?
Therefore, the affirmation stands, that
God, in the case of election and
reprobation made from eternity, considered
man in general, so that He has in
Himself, not in man, the cause of both
acts. Yet let us accurately weigh the
arguments, which are advanced here,
though, properly, they are not opposed
to this theory.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO
THE NINTH PROPOSITION
I think it is sufficiently evident how
the authors of the first theory
considered man, from what was said in
reply to your answer to Prop. 6. But
that the authors of the second theory,
by the addition of that special
relation, did not exclude the
universal relation, seems hardly probable to
me. For he, who says that sin
supervened to election and preterition
originating in their own causes,
excluding sin not only from the cause of
election and preterition, but from the
subject and the condition requisite
in it, he denies that man,
universally, considered as fallen, is presented
to him who elects and passes by, and
if he denies this, he denies also that
man is considered in general, by God,
in the act of decree. In other
respects I assent to what you affirm.
Sin is not the cause of election and
preterition, yet this statement must
be rightly understood, as I think that
it is here understood, namely, that
sin is not the cause that God should
elect some, and pass by others: let it
be only stated that sin is the cause
that God may be able to pass by some
individuals of the human race made in
His own image. In the former statement
there is agreement between us, in the
latter we disagree, if at all. It is
not, then, the question, "Did God have
reference, in His own decree, to men
apart from any consideration of sin, as
a cause, that is, as a cause that He
should elect these, and pass by those."
For this is admitted even by
Augustine, who, nevertheless, presupposes to
that decree sin, as a requisite
condition in its object. But the question is
this; "Is sin a condition
requisite in the object, which God has reference
in the acts of election and
preterition, or not?" This is apparent by the
arguments presented by myself, which
prove, not that sin is a cause of that
decree, but a condition, requisite in
the object. Augustine affirms this,
and I agree with him. Let us look at
some passages from his works. In Book
1, to Simplicianus, he excludes sin as
a cause that God should elect or
reprobate, but includes it as a cause
that He might have the power to pass
by or reprobate, or as a condition
requisite in the object of election and
reprobation. The latter, I prove by
his own words, (there is no necessity of
proof as to the former, for in
reference to that, there is agreement between
us). "God did not hate Esau, the
man, but He did hate Esau, the sinner," and
again, "Was not Jacob, therefore,
a sinner, because God loved him? He loved
in him not sin, of which he was
guilty, but the grace which Himself had
bestowed, &c., and again,
"God hates iniquity, therefore He punishes it in
some by damnation, and removes it from
others by justification." Again, "The
whole race from Adam is one mass of
sinful and wicked being, among whom both
Jews and Gentiles, apart from the
grace of God, belong to one lump." If you
say that Augustine was here
discussing, not preterition, but predamnation, I
reply that Augustine knew no
preterition which was not predamnation, for he
prefixes to preterition hatred as its
cause, as he prefixes love to
election. Then, I conclude, according
to the theory of Augustine, that what
is affirmed in the case of Esau and
Jacob, is not to be understood in that
of Adam and Eve, and it does not,
hence, follow that there would be a
diverse mode of election and
reprobation, unless it be first proved that
God, in election, had reference to
Adam and Eve, considered in their
primitive state, which, throughout
this discussion, I wholly deny. But there
is a manifest difference between Esau
and Jacob, and Adam and Eve. For the
former, though not yet born, could be
considered as sinners, for both had
been already conceived in sin; if they
had not been created, they could not
be considered as such, for they were
such in no possible sense; not even
when they had been created by God, and
remained yet in their original
integrity. It cannot be inferred from
this, that "persons, and all causes
originating from, or situated in
persons" preceded the act of election. For
sin, in which Jacob and Esau were then
already conceived, did not precede.
Yet I admit that sin was not the cause
that God should love one and hate the
other, should elect one and reprobate
the other, but it was a condition
requisite in the object of that
decree. Those arguments, however, which you
present, do not injure my case. For
they do not exclude sin from the object
of that decree as a requisite
condition, nor as a cause without which that
decree could not be made, but only as
a cause, on account of which one is
reprobated, another elected.
This is apparent from Romans 9. For
Esau had been conceived in sin when
those words were addressed by God to
Rebecca. In the same chapter also, the
elect and the reprobate are said to be
"vessels of mercy" and "of wrath,"
which terms could not be applied to
them apart from a consideration of sin.
I will not now affirm, as I might do with truth, that Jacob and Esau are
to
be considered, not in themselves, but
as types, the former being the type of
the children of the promise, who seek
the righteousness which is of faith in
Christ, the latter, the type of the
children of the flesh, who followed
after the righteousness of the law,
which subject requires a more extended
explanation, but here not so
necessary. The first chapter to the Ephesians
clearly affirms the same thing, as it
asserts that the election is made in
Christ, because it is of the grace, by
which we have redemption in the blood
of Christ, &c.
Your arguments "from reason"
do not militate against the position, which I
have assumed, they rather strengthen
it. For in the first place, "the
election is made in Christ,"
therefore, it is of sinners, as will be
hereafter proved at greater length.
Secondly, "predestination and
reprobation suppose nothing in their
subject." Therefore, whatever character
the subject may have, which receives
grace, for such a character, and
considered in the same relation, is
the grace prepared. But the sinner
receives, and he only, the grace
prepared in predestination. Therefore, also
for the sinner alone, is grace prepared
in predestination, but of this,
also, more largely hereafter. Thirdly,
men are the sons of God, not by
generation, but by regeneration; the
latter, presupposes sin, therefore,
adoption is made from sinners.
The example of angels in this case
proves nothing. Their election and
reprobation and those of men are
unlike, as you in many places acknowledge,
for their salvation is secured by the
grace of preservation and
confirmation, that of men by the grace
of restoration. He begat angels, as
sons to Himself, according to the
former grace; He regenerated men as sons
to Himself by the latter grace.
Therefore, God regarded man not in general,
but as sinful, in reference to which
point is this question between us,
though he might find in man no cause
that He should adopt one and pass by
another, in reference to which we have
no controversy. The question then
remains between us, did God, in His
decree of predestination and
reprobation, have reference to man
considered in his natural purity, or to
man considered as in his sins? I
assert the latter, and deny the former, and
I have presented many arguments in
support of my opinion; but I will now
consider, in their order, those
things, which you have presented against it.
_________________________________________________________________
TENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS.
First, in general. 1. Since no man was
ever created by God in a merely
natural state; whence also no man
could ever be considered in the decree of
God, since that, which exists in the
mind, is the material of action and
exists in the relation of capability
of action, but takes its form from the
will and decree by which God
determined actually to exert His power, at any
time, in reference to man. Hence,
whatever distinction may be made, in the
mind, between nature, and a
supernatural gift, bestowed on man at the
creation, that is not to be considered
in this place. For the creation of
the first man, and, in him, of all men,
was in the image of God, which image
of God in man is not nature, but
supernatural grace, having reference not to
natural felicity, but to supernatural
life. It is evident, from the
description of the image of God, that
supernatural grace in man is that
divine image. For, according to the
Scripture, it is "knowledge after the
image of Him that created him,"
(Col. iii. 10,) and "righteousness and true
holiness" pertaining to the new
man which is created after" (according to)
"God." (Ephes. iv. 24.) In
addition to this, all the fathers, seem, without
exception, to be of the sentiment that
man was created in a gracious state.
So, also, our Catechism, ques. 62.
Since there is found, in the Scriptures,
no reference to the love of God
according to election, no divine volition
and no act of God concerning men,
referring to them in different respects,
until after the entrance of sin into
the world, or after it was considered
as having entered.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TENTH
PROPOSITION
Before I refer to arguments, an
ambiguity must be removed, which is
introduced here, and which will be
frequently introduced whenever reference
is made to a "merely natural
state." Things are called natural from the term
"nature." But nature is
two-fold, therefore, natural things are also
two-fold. I affirm that nature is
two-fold, as it is considered, first in
relation to this physical world,
situated nearer and lower in elementary and
material things, which is described by
Philosophers in the science of
Physics, secondly, in relation to that
spiritual world, namely, that which
is more remote and higher, consisting
in spiritual and immaterial things,
which is treated of in Metaphysics,
rightly so called. From the former
nature we have our bodies, and by it
we are animals; from the latter, we
have our spirits, and by it we are
rational beings, which is also observed
by Aristotle (lib. 2, de gener.
animalium cap. 3) in his statement that the
mind alone "enters from
without" into the natural body, and is alone divine;
for there is no communion between its
action and that of the body. Hence, it
is, that natural things must, in
general, be considered in three modes;
physically, in relation to the body
according to its essence, capability,
actions and passions; metaphysically,
in relation to the intelligent mind,
according to its essence and being;
and conjointly in relation to that
personal union, which exists in man,
as a being composed of both natures.
But particularly, a distinction must
be made in these same natural things,
in respect to nature as pure and as
corrupt. Therefore, all those things,
which pertain to the nature of man in
these different modes, are said to
belong to the mere natural state of
man, sin being excluded.
Now, I come to the particular members
of your Proposition. First, you
affirm, "that no man was ever
created in a merely natural state." If you
mean that he was created without
supernatural endowments, I do not see how
this can be proved, (though many make
this assertion). The Scripture does
not any where make this statement. But
you are not ignorant that it is said
in the schools, that a negative
argument from authority, as, "it is not
written, therefore, it is not
true" is not valid. Again, the order of
creation, in a certain respect, proves
the contrary, since the body was
first made from the dust, and
afterwards the soul was breathed into it.
Which, then, is more probable, that
the soul was, at the moment of its
creation, endowed with supernatural
gifts, or that they were superadded
after its creation? I would rather
affirm that, as the soul was added to the
body, so the supernatural endowments
were added to the soul. If God did this
in relation to nature, why may He not
have done it, in the case of grace,
which is more peculiar. Lastly, I do
not think that it follows, if man was
not made in a merely natural state,
but with supernatural endowments, that
grace, therefore, pertains to creation, and also that supernatural
gifts
would therefore, pertain, in common,
to the whole race. That this
consequence is false, is proved by the
definition of nature, and the
relation of supernatural things. For what
else is nature than the principle
of motion and rest, ordained by God?
If, then, supernatural things are
ordained on this principle, they cease
to be supernatural and become
natural. Besides the relation of
supernatural things is such that they are
not natural, as they are not common;
for those things which are common to
all men belong to nature, but
supernatural things are personal, and do not
pass to heirs. I acknowledge that Adam
and Eve received supernatural gifts,
but for themselves not for their
heirs; nor could they transmit them to
their heirs, except by a general
arrangement or special grace. If this be
so, then man is without supernatural
endowments, though, as you claim, the
first man may not have been made without
them; and he is justly considered
by us as not possessing them, and much
more would he have been so considered
by the Deity. Indeed, my brother, God
contemplated man, in a merely natural
state, and determined in His own
decree to bestow upon him supernatural
endowments. He could then be so
considered in the decree of God. He
contemplated nature, on which He would
bestow grace; the natural man, on
whom He would bestow, by His own
decree, supernatural gifts. Was it not,
indeed, a special act of the will, to
create man, and another special act of
the will to endow Him with
supernatural gifts? Which acts, even though they
might have occurred at the same time
(which does not seem to me necessary,
for the reasons which have been just
advanced) cannot be together in the
order of nature, since one may be
styled natural, and the other
supernatural. I know that you
afterwards speak of the image of God, but we
shall soon see that this has no
bearing, (as you think), on this case.
Meanwhile, I wish that you would
always keep in view the fact, that, though
all these things should be true, yet
they are not opposed to that doctrine
which asserts that in this decree, God
considered man in general.
I will leave without discussion those
subsequent remarks on the material and
the formal relation of the decree of
God, since the force of the argument
does not depend on them, and pass to
the proof. "The creation of the first
man," you affirm, "and, in
him, of all men, was in the image of God," (I
concede and believe it,) "which
image of God in man is not nature but
supernatural grace, having reference
not to natural felicity but to
supernatural life." What is this,
your statement, my brother? Origen
formerly affirmed the same thing, and
on this account received the
reprehension of the ancient church in
its constant testimony and harmonious
declarations, as is attested by
Epiphanius, Jerome and other witnesses. I do
not, however, believe that you agree
in sentiment with Origen, in opposition
to the united and wise declaration of
that church, but some ambiguity, which
you have not observed, has led you
into this mistake. Let us then expose and
free from its obscurity this subject,
by the light of truth.
The first ambiguity is in the word
nature, the second in the term
supernatural. We have just spoken in
reference to the former, affirming that
this term may refer to the lower
nature of elementary bodies, or to that
higher nature of spiritual beings, or
finally to our human nature, composed
of both natures in one compound
subject; and that this latter nature is
itself two-fold, pure and
depraved.
The latter ambiguity consists in the
fact, that the term supernatural is
applied, at one time, to those things
which are above this inferior nature,
and pertain to the superior,
spiritual, or metaphysical nature; at another,
to those things which are above even
that higher and metaphysical nature,
that is, to those which are properly
and immediately divine; and at another,
to those things which are above the
condition of this our corrupt nature, as
they are bestowed upon us only of
supernatural grace, though they might have
pertained to that pure nature. The
body, for example, is of this lower
nature, and in comparison with it, the
soul is supernatural. Again, our
souls are of the higher nature, which
pertains to angels. In reference to
both the soul and the body, all divine
things are supernatural as they are
superior to all corporeal and mental
nature. How you say that "the image of
God in man is not nature but
supernatural grace;" that is, as I think, it is
not of nature, but of grace, or not
from nature, but from grace. Here
consider, my brother, the former
ambiguity. "The image of God is not of
nature," if the lower or
corporeal nature is referred to, is a true
statement, but if the higher nature is
referred to, it is not a true
statement. For what is nature? It is
the principle, ordained of God, of
motion and rest in its own natural
subject, according to its own mode. Place
before your mind the kinds of motion,
which occur in the lower nature,
generation, corruption, increase,
diminution, alteration, local transition,
which they style fora &c. You will
find this difference, that the subjects
of this lower nature experience these
motions according to their own essence
and all other matters, that is,
according to their material, form, and
accidents, but the subjects of that
higher nature are moved by no means
according to their essence, but only
according to their being; but that
divine things surpass both natures, in
an infinite and divine mode, because
they are, in all respects, destitute
of all motion. The body is mortal;
whence, if not from this inferior
nature? The soul is immortal; whence, if
not from that superior nature? But
both natures are ordained of God, and so
perform their work, immediately, that
God performs, by both mediately, all
things which pertain to nature. But
the image of God is from that superior
nature, by which God performs
mediately in the children of Adam, as He
instituted our common nature in Adam,
our first parent. It is indeed true,
that it was supernatural grace by
which God impressed His own image on Adam;
just as he also performed the work of
creation by the same grace. God
bestowed its principle not on nature,
of nature, but of Himself; but when
nature has received its existence,
that which existed by nature, was
produced by nature in the species and
individuals. Though, in its first
origin, it is of grace, yet it is now,
in its own essence, of nature, and is
to be called natural. But the image of
God is produced, in the species and
in the individuals, by nature.
Therefore, it must be called natural We shall
hereafter consider its definition, for
it is necessary first to elucidate
the statement that "the image of
God has reference, not to felicity, but to
supernatural life." Let us remove
the ambiguity, as we shall thus speak more
correctly of these matters. Natural
felicity pertains either to the nature
from which we have the body, or to
that from which we have the spirit, or to
both natures united in a compound
being. To this latter felicity the image
of God has, naturally, its reference;
to that of the body as its essential
and intimately associated instrument;
to that of the spirit, as its
essential subject; to that of the man,
as the entire personal subject. If
you deny this, what is there, I pray
you, in all nature, which does not seek
its own good? But, to every thing, its
own good is its felicity. If, in this
lower nature, a stone, the herds, an
animal, and, in that higher nature,
spirits and intelligent forms do this,
surely it cannot be justly denied to
man, and to the image of God in man.
You add that "it has reference to
supernatural life." This,
however, is a life dependent on grace, as all the
adjuncts show. If you understand that
it has reference to that life only, we
deny such exclusive reference. If to
this (natural) life, and to that life
conjointly, we indeed affirm this, and
assent to your assertion that the
image of God in man has respect to
both kinds of felicity, both natural and
supernatural; by means of nature, in a
natural mode, and of grace, in a
supernatural mode.
I would now explain this, in a more
extended manner, if it was not necessary
that a statement should first be made
of the subject under discussion.
Perceiving this very clearly, you pass
to a definition of that image, in
proof of your sentiment. "It is
evident," you say, "from the description of
the image of God, that supernatural
grace, in man, is that divine image."
You will permit me to deny this, since
you ask not my opinion. You add,
"According to the Scripture, it
is ‘knowledge after the image of Him that
created him,’ (Col. iii. 10,) and
righteousness and true holiness pertaining
‘to the new man which is created after
God.’ (Ephes. v. 25)". I acknowledge
that these are the words of the
apostle, and I believe them, but I fear my
brother, that you wander from his
words and sentiment.
In the former passage, he does not
assert that the image of God is
"knowledge after the image
etc," but that the "new man is renewed in
knowledge after the image of him that
created him." The subject of the
proposition is man, one in substance,
but once "old," now "new." In this
subject there was old knowledge, there
is new knowledge. According to the
subject, the knowledge is one, but it
differs in mode; for the old man and
the new man understand with the same
intellect, in the previous case as the
old, afterwards as the new man. What,
therefore, is the mode of that
knowledge! "After the image of
God." This is the mode of our knowledge and
intelligence. The former (that which
is old) according to the image of the
first Adam who "begat a son in
his own likeness;" (Gen. v. 3;) the latter
according to the image of the second
Adam, Christ and God, our Creator. The
image of God is not said to be
knowledge, but knowledge is said to be
renewed in us after the image of God.
What, then, is knowledge? An act of
the image of God. What is the image of
God? The fountain and principle of
action, fashioning in a formal manner,
the action, or the habit of that
image. The mode, in which this may be
understood, is a matter of no interest
to me. Consider, I pray you, and I
appeal to yourself as a judge, whether
this can be justly called a suitable
description; -- "The image of God is
knowledge according to the image of
God." This description, indeed, denies
that the image of God is either one
thing or another; either knowledge or
the image of God, if, indeed,
knowledge is according to the image of God.
You will, however, understand these
things better, from your own skill, than
they can be stated by me in writing. I
now consider the other passage. "The
image of God is ‘ righteousness and
true holiness’ pertaining ‘to the new
man, which is created after
God."’ Here you affirm something more than in
the previous case, yet without
sufficient truth. That knowledge, of which
you had previously spoken, is a part
of truth, for it is the truth, as it
exists in our minds. Here you state
that it is truth, and righteousness and
holiness. But let us examine the words
of the apostle. He asserts, indeed,
that the new man is one "which
after God is created in righteousness and
true holiness." I will not plead the fact that many explain the
phrase
"after God," as though the
apostle would say "by the power of God working in
us." I assent to your opinion
that the words kata< Qeon mean simply the
same as would be implied in the phrase
"to the image," or "according to the
image of God." Yet do you not
perceive that the same order, which we have
just indicated, is preserved by Paul;
and that the subject, the principle,
and the acts or habits, thereby
inwrought, are most suitably distinguished?
The subject is man, who is the same
person, whether as the old; or the new
man. The principle is the image of
God, which is the same, whether old or
new, and purified from corruption. The
acts or habits, inwrought by that
principle, are righteousness,
holiness, and truth. Righteousness, holiness,
and truth are not the image, but
pertain to the image. Let us return, if you
please, to that principle, which the
Fathers laid down "natural things are
corrupt, supernatural things are
removed." You may certainly, hence, deduce
with ease this conclusion; --
righteousness, holiness and truth are not
removed, therefore, they are not
supernatural. Again, they have become
corrupt, therefore, they are natural.
If they had been removed, none of
their elementary principles would
exist in us by nature. But they do exist;
therefore, they are by nature, and are
themselves corrupt, and, with them,
whatever originates in them. The same
is the fact with the image of God. The
image of God is not removed; it is
not, therefore, supernatural; and, on the
other hand, it has become corrupt; it
is, therefore, natural. For it is
nowhere, in the Scriptures, said to be
bestowed, but only to be renewed. I
shall offer proof, on this point, from
the Scriptures, when I have made a
single remark. Righteousness,
holiness, truth, exist only in the image of
God; there is, in man, some
righteousness, holiness and truth; therefore,
there is in man somewhat of the image
of God. Moses, in Genesis 1, certainly
relates nothing else than the first
constitution of nature, as made in
reference to every subject and
species. But he relates that man was made in
the image of God. This, then, was the
constitution of human nature. But, if
it is of nature, then the image of God
pertains universally to the human
race, since natural things differ from
personal things in this, that they
are common. The same is evident from
Gen. v. 3. Adam begat Seth "in his own
likeness," in his own image; but
Adam was made in the image of God;
therefore he begat Seth in the image
of God. It may be said, however, that
the image of God, and the image of
Adam differ, and that a distinction is
made between them by Moses. They
indeed differ, but in mode, not in their
essence; for the image of God in Adam
was uncorrupted, in Seth it was
corrupted through Adam; yet in both
cases it was the image. In the same
respect, this image, in the rest of
the human race, is called according to
its corruption, the image of the
earthy, according to its renewal, the image
of the heavenly. But since the image
of God is diverse in mode only, and not
in essence, it is said to be renewed,
and restored, and not to be implanted
or created, as we have before
observed, as that which differs not in
essence, but in mode or degree. The
same thing is taught in Gen. ix. 6.
"Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by
man shall his blood be shed: for in the
image of God made he man." If the
image of God did not exist in the
descendants of Adam, who are slain,
the argument of Moses would be
impertinent and absurd. But the
argument, either of Moses or of God, is just
and conclusive; for if you say, --
"The slayer of him, whom God has made in
His own image, ought to be slain by
man; God made the man who is slain in
his own image; therefore, let the
murderer be slain by man." the argument is
valid. For since man was made in the
image of God, it is just that his
murderer should be slain, and indeed
that he should be slain by man. But if
you explain the passage "for in
the image of God made He man," so that "He"
shall refer to man, my interpretation
of the argument will be even more
confirmed. I do not, however, remember
that it is affirmed any where in the
Scriptures that man made man, nor can
it be proved to me. These things, I
think will be sufficient that you may
see, my brother, that the image of God
is naturally in man.
What, then, is the image of God? For
it is now time that we pass from
destructive to constructive reasoning.
I will state it, in the words of the
orthodox Fathers. Let Tertullian, of
the Latins, first speak (lib. 2 advers.
Marcion, cap. 9.) "The
distinction is especially to be noticed, which the
Greek Scriptures make, when they speak
of the afflatus, not of the Spirit,
(pnohn non pneu~ma) for some,
translating from the Greek, not considering
the difference or regarding the proper
use of words, substitute Spirit for
afflatus, and afford heretics an
occasion of charging fault on the Spirit of
God, that is, on God Himself; and it
is even now a vexed question. Observe,
then, that the afflatus is inferior to
the Spirit, though it comes from the
Spirit, as its breath, yet it is not
the Spirit. For the breeze is lighter
than the wind, and if the breeze is of
the wind, the wind is not therefore,
of the breeze. It is usual also, to
call the afflatus the image of the
Spirit; for thus also, man is the
image of God, that is of the Spirit, for
God is Spirit, therefore, the image of
the Spirit is the afflatus. Moreover
the image will never in all respects
equal the reality; for to be according
to the truth is one thing, to be the
truth itself is another. Thus, also,
the afflatus cannot, in such a sense,
be equal to the Spirit, that, because
the truth—that is the Spirit, or
God—is without sin, therefore the image, of
truth also, must be without sin. In
this respect the image will be inferior
to the truth, and the afflatus will be
inferior to the Spirit, having some
lineaments of the Deity, in the fact
that the soul is immortal, free,
capable of choice, prescient to a
considerable degree, rational, and capable
of understanding and knowledge. Yet,
in these particulars, it is only an
image, and does not extend to the full
power of divinity, and so, likewise,
it does not extend to sinless
integrity, since this belongs alone to God,
that is to truth, and can not pertain
to the mere image; for as the image,
while it expresses all the lineaments
and outlines of the truth, yet is
destitute of force, not having motion,
so the soul, the image of the Spirit,
is not able to exhibit its full power,
that is, the felicity of freedom from
sin, otherwise it would be not the
soul, but the Spirit, not man, endowed
with mind, but God, &c."
Ambrose (hexaemeri lib. 6, cap. 7), after many
arguments, concludes in this way;
"for ‘what will a man give in exchange for
his soul?’ in which there is, not
merely a small portion of himself, but the
substance of the entire human race. It
is this by which thou hast dominion
over other living creatures, whether
beasts or birds. This is the image of
God, but the body is in the likeness
of beasts; in one there is the sacred
mark of divine resemblance, in the
other the vile fellowship with the herds
and wild beasts, &c." Also,
in Psalm 118, sermon 10, "Likeness to the image
of God consists, not in the body, or
in the material parts of our nature,
but in the rational soul; in respect
to which man was made after the
likeness and image of God, and in
which the form of righteousness, wisdom,
and every virtue is found."
To the same purpose are the words of
Augustine, in his first Book "De Genes.
contra Manich," chap. 17th, and
in many other places. I mention also Jerome,
because he evidently has the same
view, and, in writing against Origen, he
uses the same argument with that of
Epiphanius and the Greek Fathers. I
would refer to Basil, if you did not
know that Ambrose quotes from him. Why
should I speak of Chrysostom, the two
Gregories, Cyril, Theodouret?
Damascenus, an epitomist of all those
writers, presents this subject, with
the greatest accuracy, in the book
which he has inscribed "Concerning the
respect in which we were made in the
image of God." Also, in another, which
has reference to "The two wills
in Christ," in which he uses the following
words, "as to the rational, and
intellectual, and voluntary powers, they
belong to the mind at birth, and the
Spirit is superadded, as having
princely prerogative, and in these
respects both angels and men are after
the image of God, and this is
abundantly true of men, &c.," in which passage
he has, with the utmost diligence,
introduced those things which are
essential and those which are
adjunct.
I conclude with a single argument from
Augustine against the Manichees.
"Those men," he says,
"do not know that it is not possible that nature
should use any action, or produce any
effect, the faculty for which has not
been received according to nature. For
example, no bird can fly, unless it
has received the faculty of flying,
according to nature, and no beast of the
earth can walk, unless it has received
the faculty of walking, according to
nature. So, likewise, man cannot act
or will, unless he has received,
according to nature, that faculty,
which is called the "voluntary," and the
"energetic;" and he cannot
understand if he has not received from nature the
intellectual faculty, and he cannot
see, or perform any other action, and,
therefore, in every kind of nature,
natural actions find place, and they
exist at once and together, but those
which depend on the will and activity,
do not exist together." From
which reasoning he infers that man understands,
reasons, wills, and, above other
creatures, does many things which savour of
divinity; therefore, many faculties
exist in man, in respect to which he is
said, in the Scriptures, to have been
made in the image and likeness of God.
Here then is that image of God, in our
soul; its essential parts not only
show, of themselves, some resemblance,
by nature, to divinity, but are, by
nature and grace together, adapted to
the perception of supernatural grace,
as we shall soon show. You add that
"all the fathers, seem, without
exception, to be of the sentiment that
man was created in a gracious state.
So also our Catechism, ques. 6."
I have, indeed, known no one among orthodox
divines, who holds any different
opinion; nor is there any other correct
explanation of our catechism.
But you seem to fall into an error
from a statement, which is susceptible of
a two-fold interpretation, and to
unite things really distinct. For it is
not meant that the first man was
created with grace, that is, that he
received, in the act of creation,
nature and supernatural grace; but this is
their meaning: the man who was first
created, received grace, that is,
supernatural grace, as an additional
gift—which idea we have before
presented in this answer. What then?
Did he not have supernatural grace in
creation? If you understand, by grace,
the good will of God, he had grace;
if you understand supernatural gifts,
bestowed upon him, then he did not
have those things, which are
supernatural, from creation, or by the force of
creation, since creation is the
principle of nature, or its first term, but
supernatural things entirely differ
from it; but he had them in creation,
that is, in that first state of
creation in which Adam was until he fell
into sin. That you may more easily
understand the subject, let us use the
illustration of the sun and moon, to
explain the divine image. The moon has
an essential image, and one which is
relative and accidental. As its image
is essential, it has its own light in
some degree; yet it would be darkened,
unless it should look towards the sun;
as its image is relative, it has
light borrowed from the sun, while it
is looked upon by it, and looks to it.
So, there was, in man, a two-fold
relation of the image of God, even from
the creation. For man had his own
essential light fixed in the soul, which
shines as the image of God among
created things; he had also a relative
light, as he was looked upon by God,
and looked back to God. The essential
image is natural; the relative image
was, so to speak, supernatural, for it
looked to God, through nature joined
to grace, by a peculiar and free motion
of the will; God looked upon it, of
grace, (for, what action of God towards
us is natural?) We have that essential
light, corrupted by sin; it is plain
that we have not lost it. We have lost
the relative light; but Christ
restores this, that we may be renewed,
after God, in his own image, and that
the essential light may be purified,
since natural things are corrupted, the
supernatural are lost, as we have
previously said.
Your second argument is stated thus:
"Since there is found, in the
Scriptures, no reference to the love
of God according to election, no divine
volition, and no act of God,
concerning men, referring to them in different
respects, until after the entrance of
sin into the world, or after it was
considered as having entered." If
I should concede this, yet the sentiment
of those, who say that man is
considered, in general, by the Deity, would
not, therefore, be confuted, as we
have before shown. But I may, perhaps, be
able to disprove this assertion by
authority, by reason, and by example. You
have authority in Romans ix. 11-13.
"For the children being not yet born,
neither having done any good or evil,
that the purpose of God, according to
election, might stand, not of works,
but of Him that calleth; it was said
unto her, The elder shall serve the
younger; as it is written, Jacob have I
loved, but Esau have I hated."
What do those three phrases indicate "the
children being not yet born;"
again, "neither having done any good or evil;"
and "according to election, not
of works, but of Him that calleth." You will
say, "these expressions are
according to truth; but they have reference to
fallen and sinful nature." But
they exclude, with the utmost care, all
reference to sin and refer all
blessing to the sole vocation of God, who
calleth, as even yourself, my brother,
if you are willing to observe it,
(and you certainly are thus willing,)
may easily deduce from that
proposition. To this authority you
will certainly submit every semblance of
reasoning. (Ephes. i. 4, 5,) "He
hath chosen us in Him before the foundation
of the world, having predestinated us
unto the adoption of children, by
Jesus Christ to Himself."
Election originates in special love;
and when He is said to have chosen us
in Christ, all reference to ourselves
is excluded; predestination also
precedes both persons and cases
relating to them. Indeed this is indicated
by the words "foreknow" and
"predestinate," (Rom. 8). Christ himself
attributes to the blessing of the
Father only that they were made possessors
of the kingdom, "from the
foundation of the world," (Matt. 30). In sin, or
previous to sin? In view of sin, or
without reference to it? Why should the
former be true, I ask, rather than the
latter? Why indeed, should not the
latter rather, since all things are
said to depend on God, who calleth? To
these, let the following
considerations be added:
1. Whatever absurdity may be connected
with this subject, you will perceive,
(if you examine it closely,) that it
pertains as much to the former
interpretation, and rather more to it
than to the latter. This absurdity is
not to be passed by, but rather to be
religiously and suitably removed.
2. I deny that a reference to sin
belongs to the matter of filial adoption.
I call nature as a witness: Does not a
father beget sons, before he
investigates or observes what shall be
their condition? But this generation,
(namely that of the children of God),
is of will and not of nature. True:
yet it is attributed to the will of
God alone, not to any condition in us.
Every condition in us is excluded,
even that of sin; the will of God, alone,
His purpose, alone, is considered in
the matter. God distinguishes by His
mere will among those equal in nature,
equal in sin; whom, considered in
their natural condition simply, not in
that of sin, but generally in Christ,
He adopts as His children. As in
nature, children are begotten without
reference to their future condition,
so God, of His own will, adopted from
eternity His own children.
3. Whatever is more consistent with
the wisdom and grace of God, would be
performed by the Deity, and is to be
believed by us, rather than that which
is less consistent. But it is more
consistent with His wisdom and grace that
He should adopt unto Himself children
without any consideration of
character, than that He should do so
on the supposition of such
consideration; otherwise nature would
act more perfectly than God, as
according to nature, fathers beget
children, without such consideration.
Therefore, the former view is more
consistent with the character of God, and
rather to be received with faith by
us.
As an example, for the confirmation of
this matter, we will take, if you
please, that of the Angels. Whoever
are the sons of God, are sons by
election. Angels are the sons of God,
(Job 1, 2, & 37,) therefore, they are
such by election, as Paul affirms (1
Tim. v. 21,) when he calls them "the
elect." But they are elect
without consideration of their sins, as they did
not sin, but remained in their
original condition.
Therefore, the love of God is with
election, without
reference to sin, or consideration of
it, which you seem to
deny in your assertion. Perhaps you
will say that your assertion had
reference only to men. But I reply,
that love and election are spoken of in
relation both to angels and men, and
in the same manner, since God placed,
in both, his own image, in reference
to which election is made. The most
decisive proof of this is found in the
principle that, if any act which
apparently exists in reference to two
things, which have the same relation,
does not really exist in reference to
one, it does not exist in reference to
the other. In the election of Angels,
there is no reference to their
condition or their works; therefore,
in the election of men there is no such
reference. If the condition of Angels
and of men is, in some respects,
different, it does not follow that the
mode of their election is different;
especially when the relation of that
thing, in reference to which they are
chosen, is the same in both cases.
This is the image of God, which,
preserved or restored according to His
own will, he has called and united to
Himself, which will remain immutably
in Christ, "gathering together in one
all things," (Ephes. i. 10,) and
which he had placed on the common basis of
his own nature, from which, those, who
were to be damned according to His
judgment, fell of their own
will.
It is not possible to adduce any other
example; because all other things are
created in a different relation. For
they are destitute of the image of God,
in which consists, with suitable
limitations, the object of election.
Therefore, the nature of the divine
election, made concerning men, can be
illustrated by the example of angels,
and by no other example. But the
divine election was such, not that it
separated, at first, the Angels who
sinned from those who did not sin, but
that, of His own will and grace, he
distinguished those who were not about
to sin, as previously elected and
predestinated to adoption, from others
who were about to sin of their own
free will. What reason, then, is there
that we should think that another
mode of the divine election must be
devised in reference to men?
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE
TENTH PROPOSITION
I apply the term natural to whatever
pertains to the substance and existence
of man, without which man cannot
exist. Such are the soul and the body, and
the whole system compounded of them,
with all natural attributes,
affections, passions, &c. I apply
the term supernatural to whatever God has
bestowed on man above and in addition
to those natural characteristics,
which indeed pertain to the perfection
of man, not in respect to his animal
nature, but in respect to his
spiritual nature, to the acquisition not of
natural, but of supernatural good. I
apply the phrase "merely natural," in
this place, to that which has nothing
supernatural added to it. The sense
then of my words is that man is not
made in a merely natural state, without
supernatural endowments.
I do not here contend, with much
strenuousness, whether he has those
supernatural endowments from the act
of creation or from another act of
superinfusion, but leave this without
decision, as neither useful or
injurious to my cause. But I decidedly
state and affirm, that God decreed to
make man such by nature, as he in fact
did make him; but such, that He might
add to him some supernatural
endowments, as He not only wished that he might
be such as he was by nature, but He
wished also to advance him further to a
happier state, namely, to a
participation of Himself, to which he could not
attain, unless endowed with
supernatural gifts. But when I deny that man was
made in a merely natural state, and,
therefore, was created with
supernatural gifts, I wish not to
indicate that the act, by which
supernatural endowments are
communicated, was creation, (for in my 26th
proposition I have called that act
superinfused Grace,) but that God was
unwilling to cease from the act of
communicating His blessing to that part
of primitive matter or Nothing from
which He created man, and that of His
own decree, until he should also have
bestowed those supernatural gifts upon
him. I thought that I ought to observe
the mode of expression, used in the
Scripture, which declares that man was
created "in the image and likeness of
God," which image and likeness of
God comprehends in itself also
supernatural gifts. If this is true,
as I contend, then man was created with
supernatural endowments. For he was
made in the image of God, and the word
"made" is attributed,
without distinction, to all parts of the image,
without separating that, in the image,
which is natural from that which is
supernatural to man. I am glad to
quote here the words of Jerome Zanchius,
who, in his first book concerning the
creation of man, chapter 1, speaks
concerning this same matter in these
terms;" I am pleased with the sentiment
of those, who say that with the inbreathing
of life, there was also
inbreathed and infused by the Deity
whatever Adam possessed of celestial
light, wisdom, rectitude, and other
heavenly gifts; in which he reflects the
Deity, as His true image. For he was
created such as the Scripture teaches,
affirming that he was made in the
image of God, and Solomon in Eccl. vii.
29, "God made man upright."
But he was not such when his body only was
formed. When, with a soul placed in
him, he became a living soul, that is a
living man, that he was made upright,
just, &c., and thus, at the same time
with his soul, rays also of divine
wisdom, righteousness, and goodness were
infused." Thus Zanchius, who
clearly decides what I left without decision in
either direction, and this for a
twofold reason; I knew that it was a matter
of dispute among the learned, and I
perceived that nothing could be deduced
from it either of advantage or
disadvantage to my cause.
Those supernatural gifts, which were
bestowed on man, he received for
transmission to posterity, on the
terms, on which he received them, namely,
of grace, not as this word denotes the
principle of natural endowments, for
from grace, understood in its widest
sense, we have received even our
nature, as that to which we had no
claim, but as it is used in
contra-distinction to nature, and as
it is the principle of supernatural
gifts. I can then concede that God had
reference to man in nature, as the
subject of grace, the natural man as
the subject of supernatural gifts; but
that He had reference to him,
contemplated in the administrative decree of
creation, not in the decree of
predestination, which we have now under
discussion; as the subject of grace
sufficient for supernatural felicity,
not of effectual grace, of which we
now dispute; as the subject of
supernatural gifts, to be transmitted
to his posterity, without exception,
according to the arrangement of grace,
and without any condition, not of
such gifts as are peculiar to those,
who are predestinated, and to be
bestowed, with certainty and
infallibly, upon them, in reference to which is
the controversy between us.
Hence, these things are not opposed to
my sentiment, for in them the fallacy
of ignoratio elenchi is committed. I
wish, however, that you would always
remember that I speak constantly
concerning the grace, prepared in the
decree of predestination, and in no
other decree. But I have proved that man
was not made in a merely natural
state, in the sense, as I have already
stated, of a destitution of
supernatural endowments, whether he is said to
have them by the act of creation, or
by the act of superinfusion; and I have
proved it by an argument, deduced from
the image and likeness of God in
which man was created. Which argument
is valid, whether the image of God
signifies only supernatural gifts,
bestowed on man by the Deity, as our
Catechism and Confession, and some of
our theologians affirm in reference to
the image of God, or nature itself,
together with those supernatural gifts,
which is my opinion; according to
which I wish that my affirmation, that
"the image of God in man is not
nature, but supernatural grace," should be
understood, that is, that it is not
nature alone, apart from supernatural
endowments, which is sufficient for
any argument. For the question is not
concerning natural qualities, and
therefore, the decision of the point
whether they belong to the image of
God, according to my opinion, or not,
does not affect the subject of inquiry. Let
supernatural qualities be
embraced in the definition of the
image of God, in which man was made, and I
have obtained what I desire.
I also wish that my subsequent remarks
should be understood in the same
manner, namely, that the image of God,
has respect, not to natural felicity
only, but to supernatural, and if that
is true, as you seem to concede, I
have attained my object. I did not
wish to define with accuracy the image of
God in which man was made, since this
was not necessary to my purpose: it
was sufficient to have shown that
"knowledge, righteousness, and holiness"
pertained also to the image of God,
whether that image consisted wholly or
only in part in them. For either of these
statements would be equally
available for my purpose, as I had
undertaken to prove that man was not
created without supernatural
endowments, and therefore that he could not
have been considered, in the decree of
predestination, as created in a
merely natural state, without
supernatural endowments. But, before I come to
the defense of my argument on this
point, I must speak, at somewhat greater
length, of three things, in
considering which, a considerable part of your
answer is occupied. First. I will
explain more fully than I have before
done, what I call natural, and what,
supernatural qualities. Secondly. I
will speak of the image of God, and
what things, whether natural or
supernatural, are embraced in it, and
in its definition. Thirdly, by what
action of the Deity, man has both the
former, and the latter qualities.
First; I call those qualities natural
which pertain to the nature of man,
without which man cannot be man, and
which have their source in the
principles of nature, and are
prepared, by their own nature, for natural
felicity, as their end and limit: such
are the body, the soul, the union of
both, and that which is made up of
both, and their natural attributes,
affections, functions, and passions;
under which I also comprehend moral
feelings, which are sometimes spoken
of in contradistinction to those which
are natural. I call those qualities
supernatural which are not a part of
man, and do not originate in natural
principles, but are superadded to
natural principles, for the increase
and perfection of nature, designed for
supernatural felicity, and for a
supernatural communion with God, our
Creator, in which that felicity
consists.
Between these, exists a natural
relation of this character, that natural
qualities may receive the addition of
supernatural, by the arrangement of
God, and that supernatural qualities
are adapted for adding to, adorning and
perfecting nature, and are therefore
ordained for exalting it above itself.
Hence, without ambiguity, under the
term natural, I have comprehended nature
both corporeal and spiritual, and that
which is composed of both. It is,
however, to be carefully observed—that
ambiguities of words are to be
noticed and explained, in a
discussion, when, if taken in one sense, they
favour any view, and, if in the other,
they do not, when, according to one
sense, a statement is true, and,
according to the other, is false. But when
the statement is true, and pertinent
to the subject, in whatever sense a
word is taken, there is no need of an
explanation of the ambiguity. Thus, in
this case, you observe that I
understand, by natural qualities, both those
which pertain to the inferior nature,
that is, to the body, and those which
pertain to the superior nature, that
is, to the soul, and in whatever mode
you take it, my argument is equally
strong and valid. We shall hereafter
notice examples of equally unnecessary
reference to ambiguity.
Secondly; two things must be
considered in reference to the image of God in
man, in what things does it consist,
and which of them may be called
material, and which
supernatural?
I affirm that the image of God in man
embraces all those things which
represent in man any thing of the
divine nature, which are partly essential:
yet God did not wish that the images
of all of them should be essential to
man, whom He wished to create, in such
a condition, not only that he might
be that which he was, but that he
might have the capability of becoming that
which he was not, and of failing to be
that which he was. I call essential
the soul, and in it the intellect, and
will, and the freedom of the will,
and other affections, actions, and
passions, which necessarily result from
them. I call accidental both the moral
virtues, and the knowledge of God,
righteousness and true holiness, and
whatever other attributes of the Deity
exist, to be considered in Him as
essential to his own nature, but in man as
an express image, of which under the
term "divine nature," Peter says, that
believers are "partakers."
2. I do not think that all these things can be
comprehended under the term natural,
but I think that "knowledge,
righteousness and true holiness,"
are supernatural, and are to be called by
that name. I am in doubt whether I
have your assent to this affirmation. For
in one part of your answer, you say
that those are natural qualities, and
present arguments in support of that view,
and in another place, in the same
answer, you acknowledge that Adam had
supernatural gifts though not from the
act of creation: by which supernatural
qualities, I know not what you can
understand, except those things which
are mentioned by the apostle in
Colossians 3, and Ephesians
4. Yet you seem to set forth under the
term reflexive image, those very
things which you acknowledge to be
supernatural. But, whether I rightly
understand your sentiment or not, I
will speak of those things which, I
think, tend to confirm my sentiment,
and to refute your view, as I
understand it.
I prove, then, that those qualities
are supernatural. First, from Colossians
3, and Ephesians 4. Whatever things we
have, from regeneration, by the
spirit of Christ, are supernatural.
But we have, from regeneration, by the
Spirit of Christ, "the knowledge
of God, righteousness and true holiness."
Therefore, they are supernatural. If
any one says that we do not have them,
in substance, from regeneration, but
only a renewal of the same qualities,
which had previously been made
corrupt, I do not see how that assertion can
be proved. For the phrases of the
apostle teach another doctrine. For he who
must "put on the new man,"
is not clothed with the "new man," or with any
part of him. But to the new man,
pertain "righteousness and true holiness."
Then, in the case of him, who must be
"renewed in knowledge," it is not his
knowledge which has become corrupt and
must be renewed, but his
intelligence, which must be
enlightened with new knowledge, which has been
utterly expelled by the darkness of
the old man. I designed this, only, in
my argument, and not to define the
image of God in man. But I cannot see
that I differ from the view of the
apostle in my explanation. For the
knowledge of God, in the passage
quoted by me, is the "image of God" itself,
and "after the image of
God." Nor are these expressions at variance with
each other, nor are they so absurd as
you wish them to appear. You say "the
image of God is knowledge, according
to the image of God, therefore, the
image of God is denied to be either
knowledge or image." I deny this
sequence if the definition is rightly
understood, namely, in the following
manner. The image of God, renewed in
us by the regenerating Spirit, is the
knowledge of God, according to the
image of God, in which, at the beginning,
we were created. This image has a
two-fold relation, in that it is created
anew in us by the Spirit of Christ,
and that it was formerly created in us
by the Spirit of God. That knowledge
differs not only in mode, but in its
whole nature, from the knowledge of
the old man: nor is it said to be
renewed, but the man is said to be
renewed in it. But I confess that I
cannot understand how knowledge is an
act of the image of God, and how that
image is the fountain or principle of
that act, that is of knowledge. For I
have hitherto thought that man was
said to be created in or to the image of
God, that is, because, in mind, will,
knowledge of God, righteousness and
finally holiness, he refers to God
Himself, as the archetype. In the other
passage from Ephesians 4, I do not
find the three characteristics, "truth,
righteousness and holiness," but
only two, righteousness and holiness, to
which is ascribed truth, that is,
sincerity, purity, simplicity. Knowledge,
also, is not a member or portion of
that truth, but a gift, created in the
intellect or mind of man, as righteousness
and holiness are ingenerated in
the will, or rather the affections of
man.
Secondly, I prove that the same
qualities are supernatural in this way.
Those things, according to which we
are, and are said to be, partakers of
the divine nature, and the children of
God, are supernatural: but we are,
and are said to be partakers of the
divine nature, and children of God,
according to knowledge, righteousness
and holiness; therefore, these are
supernatural. The Major does not need
proof. The Minor is evident from a
comparison of the first, second,
third, and fourth verses of 2 Peter 1.
Thirdly, those things which have their
limit in supernatural felicity, are
supernatural; but the knowledge of
God, righteousness and holiness are such;
therefore, they are
supernatural.
Fourthly, the immediate causes of
supernatural acts are supernatural. But
the knowledge of God, righteousness
and holiness, are the immediate causes
of supernatural acts: therefore they
are supernatural. I now come to your
arguments, in which you attempt to
show that the image of God in man is
natural, and that those qualities,
knowledge, righteousness and holiness,
are natural, not supernatural.
Your first argument is this:
Supernatural qualities were removed, natural
qualities were corrupted. But truth,
righteousness, holiness, were not
removed, they were corrupted;
therefore, they are not supernatural, but
natural. Your first argument is this:
Supernatural qualities were removed,
natural qualities were corrupted. But
truth, righteousness, holiness, were
not removed, they were corrupted;
therefore, they are not supernatural, but
natural. Your Minor is defended thus.
The principles of these qualities are
in us by nature; they would not be, if
they had been removed. I reply—that I
admit the Major; but the Minor does
not seem at all probable to me, not even
by the addition of that reason. For, I
affirm that the knowledge which is
according to piety, the righteousness
and the holiness, of which the apostle
speaks, were not corrupted, but
removed, and that none of the principles of
those qualities remain in us after the
fall. I acknowledge that the
principles and seeds of the moral
virtues, which have some analogy and
resemblance to those spiritual
virtues, and that, even those moral virtues
themselves, though corrupted by sin,
remained in us after the fall. It is
possible that this resemblance may
mislead him who does not accurately
discriminate between these moral and
those spiritual virtues. In support of
this sentiment, in which I state that
those gifts were taken away, I have
the declaration of the Catechism, in
the answer to question nine, in these
words:
"Man deprived himself and all his
posterity, of those divine gifts." But an
explanation of the nature of those
divine gifts is given in the sixth
question, namely, "righteousness
and holiness." I know not but that I have
the support of your own declaration on
this point. For in the eighteenth of
your Theses, Concerning Original Sin,
discussed in 1594, are these words:
"For, as in Adam the form of
human integrity was original righteousness, in
which he was made by God, so the form
of corruption, or rather of deformity,
was a deprivation of that
righteousness."
In the nineteenth Thesis, "The
Scripture calls the form, first mentioned,
the image and likeness of God."
In the twentieth Thesis, "The Scripture
calls the latter form, the image and
likeness of Adam." If I rightly
understand these expressions, I think
that it plainly follows from them that
original righteousness was removed,
and that it is, therefore, supernatural,
according to the rule
"supernatural qualities were removed; natural
qualities were corrupted." I have also, in my favour, most, perhaps
all, of
the Fathers. Ambrose, in reference to
Elijah and his fasting, chap. 4th,
says, "Adam was clothed with a
vesture of virtues before his transgression,
but, as if denuded by sin, he saw
himself naked, because the clothing, which
he previously had, was lost," and
again in the seventh book of his
commentary on the 10th chapter of that
gospel, marking, more clearly, the
distinction between the loss of
supernatural qualities and the corruption of
natural ones, he speaks thus:
"Who are thieves if not the angels of night
and of darkness? They first despoil us
of the garments of spiritual grace,
and then inflict on us wounds."
Augustine, (De Trinitate, lib. 14, cap. 16,)
says, "Man, by sinning, lost
righteousness and true holiness, on which
account, this image became deformed
and discoloured; he receives them again
when he is reformed and renewed."
Again, (De civit. Dei. lib. 14, cap. 11)
he affirms that "free-will was
lost." To conclude this part of the
discussion, I ask what were those
spiritual qualities, which were renewed or
lost, if not the knowledge of God,
righteousness and holiness.
Another argument, adduced by you, is
this: "Whatever belongs to the species
is natural; But the image of God
belongs to the species; Therefore it is
natural." I answer, the Major is
not, in every case, true. For a quality may
pertain to the species either by a
communication through nature or natural
principles, or by an arrangement of
grace. That, which, in the former, not
in the latter, pertains to the
species, is natural. In reference to the
Minor, I affirm that the image of God
pertains to the species, partly
through nature, partly of grace;
therefore the image of God in man is partly
through nature, partly of grace;
therefore, the image of God in man is
partly natural, partly supernatural.
If you make any other inference, you
deduce a general conclusion from a
particular proposition, which is not
valid. If an addition be made to your
Major, so that, in its full form, it
should stand thus:
"Whatever is produced in the
species, and its individuals, by nature, is
natural," I will admit it as a
whole. But in that case, the Minor would not
be wholly true. For the image of God
is not promised in us wholly by nature,
for that part of it which is in truth
and righteousness, and holiness, is
produced in us by nature, but is
communicated by an act of grace, according
to the arrangement of grace. But it is
objected that the image cannot be
common, if it is not natural. For
natural qualities differ, in that they are
common, from those which are personal,
(the question refers not to
supernatural qualities). I answer a
thing is common in a two-fold sense,
either absolutely, according to
nature, or conditionally, according to the
arrangement of grace. The image of God
is common in part according to nature
and absolutely, in those things which
belong to man according to his
essence, and which cannot be separated
from his nature, and in part
conditionally, according to the
arrangement of grace, in those things which
pertain not to the essence but to the
supernatural perfection of man. The
former are produced in all men
absolutely, the latter conditionally, namely
that he should preserve those
principles, which are universal to the
species, and particular to the
individual, uncorrupted. Therefore, the whole
image is common, but partly by nature,
and partly of the arrangement of
grace; by nature, that part, which is
called natural; according to the
arrangement of grace, that part which
I call supernatural. This, also, is
according to the declaration of the
Scripture that Seth was begotten in the
image and likeness of Adam, not in the
image of God. He was indeed begotten
in the image of God, not as God
communicated it, in its integrity, to Adam,
but as Adam maintained it for himself.
But Adam maintained it for himself
not in its integrity, therefore, he
communicated it in that condition. But
that, which is in its integrity, and
that, which is not in its integrity,
differ, not only in mode and degree,
but also in some of the essential parts
of that image, which are possessed by
the image, in its integrity, and are
wanting to the image, not in its
integrity, which Adam had originally, by a
complete communication from God, and
of which Seth was destitute on account
of the defective communication from
Adam.
Your third argument is this: "The image of God is not said to be
produced or
created in us, but to be renewed or
restored, therefore, it was not lost or
removed, but corrupted."
I answer—Neither part of your
assumption is, in a strict sense, true; with
suitable explanation, both parts are
true, but neither of them is against my
sentiment. I will prove the former
assertion, namely, that neither part of
the assertion is true. We are said to
be "new creatures in Christ" and "to
be created to good works." David
prayed that God would "create" within him
"a clean heart." The image
of God is nowhere said to be restored and renewed
within us, but as we are said to be
"renewed in knowledge after the image of
God," "to be renewed in the
spirit of our mind," and "to be transformed by
the renewing of our mind." Yet,
with suitable explanation, both parts of the
assumption are true, but they are very
favourable to my sentiment, as I will
show. There are in us, in respect to
ourselves, two parts of the image of
God, one essential, the other
accidental to us. The essential part is the
soul, endowed with mind, affection and
will. The accidental is the knowledge
of God, righteousness, true holiness,
and similar gifts of spiritual grace.
The former are not said to be produced
or created in us, because it was
deformed and corrupt. The latter is
not said to be restored or renewed in
us, because, from a defect in the
subject, it has no place in us and not
because it was not corrupt and
deformed, but it is said to be produced and
created in us, (for we are called, on
its access, new creatures,) because it
resembles a mold, by the use of which,
that essential part is restored and
renewed. The words of the apostle plainly
set forth this idea, in which it
is affirmed not that the knowledge,
referred to, is renewed, but that we, as
partakers of the image of God so far
as it is essential to us, are said to
be renewed in knowledge, as in a new
mold, according to the image of God, so
far as it is accidental to us. Both
parts, then, of the antecedent are true.
For the image of God is restored and
renewed in us, namely, our mind and
will, and the affections of the soul;
and the image of God is produced and
created in us, namely, the knowledge
of God, righteousness, and true
holiness. The former is the subject of
the latter; the latter is the form,
divinely given to the former.
Therefore, also, the argument of Moses in
commanding the murderer to be slain,
is valid. For in man, even after
transgression, the image of God
remained, so far as it was essential to him,
or that part remained, which pertained
to the essence of man, though the
part, which was accidental, is removed
through sin.
We now discuss the action of the Deity, by
which we have both the natural
and the supernatural part of the image
of God. I have not made any
distinction in the act, both because I
wished to use the phraseology of
Scripture, according to which the word
creation signifies the act by which
man has in himself, the image and
likeness of God, for it speaks thus:
"Let us make man in our image,
after our likeness," and "so God created man
in his own image," and because
both parts equally well answered my purpose.
But, if the subject is considered with
accuracy, I think that a distinction
is to be made in those acts, and that
one is rightly termed creation, by
which man received natural qualities,
the other, superinfusion, by which he
received the supernatural. For life in
man is two-fold, animal and
spiritual; animal, by which he lives
according to man, spiritual, by which
he lives according to God. Of the
former, the principle is the soul in man,
endowed with intellect and will; of
the latter, the principle is the Spirit
of God, communicating to the soul
those excellent gifts of knowledge,
righteousness, and holiness. It is
probable that the principles of these
kinds of life, each so diverse from
the other, were bestowed on man, not by
the same, but by a different act. But
it is not important to my sentiment to
decide in what mode, whether by a
two-fold or a single act of God, man had
these qualities, only let it be
understood that he had both the former and
the latter, before God was employed concerning him in the act of
predestination; that is, he had them
in respect to the divine consideration.
I make the statement in general terms,
because those things, both natural
and supernatural, were conferred on
the whole species, the former
absolutely, the latter on the
condition that the species should preserve to
itself that principle. Hence, I
conclude, if it was conferred on the
species, then it was conferred by a
decree of providence, in
contra-distinction to predestination;
if it was conferred conditionally, it
was not conferred by a decree of
predestination, by which no gift is
conditionally conferred. It is now
evident from this that my argument is
valid. For if man was created by God,
under this condition, that he should
have, not only natural, but also
supernatural gifts, either by the same act
of creation, or by the additional act
of superinfusion, (in reference to
which I have never contended,) it
follows, then, that God, in the acts of
predestination and reprobation, which
separate men, could not have reference
to men, as considered in a merely
natural state. You also seem, afterwards,
to concede this, that man had
supernatural endowments, even in his primitive
state, but as an increment to nature,
and not from the act of creation,
which is the principle of nature. This
I concede, and from it make this
inference, since those things, which
the first man had, were possessed by
all his posterity in him, (for all
which he was, we also were in him,
according to the 40th Thesis of your
disputation concerning Original Sin,
previously cited,) the former, of
nature, the latter, of the arrangement of
grace, it follows that God could not,
in the decree under discussion, have
reference to man, considered in a
merely natural state, nor indeed, to man,
considered with supernatural
endowments, for a being of such character could
not be passed by, or at least was not
passed by, except from the fact that
it was foreseen that he would lose
those supernatural endowments by
transgression and sin.
Your assertion that these statements,
however true they may be, are not
opposed to that sentiment, which
considers man in general, is valid, if it
is proved that man was, or could be
considered universally by God in the act
of decree. But I think that my
arguments are valid, also, against that
sentiment. For if God could not
consider man in a merely natural state, if
not with supernatural endowments, if
not without sin, regarding him as the
object of the acts of predestination
and reprobation, then also he could not
consider the same being in a general
sense. For a general consideration is
excluded by the necessary
consideration of any particular circumstance,
which becomes the formal relation
(ratio) of the object, apart from which
formal relation God could not consider
man, when He was acting in reference
to man in that decree. Besides, how
can the general consideration yet have
place, when a circumstance, which that
general consideration comprehends
within itself, is excluded.
If what you say concerning "the
essential and the relative image" has this
meaning, that the essential image
comprehends truth and righteousness, and
holiness, and yet is entirely natural
to man, as may be deduced from some
things alleged by you, then I affirm
distinctly, that I cannot oppose it;
indeed, I think that I can prove the
contrary. But if you apply the phrase
"essential image" to all
which man has, essential to himself, according to
the image of God, I admit it. Then the
"respective" image will embrace what
I call supernatural and accidental.
But, as these things, with the premises
which I have laid down, do not tend to
refute my sentiment, I proceed to the
remainder of my argument.
My second argument is this, that no
love of God according to election, or
divine volition regarding human beings
variously, or divine actions varying
in reference to them, is found after
sin entered into the world, or after it
was considered as having entered. But
if this argument is valid, it also
refutes the sentiment, which states
that man was considered "in general."
For if there is no divine election and
reprobation of men except after the
entrance of sin into the world, then
man is considered, not "in general,"
but particularly, in reference to the
circumstance of sin. But you plead
"authority, reason, and
example." You plead "authority" from three passages
of Scripture, Romans 9, Ephesians 1,
and Matthew 25. Neither of these is
opposed to my view, since I do not
deny that election and reprobation were
made from eternity, and do not say
that sin was the cause of the decree, but
a condition requisite in its object.
The passage in Romans 9, is not adverse
to me; first, because Jacob and Esau
had been already conceived in sin, when
those words were addressed to Rebecca,
as is evident from the text. The
affirmative, that they had done
neither good nor evil, is to be understood
in reference to the distinction which
might be made between them, as is
explained by Augustine in many places.
The apostle then denies all reference
to sin, namely, to that by which any
distinction might be made between them,
not to that, of which they were both
equally guilty. Secondly, because he
attributes all things to the vocation
of God, who calleth, which is of
mercy, and has reference only to
sinners. Thirdly, because the "purpose of
God, according to election" which
states, "not of works," is a gracious
purpose in Christ, to the promise of
which reference is made in Romans iv.
16 "it is of fruit, that it might
be by grace, to the end the promise might
be sure to all the seed," that
is, of faith of, or in Christ, which pertains
only to sinners, for he, who has not
sinned, does not need faith in Christ,
since he obtains righteousness, and
thereby life, by the laws. Let this,
then, be the answer in reference to
this passage, if it is to be understood
of Esau and Jacob in their own
persons, without any typical meaning. But the
meaning of that passage is far
different, as could be proved, if it were
necessary.
I come, now, to the passage cited from
Ephesians 1. That passage is so far
from being opposed to my sentiment
that I shall hereafter use it as a strong
argument in my favour. Election is
here said to be "from eternity;" I grant
it. It is said to have been made
"in Christ;" I acknowledge it. It is said
to be "unto the adoption of
children by Jesus Christ;" I consent to it. I do
not, however, see that either of these
statements is opposed to the idea,
that sin is a condition, requisite in
the object of election and
reprobation. It is true that any
reference to ourselves, as a cause of our
own election, is denied.
Predestination precedes persons, in respect to
their actual existence, not as they
are considered by the Deity. It refers
to causes, before they actually exist,
but not before they are foreseen by
God from eternity, though, in the
foresight of God, they exist, not as the
causes of predestination, but as a
condition requisite in the object. In
Matthew 25, the blessed of the Father,
who shall possess the kingdom
prepared for them of the mere
benediction of God, are spoken of. But that
benediction is in Christ, by which the
malediction is removed, which even
the blessed themselves had deserved
according to the prescience of God,
before they were blessed in Christ;
and the kingdom, which was prepared for
them, by the blood of Christ, is a
kingdom, to which they are raised from
the ignominy and slavery of sin. If
you had thoroughly considered that,
which is really in controversy, you
would not have thought that those
passages could be used effectually
against me.
The reasons, adduced by you, are not
more adverse to my opinion, for they
oppose the sentiment which makes sin
the cause of the decree, not that which
makes it a condition, requisite in the
object. I will examine them. To the
first, I answer that my sentiment,
either as antecedent or consequent, is
not absurd, until it is proved to be
so. Your second and third reasons
change the state of the question. For
they exclude from that decree sin, as
a cause, on account of which God
adopted children unto Himself, or in view
of which He made the decree; in
reference to which there is no question. To
the second, I say, that the subject of
discussion, here, is the adoption
made in Christ, which pertains to no
one except by faith in Christ, to which
we are not begotten but begotten again
by God. From this it is proved, that
the adoption is of sinners, and of
sinners equally involved in sin, not of
men equal in nature. To the third, I
answer; --
In the first place, we must judge from
the word of God, what may be more,
and what may be less in accordance
with the wisdom and grace of God. In the
second place, I affirm that it is
equally in accordance with the wisdom and
grace of God, that He should adopt
unto Himself sons from those who are not
sinners as from those who are sinners,
and vice versa, if such should be His
choice. What you say in reference to
"the supposition of such consideration"
is aside from the subject. In the
third place, the wisdom and grace,
according to which God adopted
children unto Himself from among men in that
"hidden wisdom which God ordained
before the world unto our glory, which
none of the princes of this world
knew," which wisdom is "Christ crucified,
unto the Jews a
stumbling-block,"—and that grace, is that which is joined
with mercy, bestowed on the sinner,
and is in Christ. The latter tends far
more illustriously to the glory of God
than grace, as used in
contradistinction to mercy, and so
much the more, as he, who has deserved
evil, is more unworthy than he, who
has deserved nothing, either good or
evil. It has been shown before, that
the example of angels is not analogous,
but the reverse. For God determined to
secure the salvation of men and of
angels in different modes. The
relations, therefore, of predestination, in
the former, and in the latter case,
are diverse. God stamped His own image
on both, but with a different
condition, namely, that it should be preserved
in none, but restored in some, among
men. God so tempered, as Augustine
says, the natures of angels and of
men, that He might first show, in them,
what their own freewill could effect,
then what should be the beneficial
influence of His grace, preserving in
the case of angels, and restoring, in
the case of men. He showed in the case
of angels, namely, grace in
contradistinction to mercy. He showed
in men, the power of the latter grace,
namely, grace joined to mercy, and
both of his own eternal purpose. Since,
then, He did, in men, what He did not
in angels, and, in angels, what He did
not in men, and this from the decree
of predestination, I conclude that
there is one relation of divine
predestination in the case of angels, and
another in the case of men. Therefore,
there is no love of God towards men,
according to election, without the
consideration of sin. There was no
discussion between us in reference to
angels, and, in my argument, express
mention was made of men; whatever,
then, is proved concerning angels, has no
weight in the refutation of my
argument.
_________________________________________________________________
ELEVENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Secondly, of Election.
1. Election is said to have been made
in Christ, who was ordained as
mediator for sinners, and was called
Jesus, because He should save, not
certain individuals, considered merely
in their nature, but "His people from
their sins." He is said to have
been foreordained, and we in Him, and He, in
the order of nature and causes, before
us. He was ordained as saviour, we,
as those to be saved. But in Christ,
having such a character, and being
considered such as the Scripture
describes him to us, man could not be
considered in a merely natural state.
Much less, therefore, could he be
elected in Him.
2. Election is said to have been made
of grace, which is distinguished from
nature in a two fold manner, both as
the latter is pure and considered
abstractly, and as it is guilty and
corrupt. In the former sense, it
signifies the progress of goodness
towards supernatural good, to be imparted
to a creature naturally capable of it;
in the latter sense, it signifies the
ulterior progress towards supernatural
good to be communicated to man, as
corrupt and guilty, which is also, in
the Scriptures, called mercy. In my
judgment, the term grace is used, in
the latter sense, in the writings of
the apostles, especially when the
subject of discussion is election,
justification, sanctification, &c.
If this is true, then election of grace
was made of men considered, not in a
"merely natural state, but in sin."
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE ELEVENTH PROPOSITION
It is true, that election is made by
God the Father in Christ the Mediator;
but that the Mediator was ordained,
only for sinners, is not absolutely
true. Therefore, the inference is not
valid. Indeed, should its truth be
conceded, yet it has no weight against
those, who state that, in election,
reference was to man in general. But
that the Mediator was ordained, not for
sinners alone—to say nothing of that
Mediation, which is attributed to
Christ in creation and nature,
"all things were made by Him; and without him
was not any thing made that was made.
In Him was life; and the life was the
light of men." (John i. 3, 4,)
"by whom also He made the worlds." (Heb. i.
2, &c.) -- I demonstrate most
completely by a single argument.
Christ is Mediator for those, to whom
He was, from eternity, given as Head
by the Father; -- He was given as Head
by the Father to Angels and men;
therefore, he is the Mediator for both
the latter and the former. But angels
did not sin; he was not, then,
ordained Mediator for sinners only. Let us
discuss each point, if you please,
separately, that we may more fully
understand the subject.
When we speak of the Head, we consider
three things, according to the
analogy of nature; its position, by
which, in fact, dignity, and authority,
it holds the first place in the whole
body; its perfection, by which it
contains all the inward and outward
senses, in itself, as their fountain and
the principle of motion; finally its
power, by which all power, feeling,
motion and government is accustomed to
flow from it to the other members.
According to this idea, Christ is
indeed the Head, in common, of all created
things; the Head, I say, of superior
nature, and of interior nature, and of
all those things which are in nature.
We transcend this universal relation,
when we contemplate the Head, as
appointed from eternity. Angels and men
are, after God, capable of eternity;
and to both Christ was given eternally,
by the Father, as the Head, not only
that they should exist forever, (which
is the attribute of spiritual nature)
but also, and this is specially of
grace, that they should be forever
heirs of eternal glory, as sons of God,
heirs of God, and joint-heirs with
Christ. The latter were ordained of God,
by the adoption of grace in Christ
Jesus, all to one end, namely, to the
sight, the enjoyment, and announcement
of the glory of God, and of them was
constituted the mystical body of
Christ, the celestial church. Finally, as
in all this life, that is the head of
a living creature, from which power,
feeling and motion flow into the
members of the body, so in all that eternal
life, the body grows by the influence
of Christ, its Head, and each of the
members obtain immutability of life,
that is, eternity from this fact, that
they subsist in Christ, their Head,
apart from whom they would be dissolved.
But Christ, is the Mediator by the
relation in which he is the Head of
angels and men, for, as Head, he’
joins them to Himself; as Mediator, he
joins them to the Father. That Christ
is Head and Mediator, is in fact, one
and the same thing, only that the
divinity intervenes in the relation, since
He is called the Head, as to our relation
to Himself; and Mediator as to our
relation to the Father.
"But," it may be said, "he did not redeem the angels
as he redeemed us. This indeed is
true; but Mediator and Redeemer differ
from each other, as genus and species.
To angels, Christ is Mediator of
preservation and confirmation; but to
us, he is Mediator, also, of
redemption and of preservation from
that from which we have been redeemed.
So he is styled Mediator for both,
though in a different mode. The Major,
then, of my syllogism is true, that
"Christ is the Mediator of those to whom
he was appointed from eternity as
their Head." But that He was appointed,
both to angels and men, as their Head,
and therefore, as Mediator, is taught
by the apostle in Colossians 1, when
he affirms of Christ that he "is the
image of the invisible God," that
is, He represents God the Father, in his
word and work, chiefly to those whom
the Father has given to him, as their
Head and Mediator; "the first
born of every creature," namely, every one
whom God has, of His grace,
predestinated to adoption, and begotten then,
that they might be His children; for
there is a comparison of things which
are homogeneous, and so the passage is
to be understood. Then, explaining
both those attributes, he subjoins,
first, in general terms, "For by Him
were all things created that are in
heaven, and that are in earth visible,
and invisible," (but he explains
these things, to take away the plea of the
angel worshipers, whom he assails in
this epistle,) "whether thrones or
dominions, or principalities, or
powers; all things were created by Him and
for Him, and He is before all things,
and by Him all things consist;" and
then, with particular reference to the
glorious body of which He is
precisely the Head and Mediator,
"and He is the Head of the body, the
church," who, in the confirmation
of grace is "the beginning," but in
redemption, is "the first-born
from the dead," the common end of all, which
is "that in all things he might
have the pre-eminence." The cause, is the
decree of the Father, predestinating
His Son for the adoption of His
children, "for it pleased the
Father that, in Him, should all fullness
dwell, and having made peace through
the blood of His cross to reconcile all
things to Himself;" &c. He
sets forth this idea still more clearly, when,
warning them from the worship of
angels under the pretense of philosophy, he
says, "for in Him dwelleth all
the fullness of the Godhead bodily. And ye
are complete in Him, which is the Head
of all principality and power," that
is, of angels to the worship of whom,
they were solicited. For, of every one
soliciting them to the worshipping of
angels, he afterwards affirms that
they do not hold the "Head, from
which all the body, by joints and bands
having nourishment ministered and knit
together, increaseth with the
increase of God." To the same
purpose is Ephesians 1.
It is then to be stated, generally,
that he was ordained to be Mediator for
sinners, but not for them only, since
he is also Mediator for the angels,
who have maintained their original
purity, but he is ordained as Redeemer
for sinners only. We may be able to
express this very idea in another mode,
if we say that he was ordained Mediator, both for those, who could sin,
that
they might not sin, and for those, who
had sinned, that they might be saved
from their sins. Both modes of
interpretation tend to the same result. The
same is the case with the name Jesus.
But what need is there of many words?
We say that he was ordained as
Mediator both for those who stood and for
those who fell, as Redeemer only for
those who fell; for those who stood,
that they might remain, standing, and
for those who fell, that they might
rise again, and remain standing. From
which it follows, a mode of
argumentation, plainly the same, being
preserved, that when election is said
to have been made in Christ, God had
reference to man, considered generally,
as not yet created as created in a
natural state, as standing and as having
fallen, but this is the same thing as
being considered in a merely natural
state, which you deny. The same
argument applies to what follows.
I come to your second argument. You
say "Election is said to have been made
of grace," and further, that
"grace is spoken of in a two-fold sense, when
it is used in opposition to nature,
and that it is to be taken, in the
latter sense, in this argument,"
and you conclude that, "the election of
grace was made of men, considered not
in a natural state, &c." Do you not
see, my brother, that your conclusion
is unsound, involving the fallacy of
division, and that it is also
equivocal? For, in the Major, grace is used
collectively or generally, but in the
Minor distributively; in the former,
it is used simply, as to its essence,
in the latter, an accident is taken
into account, namely, the different
modes of the object, which do not affect
the essence of grace. Why shall we not
rather argue in this manner? Election
is of grace; -- grace has reference to
those, whom it establishes in good,
and to those whom, saved from evil, it
restores to good; election, then, has
reference to the same. That, which is
stated in general terms, should be
applied in general terms, for this,
both nature and reason demand, unless
there is a positive restriction in the
necessity of the subject, or there be
some limitation by an adjunct. That
election is used in a general sense, is
most clearly evident from a comparison
of angels and men. You say, that
grace is used, in the latter
signification, in the writings of the Apostles
in this and similar arguments. This
may be correct, but this is not affected
by a restriction of the term grace, which in God and of God, embraces
all
things, but by a restriction of the
object kata ti the restriction is in the
object, that is, in man, not in that
which is added or granted to him. What,
if a farmer should command his servant
to cultivate a field, which field
needed first to be cleared, then
plowed, and lastly to be sowed, &c., would
you, then, restrict the word cultivate
to one of these processes? That,
which is general or common, remains
general or common, and its generality
may not be narrowed down by any
particular relations of the object.
Therefore, as you see, this
consequence, deduced from faulty reasoning, is
not valid, nor is that, which is
stated in general terms, to be restricted
to particular circumstances.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF THE
ELEVENTH PROPOSITION
The two arguments advanced by me, as
they are most conclusive, so they
remain unaffected by your answers. I
prove this, in reference to the first.
Its strength and force consists in
this, that the election of men is said to
have been made in Christ, as the
Mediator between God and sinful men, that
is as Reconciler and Redeemer, from
which I argued thus: Whoever are elect
in Christ, as Mediator between God and
sinful men, that is, as Reconciler
and Redeemer, they are considered by
God, electing them, as sinners; -- But
all men, who are elect in Christ, are
elect in Christ, as Mediator between
God and sinful men, that is, as
Reconciler and Redeemer; Therefore, all men,
who are elect in Christ, are
considered by God, electing them, as sinners.
The Major is plain. For, in the first
place, they, who are not sinners, do
not need a Reconciler and Redeemer.
But election is an act, altogether
necessary to those who are elected. In
the second place, Christ himself is
not considered by God as Mediator of
Redemption, unless in view of the fact,
that he is ordained as such for those
who have sinned. For the divine
foresight of sin preceded, in the
order of nature, the decree by which its
ordained that His Son should be the
Mediator, appointed to offer in the
presence of God, in behalf of men, a
sacrifice for sins. In the third place,
the election of men by God is made only
in the Mediator, as having obtained,
by his own blood, eternal
redemption.
The Minor is evident. For since Christ
is the Mediator between men and God,
only as Reconciler, Redeemer, and the
advocate of sinners; Mediator, I say,
who, by the act of His Mediation,
affords salvation to those, for whom he is
Mediator. (1 Tim. ii. 5 & 6; Heb.
viii. 6 &c.; ix, 15; xii, 24.) Hence
follows the conclusion, since the
premises are true, and consist of three
terms, and are arranged in a legitimate
form.
Let us now examine your arguments in
opposition to what I have adduced. You
affirm that Christ is not ordained as
Mediator for sinners only, and
therefore, my conclusion is not valid.
Let it be conceded that your
antecedent is true, yet it does not
follow that my conclusion is not valid.
For, in my premises, I did not assert
that Christ was ordained Mediator only
for sinners, nor are the questions
discussed between us, -- of what beings
is Christ the Mediator—when spoken of
universally—and in what modes. But I
spoke of Christ, as ordained a
Mediator for men in particular, and affirmed
that he was ordained Mediator for
them, only as sinners; for he was ordained
Mediator to take away the sins of the
world. The subject of discussion,
then, in the mode in which he is the
Mediator for men. Here, you commit two
fallacies, that of Irrelevant
conclusion [ignoratio elenchi], and that of
reasoning from a particular case to a
general conclusion, [a dicto secundum
quid, ad dictum simpliciter]. I speak
of Christ’s Mediation as pertaining to
a particular case, namely, as
undertaken for man, you treat of his
Mediation, as simply and generally
considered. But you rightly separate the
consideration of the mediation, which
is attributed to Christ, in creation
and nature, for the latter is,
entirely, of another kind and mode. According
to this, he is the Mediator of God to
creatures; according to that, of
creatures to God. The one, refers to
all creatures, the other, only to
those, made in the image of God. The
one tends to the communication of all
natural and created good to all
creatures, the other, to the bestowment, on
rational creatures, of a participation
in infinite and supernatural good.
You, indeed, prove that he was
ordained Mediator, not for sinners only, but
without any necessity. For this is not
the question between us. The point to
be proved by you, was that he is the
Mediator of men, not of sinners, which
I know that you would not wish to
attempt, as a different doctrine is taught
in the Scriptures. Yet, let us examine
the argument. He was ordained as
Mediator also for the angels; --
But the angels did not sin; --
Therefore, he was not constituted Mediator
only for sinners. I may concede all
this, for it weighs nothing against my
argument, since I have not said in
general terms, that Christ was ordained
only for sinners. I restricted his
Mediation to men, to the work of their
salvation, to the mode in which salvation
was obtained for them. Hence, if
this be true, I conclude that my
argument remains firm and unmoved, in which
I proved that, in Christ as the
Mediator of men before God, only sinners
were elected.
I wish that we might always remember
that there is no controversy between us
concerning the election of angels or
the mediation, by which they are saved,
and that we are treating only of the
election and reprobation of men, and of
the mode of mediation by which they
obtain salvation, for it will be
perceived that statements, which,
taken generally, are not true, may be, in
the highest degree, true, when applied
to the particular case of mankind.
There is, then, no need of considering
those things, which are said
concerning Christ as the Mediator of
angels. If, however, I may be permitted
to discuss even this point, I may ask
for the proof of your Major, in which
you affirm that "Christ is
Mediator for those to whom he was given, as Head,
by the Father." I think that I
have good reason for denying your postulate.
For, in Philemon 2, Christ is said to
have received "a name which is above
every name, that, at the name of
Jesus, every knee should bow, of things in
heaven, because he, "being in the
form of God, humbled himself and became
obedient unto death, even the death of
the cross." Here we see that the
reason of his being constituted the
Head, even of heavenly things, was this,
that, by his own blood and death, he
might perform the functions of Mediator
for men before God. If he was the
Mediator for angels, then this fact, and
not the former reason, should have
been alleged, in this passage, for his
appointment as Head, even of
angels.
These two terms, Head and Mediator,
seem to me to have an order and
relation, such that the appellation of
Mediator pertains to Christ in a
prior relation, and that of had in a
posterior relation, and the latter,
indeed, on account of the former. For,
by the act of Mediation, he acquires
for himself the right of dominion, the
possession of which the Father
delivers to him, when He bestows the
title of Head upon him. This is
implied, also, in the distinction used
in schools of Divinity, Christ is
Mediator by merit and by efficacy. By
merit first, then by efficacy. For by
his merit, he prepares for himself a
people, the blessings necessary for
their happiness, and the right and
power of imparting those blessings to his
own people; from which are derived the
titles Head, saviour, Leader, Prince,
and Lord; in accordance with which
titles, there flows, of his own efficacy,
to his own people, an actual
communication of those blessings, which he
obtained by the merit of his death.
For in Hebrews ii. 16, it is said that
Christ: "took not on him the
nature of angels; but he took on him the seed
of Abraham." Now, if the
statement, made by our divines, is true—that this
assumption of nature was made that he
might be able to perform the functions
of Mediator for those whose nature he
assumed, you perceive that the
conclusion is valid, that since
"he took not on him the nature of angels,"
he did not perform the functions of
Mediator for them. To this add, that it
is very frequently said, by our
Theologians that Christ is Mediator only as
he stands between God and men, which
assertion they refer to his human
nature, taken into a personal union by
the Word, that he might, in this way,
stand between both, partaking, with
the Father, of the Divine nature, and
with us, of human nature. Hence, also,
he is called Emmanuel in a twofold
sense, first, because he is God and
man in the unity of his person, and
secondly, because, being such, he has
united God and men in the office of
Mediation. But he does not stand
between God and angels. Consider, also, the
declaration of Heb. v. 1, "every
high priest taken from among men is
ordained for men in things pertaining
to God." But Christ was not taken from
among angels, therefore, he was not
ordained for angels in things pertaining
to God. Indeed, I affirm, with
confidence, that there was nothing to be
done, by the way of any mediation for,
or in behalf of angels before God. I
add, also, that a Mediator should not
be inferior in nature to those for
whom he acts in that capacity. But
Christ, in his human nature, was made "a
little lower than the angels, for the
suffering of death. (Heb. ii. 9.)
Therefore, he is not Mediator for
angels. Finally, I remark, angels are
"ministering Spirits sent forth
to minister for them who shall be heirs of
salvation." (Heb. i. 14.)
"Unto the angels hath He not put in subjection the
world to come," but unto Christ
Jesus primarily, and unto all his brethren,
secondarily, whose nature he
sanctified in himself, and exalted with himself
to that dignity. Therefore, Christ is
not the Mediator of angels. But the
inquiry may be made, Cannot Christ,
then, be said in any manner to be
Mediator for angels? I answer;
--
The term mediator may be applied in a
two fold manner, either in behalf of
creatures to the Deity, or of the
Deity to creatures. I deny that Christ is
Mediator in behalf of the angels
before God, but I do not deny he is
Mediator for God to angels. For this
coincides with the appellation of Head,
which I confess belong to Christ, in
respect to angels, though in a relation
different from that, by which he is
the Head of believers. For the union,
which exists between Christ and
believers of the human race, is more strict
and close, than that which exists
between him and angels, on account of the
consubstantiality of his human nature
with that of men, from which angels
are alien. But enough on these points.
Whether they are, as I have stated
them, or not, it affects, neither
favourably nor unfavourably, my argument,
but you entirely agree with me when
you say that he was ordained as Redeemer
only for the fallen. From this, also,
I infer the truth of my sentiment. Men
are elected in the Redeemer, only as
fallen; for they are not elected that
they should remain standing, but that
they should rise again, and then
remain standing, as you have rightly
observed. But how can you infer, that,
since election is made in Christ, the
election, I say, of men, in Christ,
the Redeemer, (for those words are to
be supplied), it follows that God had
respect to men, in general, considered
generally as not yet created, as
created in their natural state, as yet
standing and as fallen. I think that
the contrary can, and must be
inferred. Therefore, God, in election, had
reference to man, only as fallen. For,
in election, He regarded man in the
Redeemer, and the Redeemer is such
only of the fallen.
As to the latter argument, the form of
the answer is the same. I do not use
the word grace equivocally; I do not
use it at the same time collectively
and distributively. I admit that it is
used in a two-fold sense, for the
grace of preservation and restoration;
I admit that it is used collectively,
and absolutely, particularly and
concretely, that is, the grace of
preservation and restoration. But,
what then? If I use a word, which has a
general and equivocal sense, is
equivocation, therefore, at once, to be laid
to my charge? But I have used that
word, at all times in this discussion, in
the same way, namely, as referring to
the grace by which some men are
elected. It is that grace by which
restoration and its means are prepared,
not that by which preservation and its
means are appointed. For the latter
grace was not bestowed on human
beings.
From the former grace alone, all they,
who are saved, obtain their
salvation. In the Major of my
syllogism, grace is spoken of in a particular
relation, and in the Minor, it is used
in the same way, and, neither in the
former nor in the latter, is it used
in a general sense, as the following
syllogism will show. They who are
elected according to the grace of
restoration, which is joined with
mercy, having place only in reference to
sinners, are considered by Him, who
elects, as sinners; But all men, who are
elected, are elected according to the
grace of restoration, which is joined
to mercy, having place only in
reference to sinners; -
Therefore, all men, who are elected,
are considered by Him, who elects, as
sinners. Grace is spoken of,
throughout, particularly and relatively in
respect to men, and in no case, is it
used generally or absolutely. Indeed,
it cannot be used generally or
absolutely when it has reference relatively
and particularly to election, whether
of angels or of men. For neither these
nor those are elected or saved by
grace, taken absolutely, but both by grace
used relatively, angels by the grace
of preservation, men by the grace of
restoration.
When, however, we treat of election
universally and abstractly, we must
discuss the subject of grace, as its
cause, universally, absolutely and
abstractly; for, to a genus, general
attributes are to be ascribed, which
may be afterwards applied to the
species after their several modes. Your
argumentation, then, is aside from our
controversy. Election is of grace;
grace respects those, whom it
establishes, and those whom, saved from evil,
it restores to good. Therefore,
election has reference to the same persons.
For we do not now discuss election in
general, and absolutely, if so, the
word grace, according to correct
usage, must be understood in a general
sense. But we discuss the election of
men; therefore, the general term grace
must be restricted to that grace,
according to which men are elected. It is
not, therefore, proper to say that
"grace has reference to those whom it
establishes in good," for the
grace, of which we here treat, does not refer
to those whom it establishes in good,
for grace established no one of the
human race, it only restored those, to
whom it had reference. But you say
that the grace, which establishes in
good, and that, which restores, are one
in essence, and only distinguished and
restricted in relation to the object.
What if I should concede this? My
conclusion will still be valid. The
question between us has reference to
the object and its formal relations by
which relation you say that grace is
distinguished and restricted. But that
restriction of the object has only
this force, that the grace, which,
according to your assertion, is one in
essence, must unfold itself and be
applied to a sinner, and to one not a
sinner, in a different mode; and
indeed must use acts of a different
character in the two cases. There is,
then, a restriction in "that
which is added or granted," but it is a
necessary consequence of the
restriction of the object. This distinction,
then, is sufficient for the conclusion
which I desire.
The question is not concerning objects
of election, essentially different
from each other, but concerning
different modes of considering an object,
which is one and the same in essence,
and concerning a different formal
relation. I will illustrate it by a
simile. Justice in God is one in
essence, namely, giving to each one
that which is due to him; to him who is
obedient, what pertains to him,
according to the divine promise, and to the
sinner that which pertains to him,
according to the divine threatening. But
from the fact that justice renders the
retribution of punishment an object,
it is necessarily inferred that the
object is worthy of punishment, and was,
therefore, liable to sin; so likewise
with grace. Grace then is one in
essence, but varies in its mode; one
in principle and end, but varied in its
progress, steps and means: one, when
taken absolutely and in general, but
two-fold, when taken relatively and
particularly, at least in respect to
opposite and distinct matters. But in
the whole of this course of reasoning,
I have used the term grace, in a
particular relation, as it is varied in
mode, progress, steps and means, and
as it is taken relatively and
distributively. No equivocation, then,
has been used in this; there is no
reasoning from general to particular,
from the abstract to the concrete.
But, though, all these statements be
true, they avail nothing, you affirm,
against those who state that mankind
in general were regarded in election.
These arguments, indeed, prove that
mankind in general could not have been
regarded in election, or at least that
such was not the case. For if man was
considered in general, then he was
elected by grace, taken in a general
sense. For a general effect requires a
general cause. But man was elected,
not by grace considered generally, but
by grace considered particularly,
relatively, and distributively, with
reference to the circumstance of sin.
If man was considered in general, then
he was elected in the Mediator not
considered generally, but considered
particularly as Redeemer. Therefore, in
election, man was not considered in
general, but with restriction to the
circumstance of sin, which was to be
proved. The illustration of the field
to be cultivated, is not against this
view, indeed it is in its favour. For
if a farmer should command his son to
cultivate a field, which was overrun
with briars, and, therefore, required
culture joined with clearing, then the
word cultivate, though, when taken in
a general sense, it is not restricted
to clearing, yet, when applied to that
particular field, it necessarily
includes that act. Hence we infer,
that, if a field cannot be cultivated
without the act of clearing, it is,
therefore, overrun with briars and
weeds, and, by analogy, if a man can
not be saved without the act of
restoration, he is, therefore, a
sinner; for a sinner only is capable of
restoration, and restoring grace is
adapted only to his case.
_________________________________________________________________
TWELFTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Thirdly, of Non-Election or
Preterition. Non-election or preterition is an
act of the divine pleasure, by which
God from eternity determined not to
communicate to some men supernatural
happiness, but to bestow on them only
natural or animal happiness, if they
should live agreeably to nature; --
But, in an act of this kind, God has
not to do with men considered in a
merely natural state; -- Therefore,
God does not pass by certain men,
considered in a merely natural state.
The truth of the Minor is proved; --
1. Because there is no natural
happiness of this kind, which is the end of
man, and his ultimate neither in fact,
for there has not been, and there is
not a man happy in this sense, nor in
possibility, derived from the decree
of God considered, either absolutely,
for no man will ever be thus happy
naturally, or conditionally, for God
did not design happiness of this kind
for any man on a condition, as the
condition must be that of obedience,
which God remunerates by supernatural
happiness.
2. Because sin is the meritorious
cause of that act of the divine pleasure,
by which He determined to deny, to
some, spiritual or supernatural
happiness, resulting from union with
Himself and from His dwelling in man.
"Your iniquities have separated
between you and your God." (Isa. lix. 2.)
Nor can that denial of happiness to
man be considered otherwise than as
punishment, which is necessarily
preceded by the act of sin, and its
appointment by the foresight of future
sin. These arguments may be useful
also in the discussion of other
questions.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWELFTH
PROPOSITION
Your definition of non-election or
preterition, (which Augustine calls also
reelection,) is by no means just, --
and this in three respects.
1. Since that, which is made a
difference, is not merely an accident. For if
the difference of the things defined
is only an accident, the definition is
not a good one. The essential
difference between election and reprobation
consists in adoption by Jesus Christ
unto God the Father, the accidental
consectary of which is supernatural
happiness. Ephesians 1, and Romans 8.
2. Because the thing defined is
referred, not to its primary end, but to one
which is secondary, which is
erroneous. The primary end of election is union
with God by adoption, but a secondary,
and, as we have said, accidental end,
is happiness.
3. Because the definition is
redundant; for an addition is made of something
positive, when you insert, in
parentheses, "but to be bestowed," &c., while
the definition itself is purely negative.
There is also a fault, and even an
error in that which is added. For
non-election or preterition does not
bestow natural happiness, but rather
supposes it; God does not, in that act,
bestow a gift on those on whom it
already has been bestowed. This we remark
concerning the Major.
The Minor is denied. God, in this act,
has reference to man in general,
therefore also, in this mode, He has
respect to the same general reference.
Thus you perceive that your whole
reasoning is false. To sustain your Minor
you use two arguments. The first is
designed to confirm that part of the
definition, which does not, as we have
asserted, belong to definition;
therefore, I need not notice it. Yet
since you afford the occasion, I shall
be permitted to make certain
suggestions. The argument denies that there is
any "natural happiness of this
kind, which is the end of man, and his
ultimate." If you speak here of
the depraved nature of man, I admit it; for
"an evil tree does not bring
forth good fruit," much less does it acquire
any goodness of itself. If you speak
of nature, in its purity, as it was,
originally, in Adam, I deny it. For,
to undepraved nature, pertained its own
future natural happiness, though it
was afterwards, so to speak, to be
absorbed, by the grace of God, in
supernatural happiness. This happiness was
the natural design of man and his
natural end. Do not all things in nature
seek their own good? But since nature
seeks not any thing which may not
exist, (it is foolish to seek that, which does
not exist, even in
possibility, and nature, the work of
an infinitely wise Architect, is not
foolish,) it follows that the good of
each thing exists by nature, in
possibility, if the thing does not attain
to it, and in fact, if the thing
does attain to it. But if the
condition of natural things is such, consider,
I pray you, my brother, how it can be
truly said of man that he is deprived
of natural felicity, and his natural
end, when all things, in nature, are in
a different situation. Surely, nature
could not be blind, in her most
excellent work, and see so clearly in
all her other works. But you say that
this fact never existed. I admit it,
for Adam fell out by the way; but it
was to exist in the future. You say
that it did not exist "in possibility."
This is an error, for God designed it
for Adam, on the condition of his
remaining in the right way. I prove
this from the words of God himself; "in
the day that thou eatest thereof thou
shalt surely die." (Gen. ii. 17.) What
is death? Is it not privation? What is
privation? Is it not of some natural
attribute or habit? Adam, then, was
deprived of natural life, and of that
happy constitution of life, which he
obtained in Eden, otherwise he would
have remained happy in it, if he had
continued in the discharge of duty,
until God had fulfilled in him the
promise of supernatural life, which was
adumbrated to him by the tree of life
in the garden of Eden. For, on the
contrary, it follows that, if he had
not e